Roe v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 91 C 1781.

• Decision Date: 21 August 1992
• Docket Number: No. 91 C 1781.,91 C 1781.
• Citation: 800 F. Supp. 620
• Parties: Richard ROE, Plaintiff, v. LITTLE COMPANY OF MARY HOSPITAL, a Corporation, Prabodh Shaw, M.D., Armour Pharmaceutical Co., a Corporation, Beringwerke AG, Hyland Division of Travenol Laboratories, Inc., a Corporation, Hyland Division of Baxter Health Care Corp., a Corporation Cutter Biological Division of Cutter Laboratories, Inc., a Corporation, Cutter Biological Division of Miles, Inc., a Corporation, Alpha Therapeutic Corp., a Corporation, Portion Speywood Ltd., a Corporation, Blood Systems, Inc., a Corporation, American Red Cross Blood Services, Inc., a Corporation, American Red Cross, a Corporation, Mid-America Region of American Red Cross, a Corporation, John O'Donoghue, M.D., Michael O'Donoghue, M.D., and Mary Rosenow, M.D., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

800 F. Supp. 620

Richard ROE, Plaintiff, v. LITTLE COMPANY OF MARY HOSPITAL, a Corporation, Prabodh Shaw, M.D., Armour Pharmaceutical Co., a Corporation, Beringwerke AG, Hyland Division of Travenol Laboratories, Inc., a Corporation, Hyland Division of Baxter Health Care Corp., a Corporation Cutter Biological Division of Cutter Laboratories, Inc., a Corporation, Cutter Biological Division of Miles, Inc., a Corporation, Alpha Therapeutic Corp., a Corporation, Portion Speywood Ltd., a Corporation, Blood Systems, Inc., a Corporation, American Red Cross Blood Services, Inc., a Corporation, American Red Cross, a Corporation, Mid-America Region of American Red Cross, a Corporation, John O'Donoghue, M.D., Michael O'Donoghue, M.D., and Mary Rosenow, M.D., Defendants.

No. 91 C 1781.

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, E.D.

August 21, 1992.

Robert Bruce Patterson, Drumke & Patterson, Ltd., Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff.

Joseph A. Camarra, Cassiday, Schade & Gloor, William J. Rogers, Bollinger, Ruberry & Garvey, Robert B. Austin, Jason Ayres Parson, Lord, Bissell & Brook, Ronald L. Lipinski, Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Graldson, Chicago, Ill., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

PARSONS, District Judge.

I. Background

In 1984, the plaintiff, Richard Roe,¹ underwent a surgical procedure at the Little Company of Mary Hospital for treatment and removal of an enlarged spleen. Prior to and subsequent to the splenectomy, Roe received transfusions of multiple units of blood, apparently some of which was contaminated with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus ("HIV") — the virus that causes AIDS.

Roe filed the instant lawsuit in the Circuit Court of Cook County. His complaint asserted causes of action for negligence against the doctors involved in the splenectomy, the hospital and the suppliers of the blood that he received. One of those blood suppliers, the defendant American Red Cross ("Red Cross"), then removed the case to the federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1991).

Roe then filed an objection to the removal of the instant case to the federal court. He asserted that this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the state negligence claims between these non-diverse parties. Roe also asserted that the simple fact that the Red Cross was created by federal statute does not mean that the instant case presents a question "arising under" federal law, so as to confer original jurisdiction in this Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1991).²

The Red Cross countered that the statutory charter granting it the power to "sue or be sued in courts of law and equity, State or Federal, within the jurisdiction of the United States"³ confers original subject matter jurisdiction in the federal courts. Indeed, the Supreme Court of the United States, in American National Red Cross v. S.G., ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 2465, 120 L.Ed.2d 201 (1992), determined that the "sue or be sued" language in the Red Cross' congressional charter was a statutory grant of subject matter jurisdiction in the federal courts "separate and independent" from jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331. S.G., ___ U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2472.

Under the Supreme Court's decision in S.G., the claim against the Red Cross in the instant case is properly within the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts. Under this condition, the Court must exercise jurisdiction over Roe's case insofar as it attempts to assert a claim against the Red Cross.

