Roe v. Johnson Cnty.
| Decision Date | 29 July 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:18-cv-2497-B-BN,3:18-cv-2497-B-BN |
| Parties | JOHN ROE, Plaintiff, v. JOHNSON COUNTY, TEXAS, ET AL., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
A plaintiff who identifies by the pseudonym John Roe, a former immigration and state-jail detainee, brings pro se claims, mostly for alleged civil rights violations, against various entities and individuals. See Dkt. No. 50 (first amend. compl.). His case has been referred to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and an order of reference from United States District Judge Jane J. Boyle [Dkt. No. 8].
Eight motions to dismiss Roe's amended claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) are now before the Court:
Many of the grounds for dismissal, most notably statute of limitations, overlap. This reason - and Plaintiff's casting his allegations under so many novel theories of liability but including so few specific facts (if any) to support each allegation - require the undersigned to generally address the motions together. Because the undersigned recommends leave to amend, this approach does not prejudice Plaintiff.
After considering the motions and the parties' extensive briefing, the undersigned enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation that, to the extent and for the reasons explained below, the Court should grant the eight motions to dismiss without prejudice to Plaintiff's filing, within a reasonable time that the Court sets, one final amended complaint that cures all deficiencies noted below, but the Court should require Plaintiff to move for leave to continue to prosecute this action anonymously and should deny the pending motion to strike made under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f).
Further details of Plaintiff's allegations will be discussed below as necessary to address his claims. But, briefly, Plaintiff was taken into immigration custody and detained in Johnson County in November 2015. He suffered a seizure there that month and was transported to a local hospital.
At the hospital, he alleges that he was sexually assaulted by a guard assigned to him. He reported the assault when he returned to the detention center. He was examined, and his wife filed a civil rights complaint with the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") related to the assault.
On December 1, 2015, he took a polygraph exam. The next day, he was arrested for making a false report to a peace officer and received related disciplinary sanctions. Also on that day, DHS agents interview him regarding his sexual assault outcry.
On either December 2 or December 3, he alleges that he was pepper-sprayed to force him out of his cell, after he refused to be taken to booking. He was then taken into segregation, where he alleges that he was prevented from contacting an attorney. And, after spending ten days in the criminal section of the jail, he posted bail and was transferred back to immigration detention.
On December 12, 2015, he was transferred to an immigration processing center in Pearsall, Texas, where he was detained for five weeks. He posted bail and was released from immigration custody on January 2, 2016. The state prosecution for making a false report nevertheless continued. And immigration authorities continued to investigate Plaintiff's sexual assault allegation.
On August 25, 2017, Plaintiff failed to appear for his trial on the state charge. On December 19, 2017, he was arrested, and an immigration detainer prevented his release from custody. After his return to custody, Plaintiff alleges that he was retaliated against, that his food was tampered with, and that he was pepper-sprayed a second time. He further alleges that, while he was in pretrial custody, the Johnson County Defendants and the LaSalle Defendants attempted to frame and entrap him.
In May 2018, he was found not guilty on the making-a-false-report offense. He was then taken back into immigration custody. And, on September 28, 2018, he received a response to his civil rights complaint - DHS's office of civil rights and civilliberties
As a preliminary matter, the Court should consider Plaintiff's use of a pseudonym. He has proceeded under the pseudonym John Roe based on an assertion that, "as a survivor of sexual assault, he may elect to conceal his true identity." Dkt. No. 50 at 1 n.1 (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 57.02). But he has voluntarily signed his actual name to pleadings and briefs multiple times. See, e.g., id. at 202.
"Article 57.02 speaks to the use of a pseudonym to protect a victim's identity on documentation and in judicial proceedings and applies only after the victim completes a specified form and returns that form to law enforcement." Cantu v. Rocha, 77 F.3d 795, 808 (5th Cir. 1996); cf. Johnson v. Sawyer, 47 F.3d 716, 734 n.37 (5th Cir. 1995) ( .
There is no evidence that Plaintiff has complied with the requirements of Article 57.02 or that Article 57.02 applies to this proceeding.
Even so, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently examined a district court's application of "three factors common to anonymous-partysuits that [the Court of Appeals has] said 'deserve considerable weight.'" Doe v. McKesson, 922 F.3d 604, 615 n.6 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 186 (5th Cir. 1981)). "These are: (1) whether the plaintiff is 'challeng[ing] governmental activity'; (2) whether the plaintiff will be required to disclose information 'of the utmost intimacy'; and (3) whether the plaintiff will be 'compelled to admit [his] intention to engage in illegal conduct, thereby risking criminal prosecution.'" Id. (quoting Stegall, 653 F.2d at 185).
The plaintiff in McKesson moved the district court to allow him to proceed anonymously. And some factors may weigh in favor of allowing Plaintiff to do so as well. But, because Plaintiff failed to move the Court for leave to proceed anonymously initially, if the Court accepts these findings, conclusions, and recommendation - and if Plaintiff elects to file a second amended complaint to cure the deficiencies discussed herein - the Court should require that, when he files the amended complaint, he also file a separate motion for leave to continue to proceed anonymously that "demonstrates a privacy interest that outweighs the 'customary and constitutionally embedded presumption of openness in judicial proceedings.'" Id. (quoting Stegall, 653 F.2d at 186); cf. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947) ().
In deciding a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the Court "accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff."In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205-06 (5th Cir. 2007). But a plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), and must plead those facts with enough specificity "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level," id. at 555.
"A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. "A claim for relief is implausible on its face when 'the well-pleaded...
To continue reading
Request your trial