Roe v. Office of Adult Probation, 3:96cv001 (DJS).
| Decision Date | 27 August 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:96cv001 (DJS).,3:96cv001 (DJS). |
| Citation | 938 F. Supp. 1080 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | Robert ROE, Plaintiff, v. The OFFICE OF ADULT PROBATION, et al., Defendants. |
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John P. Clifford, Jr., Eliot B. Gersten, Gersten & Clifford, Hartford, CT, for plaintiff.
Stephen J. O'Neill, Margaret Quilter Chapple, Attorney General's Office, Public Safety & Special Revenue, Hartford, CT, for defendants.
This cause is before the court on plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction. An evidentiary hearing was held before the court on February 22-23, 26, 29 and March 5. Based upon the evidence adduced at the hearing, the record in this case, and the reasons set forth below, the court finds that the plaintiff has demonstrated that an injunction is warranted.
Robert Roe was arrested in 1989 for sexual assault. In May, 1991, the plaintiff entered into a plea agreement in which he agreed to plead nolo contendere to six counts of sexual assault in the second degree in violation of Conn.Gen.Stat. § 53a-71 and six counts of risk of injury to a minor in violation of Conn. Gen.Stat. § 53-21. In August, 1991, the plaintiff was sentenced to twelve years imprisonment, execution suspended after six years, and a five-year term of probation. A newspaper article concerning the plaintiff's crimes and his sentence was published after the sentencing. Plaintiff remained incarcerated until August, 1994, when he was released on parole. A violation of a condition of plaintiff's release led to a parole revocation proceeding in December, 1994, after which plaintiff was returned to prison for eight months in order to complete his original sentence.
Plaintiff was released from prison in August, 1995, and, pursuant to his sentence, was placed under the supervision of the Office of Adult Probation ("OAP"). Defendant Ronald Cormier is plaintiff's assigned probation officer.
In 1994 the Connecticut General Assembly enacted a law regarding registration of persons convicted of sexual assault crimes. The law applied to individuals convicted of sexual assault, as that term is defined in the statute, "on or after January 1, 1995." Conn.Gen. Stat.Ann. § 54-102r.1 The statute required these individuals to follow certain registration requirements and mandated law enforcement agencies to maintain the registrations "for one year after such person's sentence termination date," unless the person is convicted of a subsequent sexual assault charge after his release. Conn.Gen.Stat.Ann. § 54-102r(f). The registration information was to be kept confidential and disclosed only to law enforcement officers. Conn.Gen.Stat.Ann. § 54-102r(g).
In 1995 the Connecticut legislature amended § 54-102r to, inter alia, provide for the release of information about a registered sexual offender to law enforcement agencies, governmental agencies conducting confidential background checks, or "to any specific person if such disclosure is deemed necessary by the chief of the police department or resident state trooper of the municipality to protect said person from any person subject to the registration requirement." Act of May 30, 1995, Public Act No. 95-142 § 10(g), 1995 Conn.Legis.Serv. 312, 317 (West). The class of persons to which the law applies, i.e., persons convicted of certain sex offenses on or after January 1, 1995, did not change.
Significantly for present purposes, Public Act 95-142 also mandates that the same class of offenders convicted "on or after the effective date of this act" who are serving a period of probation must "as a condition of such ... probation, immediately notify his ... probation officer ... whenever he changes his residence address." The probation officer then "shall notify the chief of police of the police department or resident state trooper for the municipality of the new address of the ... probationer and any other law enforcement official he deems appropriate." Id. § 6(b). The act goes on to declare that "nothing in this section or section 54-102r of the general statutes, as amended by section 10 of this act, shall be construed to prohibit a parole officer or probation officer acting in the performance of his duties and within the scope of his employment from disclosing any information concerning the parolee or probationer to any person whenever he deems such disclosure to be appropriate." Id. § 6(c).
Prior to 1995, the OAP had no policy or practice of notifying members of the general public of the criminal record of an offender under its supervision. Pursuant to § 6 of Public Act No. 95-142, the OAP promulgated a Sex Offender Notification Policy (the "Guidelines") which governed the manner in which "information on convicted sex offenders will be provided to police, victims and other relevant individuals and organizations in order to enhance public safety and awareness." (Second Am.Compl., Ex. C at 1). The Guidelines represent "minimum requirements," and "Probation Officers may exceed these requirements when, in their professional judgment, it is necessary to prevent or reduce the risk of the sex offender reoffending. Id. The enumeration of offenses to which the Guidelines apply is identical to those cases listed in sections 6 and 10 of Public Act No. 95-142 in which the conviction occurred after January 1, 1995. The Guidelines extend also to "persons convicted of similar offenses in other states" under the supervision of Connecticut's OAP as well as "any other person under supervision of the Office of Adult Probation and determined through clinical assessment to be a high risk sex offender." Id. The Guidelines do not define the term "high risk sex offender." Unlike the legislation, which is to be applied prospectively, the OAP decided to "go beyond the law" and apply its policy retroactively to all offenders within its jurisdiction, including those convicted prior to January 1, 1995. (Pl.'s Notice of Additional Exs., Ex. P.; Pl.'s Mem.Ex. H).
The Guidelines establish two levels of notification which purport to link the seriousness of the risk of an offender reoffending with the breadth of notification. The first level establishes that if an offender is within the OAP's definition of "applicable cases" the probation officer will provide information regarding the offender to victims, victims parents or guardians, police, the offender's immediate family members, other occupants of the offender's residence, and treatment providers, including those not providing sex offender treatment. The second level concerns notification of cases involving "pedophiles, predatory rapists and other extreme cases," classification of which is to be determined by clinical assessment. In such cases, the probation officer must, after consultation with a supervisor, provide notification to immediate neighbors, local schools, local day care providers, employers, officials of schools, training programs and other organizations in which the client participates and other groups determined to be "at risk" due to the client's activities or proximity.
Conn.Gen.Stat.Ann. § 53a-29(a) (West 1994). The court has broad discretion in setting the conditions of the defendant's probation term. The General Assembly lists several conditions for the court's explicit consideration and vests the sentencing judge with authority to impose "any other conditions reasonably related to the offender's rehabilitation." Conn.Gen.Stat.Ann. § 53a-30 (West 1994 & Supp.1995).
A defendant sentenced to a period of probation is placed under the supervision of the OAP. Id. § 53a-29(c). The OAP is a statutorily created department within Connecticut's judicial department, Conn.Gen.Stat. § 54-103a, the director of which is charged with supervision of the State's probation officers and the maintenance of "an efficient probation service in the superior court." Conn.Gen.Stat.Ann. § 54-105(a) (West 1994 & Supp.1995). The duties of probation officers under Connecticut law are to Conn.Gen.Stat.Ann. § 54-108. Connecticut law also authorizes the OAP to require a probationer to comply "with any or all conditions which the court could have imposed under 53a-30(a) which are not inconsistent with any condition actually imposed by the court." Conn.Gen.Stat. Ann. § 53a-30(b) (West 1994 & Supp.1995).
Plaintiff filed a Verified Complaint on January 2, 1996, along with an application for temporary relief pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 65. The complaint alleges that, although the plaintiff has complied with each condition of his probation, Defendant Cormier, his probation officer, has informed the plaintiff that Cormier intends to notify plaintiff's employer, neighbors and the general community of plaintiff's prior criminal record. This decision allegedly was made after an evaluation conducted by a William Hobson, who is a social service provider acting under contract to the...
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