Roe v. Roe

Decision Date16 September 1976
Docket NumberNo. 13245,13245
PartiesIrma ROE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. James A. ROE, Defendant and Appellant.
CourtMontana Supreme Court

Patrick F. Hooks (argued), Townsend, for defendant and appellant.

Gough, Booth, Shanahan & Johnson, Helena, Ward A. Shanahan (argued), Helena, for plaintiff and respondent.

HASWELL, Justice.

This is an appeal by defendant James A. Roe from a division of property in a divorce decree entered in the district court of Broadwater County. Defendant does not appeal from the grant of divorce to plaintiff Irma Roe, but contends that the district court abused its discretion in its division of property between him and plaintiff.

The facts of this case are not seriously in dispute, for the district court adopted the defendant's proposed findings of fact as its own, with certain exceptions not pertinent here.

Plaintiff and defendant were married in 1966. No children were born of this marriage, but both parties had children from previous marriages. At the time of the marriage, defendant owned a bar called the Pagan Room in Lewiston, Idaho, while plaintiff owned equity in a residence and a part interest in a lot in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho. In summary fashion, we will set forth the various family and business transactions which took place during the marriage.

Plaintiff sold her equity in the Coeur d'Alene residence and used it as a down payment on a residence for their family in Lewiston. The parties acquired a bar called the Martini Room in Lewiston. After defendant acquired an interest in plaintiff's Coeur d'Alene lot, that property was pledged as security for the money to start the Martini Room. The liquor license for the Pagan Room was in defendant's name, and the liquor license for the Martini Room was in plaintiff's name. Defendant managed the Pagan Room until its sale in 1969, and plaintiff managed the Martini Room until its sale in 1967. During this period, defendant opened an exhaust repair shop. After the sale of the Martini Room, plaintiff worked some shifts at the Pagan Room and also was employed as a bartender at a local hotel.

In 1971, defendant purchased the Mint Bar and Cafe in Townsend, Montana. The following properties were traded in this purchase: the Lewiston residence, the Coeur d'Alene lot, and the balance due on the Martini Room contract of sale. Defendant assumed further indebtedness in the transaction. Plaintiff is not a named party to the Mint contract nor is her name on the deed in escrow. Plaintiff worked part time at the Mint Bar periodically from 1971 to 1973. At the time of trial, defendant continued to operate the Mint Bar.

In 1973, plaintiff and defendant separated. Defendant made a down payment on a residence in Coeur d'Alene for plaintiff using funds from the Mint Bar and borrowed funds. Plaintiff lived in this home at the time of trial. Also in 1973, the parties constructed an A & W drive-in facility in Post Falls, Idaho. This was partially acquired with the proceeds from the sale of the Pagan Room or Martini Room, or both, and title was held jointly. Defendant obtained the money necessary to acquire the A & W franchise. Plaintiff worked full time managing the A & W, and made the monthly payments on the Coeur d'Alene residence. During the time plaintiff managed the A & W she received all the monthly payments from the contract of sale of the Pagan Room. The A & W was sold under contract shortly before trial.

Other properties involved in the settlement included real property in Montana and Arizona, and miscellaneous personal property.

The district court's findings of fact state at one point that during the entire term of this marriage, '* * * the parties had or acquired and sold various properties-often using the sale proceeds of one property to acquire another property * * * .' The findings of fact conclude with the following statement:

'7. It is impossible for the Court to determine with exactitude the amount of financial contributions made by both parties to their present property interests. It is quite apparent that the success of the various enterprises has been due to the hard work of both and considerable good business judgment.'

The district court decreed absolute divorce to the plaintiff and made its division of the parties' property interests. Plaintiff was awarded the Coeur d'Alene residence subject to its indebtedness, the A & W contract subject to a Small Business Administration indebtedness, the Pagan Room contract balance, the Arizona real property subject to the balance due on the purchase contract, certificates of deposit, and personal property. Defendant was awarded the Mint Bar and Cafe properties subject to its indebtedness, the other Montana property, and personal property. In addition, defendant was ordered to pay a portion of the A & W property sales commission and a portion of the A & W accounts payable. The result of this division was that the parties received property of roughly equal dollar value.

The main issue is whether the district court abused its discretion in making the property division described above. Defendant also contends that the district court should have granted his motion to withdraw its findings of fact and conclusions of law, and enter new findings and conclusions and direct entry of a different judgment.

The entire basis of defendant's claim of error is that the district court arrived at an equal division of the property in a mechanical manner without considering the unique circumstances of the parties. Defendant criticizes this 'arithmetic' approach as a virtual application of 'community property law' to property divisions in a state where community property principles do not obtain. Analysis of this argument discloses defendant's desire for the application of a standard more closely connected to the individual financial contributions of each party. Unfortunately for defendant, his contentions have been argued and rejected in this Court on numerous previous occasions.

A district judge's resolution of property divisions is 'fettered only by the range of reason and his judgment will not be disturbed in the absence of an abuse of discretion.' Cook v. Cook, 159 Mont. 98,...

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5 cases
  • Marriage of McMahon, In re
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • April 10, 1980
    ...that the appellate courts did not hold that an equal division was required, only that it was not an abuse of discretion. (Roe v. Roe (1976), 171 Mont. 79, 556 P.2d 1246; In re Marriage of Harding (Colo.App.1975), 533 P.2d 947.) A fair and equitable division does not require that the marital......
  • Marriage of Jacobson, In re
    • United States
    • Montana Supreme Court
    • October 9, 1979
    ...Johnson (1960), 137 Mont. 11, 17, 349 P.2d 310. See also Zell v. Zell (1977), Mont., 570 P.2d 33, 34 St.Rep. 1070; Roe v. Roe (1976), 171 Mont. 79, 83, 556 P.2d 1246, 1248. In the present case the District Court detailed the respective contributions of the parties in its findings of fact. T......
  • Kruse v. Kruse, 14138
    • United States
    • Montana Supreme Court
    • October 23, 1978
    ...570 P.2d 33, 34 St.Rep. 1070; Eschenburg v. Eschenburg (1976), 171 Mont. 247, 557 P.2d 1014, 33 St.Rep. 1198; Roe v. Roe (1976), 171 Mont. 79, 556 P.2d 1246, 33 St.Rep. 863; Cook v. Cook (1972), 159 Mont. 98, 495 P.2d We find no abuse of discretion in the court's determination that appellan......
  • Eschenburg v. Eschenburg, 13260
    • United States
    • Montana Supreme Court
    • January 14, 1977
    ...abuse of that discretion. Cook v. Cook, 159 Mont. 98, 495 P.2d 591; Francke v. Francke, 161 Mont. 98, 504 P.2d 990; Roe v. Roe, Mont. 556 P.2d 1246, 33 St.Rep. 863. The district court concluded that plaintiff's contributions in this 32 year long marriage were the raising of the 4 children, ......
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