Roe v. Wade, No. 70-18

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtBLACKMUN
PartiesJane ROE, et al., Appellants, v. Henry WADE
Decision Date22 January 1973
Docket NumberNo. 70-18

410 U.S. 113
93 S.Ct. 705
35 L.Ed.2d 147
Jane ROE, et al., Appellants,

v.

Henry WADE.

No. 70-18.
Argued Dec. 13, 1971.
Reargued Oct. 11, 1972.
Decided Jan. 22, 1973.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 26, 1973.

See 410 U.S. 959, 93 S.Ct. 1409.

Syllabus

A pregnant single woman (Roe) brought a class action challenging the constitutionality of the Texas criminal abortion laws, which proscribe procuring or attempting an abortion except on medical advice for the purpose of saving the mother's life. A licensed physician (Hallford), who had two state abortion prosecutions pending against him, was permitted to intervene. A childless married couple (the Does), the wife not being pregnant, separately attacked the laws, basing alleged injury on the future possibilities of contraceptive failure, pregnancy, unpreparedness for parenthood, and impairment of the wife's health. A three-judge District Court, which consolidated the actions, held that Roe and Hallford, and members of their classes, had standing to sue and presented justiciable controversies. Ruling that declaratory, though not injunctive, relief was warranted, the court declared the abortion statutes void as vague and overbroadly infringing those plaintiffs' Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court ruled the Does' complaint not justiciable. Appellants directly appealed to this Court on the injunctive rulings, and appellee cross-appealed from the District Court's grant of declaratory relief to Roe and Hallford. Held:

1. While 28 U.S.C. § 1253 authorizes no direct appeal to this Court from the grant or denial of declaratory relief alone, review is not foreclose when the case is properly before the Court on appeal from specific denial of injunctive relief and the arguments as to both injunctive and declaratory relief are necessarily identical. P. 123.

2. Roe has standing to sue; the Does and Hallford do not. Pp. 123-129.

(a) Contrary to appellee's contention, the natural termination of Roe's pregnancy did not moot her suit. Litigation involving pregnancy, which is 'capable of repetition, yet evading review,' is an exception to the usual federal rule that an actual controversy

Page 114

must exist at review stages and not simply when the action is initiated. Pp. 124-125.

(b) The District Court correctly refused injunctive, but erred in granting declaratory, relief to Hallford, who alleged no federally protected right not assertable as a defense against the good-faith state prosecutions pending against him. Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 91 S.Ct. 764, 27 L.Ed.2d 688. Pp. 125-127.

(c) The Does' complaint, based as it is on contingencies, any one or more of which may not occur, is too speculative to present an actual case or controversy. Pp. 127-129.

3. State criminal abortion laws, like those involved here, that except from criminality only a life-saving procedure on the mother's behalf without regard to the stage of her pregnancy and other interests involved violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which protects against state action the right to privacy, including a woman's qualified right to terminate her pregnancy. Though the State cannot override that right, it has legitimate interests in protecting both the pregnant woman's health and the potentiality of human life, each of which interests grows and reaches a 'compelling' point at various stages of the woman's approach to term. Pp. 147-164.

(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician. Pp. 163-164.

(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first trimester, the State, in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health. Pp. 163-164.

(c) For the stage subsequent to viability the State, in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life, may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother. Pp. 163-164; 164—165.

4. The State may define the term 'physician' to mean only a physician currently licensed by the State, and may proscribe any abortion by a person who is not a physician as so defined. P. 165.

5. It is unnecessary to decide the injunctive relief issue since the Texas authorities will doubtless fully recognize the Court's ruling

Page 115

that the Texas criminal abortion statutes are unconstitutional. P. 166.

314 F.Supp. 1217, affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Sarah R. Weddington, Austin, Tex., for appellants.

Robert C. Flowers, Asst. Atty. Gen. of Texas, Austin, Tex., for appellee on reargument.

Jay Floyd, Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, Tex., for appellee on original argument.

Page 116

Mr. Justice BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.

This Texas federal appeal and its Georgia companion, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 93 S.Ct. 739, 35 L.Ed.2d 201, present constitutional challenges to state criminal abortion legislation. The Texas statutes under attack here are typical of those that have been in effect in many States for approximately a century. The Georgia statutes, in contrast, have a modern cast and are a legislative product that, to an extent at least, obviously reflects the influences of recent attitudinal change, of advancing medical knowledge and techniques, and of new thinking about an old issue.

We forthwith acknowledge our awareness of the sensitive and emotional nature of the abortion controversy, of the vigorous opposing views, even among physicians, and of the deep and seemingly absolute convictions that the subject inspires. One's philosophy, one's experiences, one's exposure to the raw edges of human existence, one's religious training, one's attitudes toward life and family and their values, and the moral standards one establishes and seeks to observe, are all likely to influence and to color one's thinking and conclusions about abortion.

In addition, population growth, pollution, poverty, and racial overtones tend to complicate and not to simplify the problem.