Nonetheless, in spite of the fact that the Court properly has subject matter jurisdiction over the claim against the Red Cross, Roe moves the Court to exercise its discretion under the statute governing the removal of cases to the federal courts codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1991) and remand the entire case, including that portion which relates to the claim against the Red Cross, back to the state court. Subsection (c) of that statute reads:

Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action within the jurisdiction conferred by section 1331 of this title is joined with one or more otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed and the district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all matters in which State law predominates.

28 U.S.C. § 1441(c). Roe asserts that this court does not properly have jurisdiction over the non-Red Cross defendants⁴ and must remand the case back to state court as it relates to them. But, in order to avoid piecemeal litigation, Roe insists that this Court should also transfer the case against the Red Cross as well.⁵ Thus the Court must determine first whether it can properly assert jurisdiction over the non-Red Cross defendants, and second, even if it can, whether the Court can and should exercise its jurisdiction under the removal statute to remand the case back to the state court in which it was first filed.

II. Analysis

Roe asserts that the entire action should be tried together before one court. In support of his position to remand the entire case, he explains that the claims between Roe and the different defendants are so "factually interrelated ... that concurrent litigation in the state court and federal court would be impractical and unduly burdensome on all parties." Thus in the interest of judicial efficiency, Roe asks that the entire case be returned back to the Circuit Court of Cook County. To determine whether and to what extent this case should be and can be remanded, the Court must determine: (A) the ability of this Court to exercise jurisdiction over the non-Red Cross defendants; and (B) whether it can exercise discretion and remand the case as a whole, even though it may have original jurisdictional authority over the Red Cross.

A. Supplemental Jurisdiction

In order to promote his position that the instant case should be remanded, Roe first asserts that this Court does not actually have adequate jurisdiction over the negligence claims filed against the non-Red Cross defendants. This assertion, however, is not necessarily accurate.

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (1991) provides (subject to certain exceptions not applicable here) that: in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy....

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).⁶ If the claims against the non-Red Cross defendants form part of the "same case or controversy" as the claim against the Red Cross, then the statute directs the Court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims.⁷ The Court must thus determine whether it properly can exert supplemental jurisdiction over the claims against the non-Red Cross defendants.

In order to exert supplemental jurisdiction, the Court would need to find that the facts leading to the claims of liability and the subsequent claims against the non-Red Cross defendants are part of the "same case or controversy" as Roe's claim against the Red Cross. In the process of making this determination, the Court must define this "same case or controversy" concept as it must be understood in the context of the supplemental jurisdictional statute.

The concept of "supplemental" jurisdiction in § 1367 was developed as a comprehensive codification of the former doctrines of "pendant" and "ancillary" jurisdiction. Section 1367, designed as it was to avoid piecemeal litigation, requires that the claims of the parties encompassed within the Court's exercise of "supplemental" jurisdiction must arise from the "same case or controversy."

Though few cases have interpreted this relatively recently enacted statute, the "Legislative History" contained at 7B Moore's Federal Practice, § 1367, p. JC-557, note 2, teaches that subsection (a) codifies the scope of pendant jurisdiction first articulated by the Supreme Court in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966).⁸ See also, "Practice Commentary," by David Siegel, appended to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

In Gibbs, a union was sued in federal court under both a federal law claim and a state law claim. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court grappled with the question of whether the federal courts had the jurisdictional power to hear the state law claim. Thus, the Supreme Court focused on the relationship between the federal and state law claims. The Supreme Court wrote that the federal courts have pendant jurisdiction over a state claim if the state and federal claims "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact." 383 U.S. at 725, 86 S.Ct. at 1138. In addition, the Supreme Court ruled that the exercise of pendant jurisdiction is proper if "plaintiff's claims are such that he would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding." Id. In determining supplemental jurisdiction, the Court is thus guided by the same "common nucleus of operative fact" and the same "expectation of a single forum" tests that are laid out in Gibbs in its "same case or controversy" analysis.

In the instant case, Roe's complaint alleges separate negligence claims against each defendant: the blood suppliers, by supplying tainted blood products; the physicians, by negligently prescribing blood product transfusion; and the hospital, by negligently supplying tainted blood products and failing to warn of its potentially contaminated condition. However, all of these claims are factually and logically intertwined. Roe asserts a single injury — an HIV infection — resulting from the allegedly negligent conduct of some or all of the defendants involved in his splenectomy in April of 1984.

Where, as here, there is a single wrong alleged by a plaintiff arising out of an interlocked series of transactions and giving rise to the relief that is sought, the Court should find that the claims against all of the...