Roe v. The Bishop of Charleston

• Decision Date: 17 May 2022
• Docket Number: Civil Action 2:21-cv-20-RMG
• Parties: Mary Roe 1818, Plaintiff, v. The Bishop of Charleston, A Corporation Sole, and the Bishop of the Diocese of Charleston, In His Official Capacity, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina

Mary Roe 1818, Plaintiff,
v.
The Bishop of Charleston, A Corporation Sole, and the Bishop of the Diocese of Charleston, In His Official Capacity, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 2:21-cv-20-RMG

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Charleston Division

May 17, 2022

ORDER AND OPINION

RICHARD M. GERGEL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court are various motions for summary judgment filed by Defendants. (Dkt. Nos. 63, 64, 66, and 68). Also before the Court is a motion to strike filed by Defendants. (Dkt. No. 80). For the reasons stated below, the Court rules as follows.

Background

Plaintiff alleges she was abused by Frederick McLean, a priest of the Diocese of Charleston, sometime between 1961-1966, while she and her family were members of St. John Church in North Charleston. See, e.g., (Dkt. No. 68-1 at 1) (stating Plaintiff “claims she was molested by Fr. Frederick McLean in 1962 or 1963 when she was three or four years old); (Dkt. No. 71 at 1) (“Plaintiff was abused by Frederick McLean, a priest of the Diocese of Charleston, during a time period of 1961-1966[.]”).

On January 4, 2021, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Defendants in the Charleston County Court of Common Pleas, (Dkt. No. 1-1), which Defendants removed to federal court, (Dkt. No. 1).

Plaintiff brings claims for: (1) fraudulent concealment; (2) negligence/gross negligence/recklessness; (3) breach of fiduciary duty; (4) outrage/intentional infliction of emotional distress; (5) civil conspiracy; and (6) negligent retention or supervision.

1

On December 3, 2021 Defendants filed various motions for summary judgment: (1) motion for summary judgment based upon the doctrine of charitable immunity, (Dkt. Nos. 63, 77); (2) motion for summary judgment on all claims based upon the statute of limitations, (Dkt. Nos. 64, 78); (3) motion for summary judgment regarding “The Bishop of the Diocese of Charleston, in His Official Capacity, ” (Dkt. No. 66); and (4) motion for summary judgment based upon individual causes of action, (Dkt Nos. 68, 79). Plaintiff opposes Defendants' motions for summary judgement. (Dkt. Nos. 70, 71, 72, 73). Defendants also filed a motion to strike an attachment to Plaintiff's complaint and attachments to two of Plaintiff's oppositions to Defendants' motions for summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 80). Plaintiff opposes that motion as well. (Dkt. No. 85).

Defendants' motions are fully briefed and ripe for disposition.

Legal Standard

To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the movant must demonstrate that there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of identifying the portions of the “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, [which] show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving part is entitled to a judgement as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 & n.4 (1986) (citing Rule 56(c)). The Court will interpret all inferences and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving party. U.S. v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). Where the moving party has met its burden to put forth sufficient evidence to demonstrate there is no genuine dispute of material fact, the non-moving party must come forth with “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citing Rule 56(e)). An issue of material fact is genuine if

2

the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986).

Discussion

Defendants argue that all of Plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of charitable immunity. See generally (Dkt. No. 63-1). Plaintiffs argue that Defendants are “estopped” from invoking the immunity because of a fundraising evening Defendants held in 2017 called “A Night in Monte Carlo” which involved “bingo, raffles, drawings, door prizes, lotteries, and other games of chance.” (Dkt. No. 72 at 6-7, 15-16) (arguing that because the event generated a “profit” Defendants were engaging in “commercial activities” unrelated to their charitable function). Contra (Dkt. No. 77 at 2) (noting the “Bishop England High School Parents Guild sponsored a Casino fundraiser-at which the ‘gambling' was all pretend, no actual money was wagered, won or lost-in...