Roe v. Richardson
| Docket Number | 3:21-cv-00125-JPG |
| Decision Date | 12 January 2022 |
| Parties | JOHN ROE, Plaintiff, v. MARVIN RICHARDSON, in his official capacity as acting director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, and MERRICK GARLAND, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the United States, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois |
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants' Marvin Richardson and Merrick Garland, [1] (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff John Roe's (“Roe” or “Plaintiff”) Complaint (Doc. 21). Plaintiff responded to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 24).
Plaintiff filed his Complaint in this Court on February 3, 2021 (Doc. 1). Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief to a series of questions he posed regarding drop-in auto sear (“DIAS”) that Plaintiff allegedly purchased around 1979 (Doc. 1 ¶ 4). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) Notice-and-Comment Requirements (Doc. 1 at ¶ ¶ 56-65). Plaintiff argues the questions contained in paragraph 68 of his Complaint require adjudicating (Doc. 1 at ¶ 68). Additionally, Plaintiff alleges this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act under 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). (Doc. 1 at ¶ 71).
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for “lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of standing, and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” (Doc. 21).
Plaintiff alleges he lawfully purchased a DIAS in the Southern District of Illinois around 1979 (Doc. 1 at ¶ 4). “On a firearm, a sear is the part of the trigger mechanism that holds the hammer back until the correct amount of pressure has been applied to the trigger.” (Doc. 21, p. 2). According to Plaintiff, a DIAS is an “aftermarket part.. .that would.. .make some, but not all, otherwise semi-automatic AR15 rifles.. .fire as a “machinegun” as that term was defined in 28 U.S.C. § 5845(b) .” (Doc. 1 at ¶ 5). Two weeks after Plaintiff purchased the DIAS, Plaintiff contacted the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”) to inquire as to the legality of the DIAS and was told the DIAS were lawful (Doc. 1 at ¶ ¶ 14, 16). ATF allegedly told Plaintiff the following:
...the DIAS by itself, was not prohibited or subject to the registration requirements of the National Firearms Act, as long as Plaintiff did not own compatible AR15 and M16 trigger parts, which Plaintiff did not possess, but that if Plaintiff were to acquire an AR15 or M16 parts, it was suggested that possession of both the auto sear and the AR15 and/or M16 parts might not be legal, if the group of items was not registered with ATF.
In 1934, the National Firearms Act (“NFA”) was enacted to target lethal weapons; imposing a tax on making and transferring firearms defined in the Act and requiring registration of these firearms.[2] 26 U.S.C. § 5845. The NFA defines a firearm to include a machinegun. See 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a)(6). The NFA further defines a machinegun as “any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger.” 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b).
In 1981, the ATF published Revenue Ruling 81-4 (“Ruling 81-4”) regarding DIAS. This ruling determined that DIAS manufactured after October 31, 1981 are considered machineguns and are therefore, regulated under the NFA. The entirety of the ruling is reproduced below.
ATF Rul. 81-4, [ATFQB 1981-3 78] (1981).
In 1986, the Title II of the Gun Control Act of the NFA (“Gun Control Act”) was enacted and amended the NFA to ban machineguns. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(23). Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), machineguns manufactured on or after May 19, 1986, may be only transferred or possessed by law enforcement, effectively banning private ownership of machineguns.[3]
In 2014, the ATF published an editor's note to Ruling 81-4 in the Federal Firearms Reference Guide (“Editor's Note”), which explained that unregistered DIAS, regardless of when it was manufactured, is illegal (Doc. 1 at ¶ 56). Specifically, the Editor's Note states as follows:
Regardless of the date of manufacture of a drop in auto sear (i.e., before or after November 1, 1981) the possession or transfer of an unregistered drop in auto sear (a machinegun as defined) is prohibited by the National Firearms Act (NFA), 26 U.S.C. § 5861, and the Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(o). The last paragraph of ATF Ruling 81-4 only exempts the making, transfer, and special (occupational) taxes imposed by the NFA with respect to the making, manufacture, or transfer of drop in auto sears prior to November 1, 1981. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801, 5811, 5821, 7805(b)(8).
U.S. Dep't of Just. ATF, Fed. Firearms Reg. Reference Guide, p. 126-27 (1988).
Plaintiff allegedly forgot about his DIAS until 2020 when he wanted to legally sell the DIAS. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 27). Plaintiff states that it would have been “an utterly futile act” to try to file an ATF Form 4[4] “because the ATF would summarily disapprove the Form 4, refund the $200.00 transfer tax, and refuse to register the auto sear to the buyer, whoever it might be, as the auto sear is not registered.” (Doc. 1 at ¶ 31). Specifically, under the NFA, firearms can only be transferred when the Attorney General has approved the transfer and registration. 26 U.S.C. § 5812(b). No other provisions allow for transfer of firearms. The NFA makes it unlawful for “any person” to “receive or possess a firearm which is not registered to him in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record.” 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d).
The crux of Plaintiff's Complaint is that he believes pursuant to Ruling 81-4, Plaintiff can legally continue to possess his DIAS while, on the other hand, the ATF and DOJ state that Plaintiff cannot legally do so (Doc. 1 at ¶ 66(B)). This leaves Plaintiff with a “conundrum” regarding conflicting laws (Doc. 1 at ¶ 66). Defendants move to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of standing, and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Defendants move to dismiss on the basis that this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's action. Specifically, Defendants argue neither 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and the Declaratory Judgment Act provide an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction (Doc. 21, p. 6).
Once jurisdiction has been called into doubt, the party asserting jurisdiction has the burden of proving that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction. Ware v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 6 F.4th 726, 731 (7th Cir. 2021). When deciding a facial challenge to jurisdiction, “the district court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations, and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Int'l Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators Loc. 17 Pension Fund v. CEC Env't, Inc., 530 F.Supp.3d 757, 760 (N.D. Ill. 2021) (cleaned up). The court may also “look beyond the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint and view whatever evidence has been submitted on the issue to determine whether in fact subject matter jurisdiction exists.” Id. Thus, “no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff's allegations, ” and the court is “free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case.” Id.
The Court agrees that the Declaratory Judgment Act and Section 1331 do not provide independent bases to confer jurisdiction. Manley v. L., 889 F.3d 885, 893 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950). Plaintiff states the Declaratory Judgment Act confers jurisdiction where “federal jurisdiction would exist in a coercive suit brought by the declaratory judgment defendant.” (Doc. 24, p. 2). Said differently, the Seventh Circuit states that “jurisdiction is determined by whether federal question jurisdiction would exist over the presumed suit by the declaratory judgment defendant.” Wisconsin v. Ho-ChunkNation, 512 F.3d 921, 935 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting GNB Battery...
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