Our task, of course, is to resolve the issue by constitutional measurement, free of emotion and of predilection. We seek earnestly to do this, and, because we do, we

Page 117

have inquired into, and in this opinion place some emphasis upon, medical and medical-legal history and what that history reveals about man's attitudes toward the abortion procedure over the centuries. We bear in mind, too, Mr. Justice Holmes' admonition in his now-vindicated dissent in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76, 25 S.Ct. 539, 547, 49 L.Ed. 937 (1905):

'(The Constitution) is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar, or novel, and even shocking, ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United States.'

I

The Texas statutes that concern us here are Arts. 1191-1194 and 1196 of the State's Penal Code,1 Vernon's Ann.P.C. These make it a crime to 'procure an abortion,' as therein

Page 118

defined, or to attempt one, except with respect to 'an abortion procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother.' Similar statutes are in existence in a majority of the States.2

Page 119

Texas first enacted a criminal abortion statute in 1854. Texas Laws 1854, c. 49, § 1, set forth in 3 H. Gammel, Laws of Texas 1502 (1898). This was soon modified into language that has remained substantially unchanged to the present time. See Texas Penal Code of 1857, c. 7, Arts. 531-536; G. Paschal, Laws of Texas, Arts. 2192-2197 (1866); Texas Rev.Stat., c. 8, Arts. 536-541 (1879); Texas Rev.Crim.Stat., Arts. 1071-1076 (1911). The final article in each of these compilations provided the same exception, as does the present Article 1196, for an abortion by 'medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother.'3

Page 120

II

Jane Roe,4 a single woman who was residing in Dallas County, Texas, instituted this federal action in March 1970 against the District Attorney of the county. She sought a declaratory judgment that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were unconstitutional on their face, and an injunction restraining the defendant from enforcing the statutes.

Roe alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant; that she wished to terminate her pregnancy by an abortion 'performed by a competent, licensed physician, under safe, clinical conditions'; that she was unable to get a 'legal' abortion in Texas because her life did not appear to be threatened by the continuation of her pregnancy; and that she could not afford to travel to another jurisdiction in order to secure a legal abortion under safe conditions. She claimed that the Texas statutes were unconstitutionally vague and that they abridged her right of personal privacy, protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. By an amendment to her complaint Roe purported to sue 'on behalf of herself and all other women' similarly situated.

James Hubert Hallford, a licensed physician, sought and was granted leave to intervene in Roe's action. In his complaint he alleged that he had been arrested previously for violations of the Texas abortion statutes and

Page 121

that two such prosecutions were pending against him. He described conditions of patients who came to him seeking abortions, and he claimed that for many cases he, as a physician, was unable to determine whether they fell within or outside the exception recognized by Article 1196. He alleged that, as a consequence, the statutes were vague and uncertain, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that they violated his own and his patients'...

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4088 practice notes
  • National Abortion Federation v. Ashcroft, No. 03 CIV. 8695(RCC).
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. Southern District of New York
    • August 26, 2004
    ...appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life and health of the mother." Id. at 879, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973)). It is the third of these principles that guided the Stenberg Court in striking down the Nebr......
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    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)
    • September 18, 1985
    ...recognize that legislative line drawing of precise boundaries is generally more acceptable than similar judicial efforts, cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973), defining the parameters of a group excluded from jury selection is not the type of line drawing that ......
  • BJRL v. State of Utah, Civ. No. C86-324G.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 10th Circuit. United States District Court of Utah
    • January 28, 1987
    ...cited the following cases as examples of situations where fundamental independent decision making interests were recognized: Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-59, 93 S.Ct. 705, 726-29, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973) (women's qualified right to terminate her pregnancy); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 193-......
  • Mancuso v. Taft, No. 72-1180.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit
    • March 20, 1973
    ...of the complaint, within her third trimester as to which the Court permitted regulation even to the point of prohibition. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1973). Since the Court there used the same analysis we employ here, i. e., whether the regulation ......
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4017 cases
  • National Abortion Federation v. Ashcroft, No. 03 CIV. 8695(RCC).
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. Southern District of New York
    • August 26, 2004
    ...appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life and health of the mother." Id. at 879, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973)). It is the third of these principles that guided the Stenberg Court in striking down the Nebr......
  • Barber v. Ponte, No. 84-1750
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)
    • September 18, 1985
    ...recognize that legislative line drawing of precise boundaries is generally more acceptable than similar judicial efforts, cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973), defining the parameters of a group excluded from jury selection is not the type of line drawing that ......
  • BJRL v. State of Utah, Civ. No. C86-324G.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 10th Circuit. United States District Court of Utah
    • January 28, 1987
    ...cited the following cases as examples of situations where fundamental independent decision making interests were recognized: Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-59, 93 S.Ct. 705, 726-29, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973) (women's qualified right to terminate her pregnancy); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 193-......
  • Mancuso v. Taft, No. 72-1180.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit
    • March 20, 1973
    ...of the complaint, within her third trimester as to which the Court permitted regulation even to the point of prohibition. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1973). Since the Court there used the same analysis we employ here, i. e., whether the regulation ......
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