Roerig v. Houghton

• Decision Date: 19 December 1919
• Docket Number: No. 21400.,21400.
• Citation: 175 N.W. 542,144 Minn. 231
• Parties: ROERIG v. HOUGHTON, Inspector of Buildings, et al.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

144 Minn. 231

175 N.W. 542

ROERIG

v.HOUGHTON, Inspector of Buildings, et al.

No. 21400.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Dec. 5, 1919.

On Application for Rehearing, Dec. 19, 1919.

Appeal from District Court, Hennepin County; John H. Steele, Judge.

Action by William Roerig against James G. Houghton, Inspector of Buildings of the City of Minneapolis, and the City of Minneapolis. Verdict for plaintiff. From a denial of a new trial, defendants appeal. Order reversed.

Syllabus by the Court

Neither a municipal corporation nor its administrative officers are liable in damages suffered by third persons in consequence of judicial proceedings conducted in behalf of the municipality in the exercise of its governmental functions. Dibell, J., dissenting. C. D. Gould and R. S. Wiggin, both of Minneapolis, for appellants.

Rose & Brill, of Minneapolis, for respondent.

LEES, C.

Defendant Houghton is building inspector of the city of Minneapolis. Plaintiff, a lot owner, applied to him for a permit to erect an apartment house on his lot. The application was denied, and he brought an action to compel Houghton and the city to issue the permit. They answered, and he demurred, and on November 8, 1916, his demurrer was sustained. The city council then adopted a resolution directing the city attorney to appeal. The resolution provided that, if he could not procure a waiver of a supersedeas bond, the proper city officials should execute such bond in behalf of the defendants. Thereafter the attorneys for the parties entered into a stipulation, the material portions of which are as follows:

‘It is hereby stipulated * * * that a stay of all proceedings * * * until the conclusion of the appeal of defendants in the Supreme Court may be granted by the district court without the filing of the cost or supersedeas bonds required by sections 8002 and 8003 of the General Statutes of Minnesota of 1913, and the filing of such * * * bonds is expressly waived by the plaintiff, without, however, waiving right to costs and damages to which plaintiff would be entitled if such bonds had been given.’

A stay was entered and an appeal taken November 13, 1916. On May 11, 1917, this court affirmed the order appealed from. State ex rel. Roerig v. City of Minneapolis, 136 Minn. 479, 162 N. W. 477. The case being remanded, findings were made and filed in the district court, with an order for judgment, and on May 31, 1917, judgment was entered and a writ of mandamus issued directing defendants to issue the building permit. On July 6, 1917, one was issued, under which plaintiff built on his lot. The present action was brought to recover damages for the delay in the building operations from November 13, 1916, to May 31, 1917, due to the stay of proceedings while the appeal was pending. There was a trial by jury, and a verdict for plaintiff for $930. Defendants appeal from a denial of a new trial, and contend: (1) That a municipal corporation is not required to give a bond on appeal. (2) That the city attorney, by signing the stipulation, could not enlarge the city's common-law liability for damages in case it failed in its appeal. (3) That the plaintiff did not prove any damages which were properly allowable.

The question presented by the second contention alone requires attention, for the necessary answer thereto results in a reversal on the merits of plaintiff's claim and terminates the litigation.

[1] In the consideration of the question we assume, without so deciding, that the stipulation above recited amounted to an agreement between the parties which, in effect, subjected defendants to the same liability for damages as would exist, had a supersedeas bond been given, and the question presented may be thus stated: Is a municipal corporation, or one of its officers, liable, in the absence of a statute imposing liability, for damages sustained by an applicant for a license or permit in consequence of a refusal to grant it, or as a result of judicial proceedings had in contesting the right of the applicant to it?

It is well settled that a municipal corporation cannot be held in damages for the manner in which it exercises its discretionary powers of a public, legislative, or quasi judicial nature. While engaged in the discharge of duties imposed upon it, from the performance of which it derives no compensation or benefit in its corporate capacity, it is clothed with the immunities of the state. Bryant v. City of St. Paul, 33 Minn. 289, 23 N. W. 220,53 Am. Rep. 31;Lane v. Minn. Agr. Soc., 62 Minn. 175, 64 N. W. 382,29 L. R. A. 708;Ackeret v. Minneapolis, 129 Minn. 190, 151 N. W. 976, L. R. A. 1915D, 1111, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 897.

The ordinance prohibiting the erection of certain classes of buildings in the residential districts of Minneapolis was enacted in the exercise of the city's governmental powers as a political subdivision of the state. It was a regulation made by virtue of the police power of the city. State v. Houghton, 134 Minn. 226, 158 N. W. 1017, L. R. A. 1917F, 1050;State v. Houghton, 170 N. W. 853. The police regulations of a city are made and enforced in the interests of the public; hence it is not liable for the acts of its officers in attempting to enforce them. Gullikson v. McDonald, 62 Minn. 278, 64 N. W. 812;Claussen v. Luverne, 103 Minn. 491, 115 N. W. 643,15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 698,14 Ann. Cas. 673. The cases are collected in a note to Bond v. Royston, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 409, and in Hershberg v. Barbourville, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 141.

Liability of a municipal corporation is not created because the acts of its officers were done under a void ordinance, if the ordinance was enacted in the exercise of governmental powers. Trammell v. Russellville, 34 Ark. 105, 36 Am. Rep. 1; Bond v. Royston, supra. Neither is it liable for damages sustained by reason of a wrongful revocation of a license or permit. Lerch v. Duluth, 88 Minn. 295, 92 N. W. 1116; Claussen v. Luverne, supra; Kansas City v. Lemen, 57 Fed. 905, 6 C. C. A. 627. It seems clear that the city could not be held at common law for any damages suffered by plaintiff by reason of any of its acts in contesting plaintiff's right to a building permit, and its officers are without authority to charge it with liability by contract.

Houghton's liability stands upon a somewhat different footing. A public officer, whose functions are judicial or quasi judicial, cannot be called upon to respond in damages for the honest exercise of his judgment within his jurisdiction, however erroneous his judgment may be. Stewart v. Case, 53 Minn. 62, 54 N. W. 938,39 Am. St. Rep. 575; Mechem, Pub. Off. § 636. If, however, he exercises ministerial powers only, he does not come within this rule, and is liable to one who sustains an injury by his malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance. Rosenthal v....