Roeseke v. Pryor

• Decision Date: 11 February 1987
• Docket Number: No. 86-0012,86-0012
• Citation: 152 Ill.App.3d 771,504 N.E.2d 927,105 Ill.Dec. 642
• Parties: , 105 Ill.Dec. 642 Pamela ROESEKE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gregory PRYOR and Marriott Corporation, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 927

504 N.E.2d 927

152 Ill.App.3d 771, 105 Ill.Dec. 642

Pamela ROESEKE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gregory PRYOR and Marriott Corporation, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 86-0012.

Appellate Court of Illinois First District, Fourth Division.

Feb. 11, 1987.

McKenna, Storer, Rowe, White & Farrug, Chicago (Robert S. Soderstrom, Charles P. Menges, Shaun McParland, of counsel), for defendants-appellants.

John G. Phillips & Associates, Chicago (John G. Phillips, Kenneth R. Nix, John F. Klebba, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellee.

Justice LINN delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendants Gregory Pryor and Marriott Corporation (referred to collectively as "Defendants"), bring this appeal seeking reversal of a jury's verdict in favor of plaintiff Pamela Roeseke and against the Defendants. Roeseke sued the Defendants after she was struck and seriously injured in an accident involving a van being driven by defendant Pryor. ¹ After a full trial on the merits, the jury determined that Roeseke had suffered $500,000 in damages. However, the jury also found that Roeseke had been 33% comparatively negligent. That being the case, judgment was entered in favor of Roeseke in the amount of $335,000.

The Defendants now bring this appeal contending: (1) that the trial court erred in failing to direct a verdict in favor of the Defendants or, in the alternative, in failing to grant the Defendants' motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict; (2) that the trial court erred in granting Roeseke's motion in limine barring certain testimony by a witness; (3) that the trial court erred in making certain rulings relative to a missing report allegedly compiled by a manager for Marriott Corporation; and (4) that the jury's verdict finding Roeseke to be only 33% comparatively negligent was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

We affirm.

Background

The record reveals that this lawsuit arose from an accident which took place on November 10, 1979. The accident involved 18-22 vehicles and occurred on the Kennedy Expressway in suburban Cook County near O'Hare Airport. Those testifying at trial included the plaintiff, Pamela Roeseke, the defendant-driver, Gregory Pryor, several other drivers and passengers involved in the accident, and a policeman who arrived at the scene of the accident subsequent to its occurrence.

Defendant Pryor testified that he was employed by the Marriott Corporation as a bellman and driver. Pryor's duties included, inter alia, transporting Marriott customers from O'Hare Airport to the hotel. On the night of the accident, he was traveling between the Marriott Hotel and O'Hare Airport.

Pryor testified that he did not know the bridge (on which the accident occurred) was icy. He stated that as he approached the bridge, he saw a white auto in front of him that appeared to be parked. As he came upon the vehicle, he applied his brakes. At that point, however, Pryor lost control of his van. The van began sliding sideways and eventually collided with the white auto. The white auto was being driven by Barbara Dorenzo. Pryor asserts that he did everything possible to control his van prior to the collision with Dorenzo's vehicle. After the collision, Pryor's van rested perpendicular to traffic.

Barbara Dorenzo also testified about the accident. Dorenzo stated that as she approached the bridge, she experienced slippery conditions. She immediately began pumping her brakes. As she was attempting to slow down, however, Pryor's sliding van collided with her car pushing it into the guard rail. Dorenzo testified that she never lost control of her vehicle prior to being hit by Pryor's van.

This initial collision between Pryor's van and Dorenzo's vehicle constituted the first mishap of an apparent chain reaction collision ultimately resulting in Roeseke's injury.

Plaintiff Roeseke testified that she was driving in a westerly direction along the Kennedy Expressway prior to the accident. The weather was cold and damp and the temperature was near freezing. Roeseke then exited the Kennedy and began driving along the Kennedy extension. As she came upon a bridge, however, she noticed several stationary vehicles in front of her. The vehicles were stopped in both lanes of traffic. One of these vehicles was the van being operated by Pryor.

Roeseke testified that she was able to safely stop her vehicle even though the road conditions were icy. She claimed that she was able to stop her car by lifting her foot off the gas pedal and by slowly pumping her brakes. Roeseke's vehicle came to a halt without hitting any other car and without coming into contact with the guard rail.

It was not raining or snowing at the time that the Roeseke vehicle came to a halt. As Roeseke was turning her car's engine off, however, her vehicle was struck by another car.

Several other people involved in the accident also testified. In general, each of these witnesses' testimony was the same, namely, that the road conditions were icy and that they had lost control of their vehicles thereby resulting in their vehicles being added to those already involved in the bridge pile-up.

Raymond Coffey also testified. Coffey was the manager on duty at the Marriott Hotel where Pryor worked. Coffey arrived at the scene of the accident after Pryor had phoned him.

Following Coffey's inspection of the accident, he prepared a "Manager on Duty" report. This was a standard report typically completed by the manager in charge of the Marriott Hotel when an incident such as the aforementioned automobile accident occurs. Coffey completed the report (which contained his findings and summary of what happened) and forwarded it to his superior. After that, however, the report could not be located even though it had been requested by Roeseke.

One of the policemen who was called to the scene of the accident after it occurred also testified. Officer Stachula's testimony is of importance not so much for what he affirmatively stated, but rather for what he was barred from saying. When Officer Stachula and his partner completed their investigation of the accident, they compiled a police report. The report contained information that both Stachula and his partner had gathered from various people at different places and at different times (see discussion infra ). Pursuant to Roeseke's motion, the trial court barred Officer Stachula from revealing certain portions of the report.

Following the accident, Roeseke's leg had to be amputated. She later filed this suit against, among others, Pryor and his employer, Marriott Corporation. Roeseke alleged that Pryor had operated his vehicle negligently thereby leading to the initial collision with Dorenzo's car. Roeseke further claimed that but for Pryor's initial collision with Dorenzo's car, she would not have had to stop her vehicle and would not have been subsequently injured.

The jury returned a verdict in Roeseke's favor and the Defendants now bring this appeal.

Opinion

I.

We first address the Defendants' claim that the trial court erred in failing to direct a verdict in their favor at the close of the plaintiff's case or, in the alternative, in failing to grant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (n.o.v.). It is the Defendants' position that a directed verdict or a judgment n.o.v. should have been entered because: (1) Roeseke's injury resulted from an "unavoidable accident" rather than from any negligence on the Defendants' part; and/or (2) that even if Pryor was negligent, nevertheless, the intervening and superceding negligence of Roeseke and others was the true and proximate cause of Roeseke's injury.

A verdict should be directed and/or a judgment n.o.v. should be granted only in those cases in which all of the evidence, when viewed most favorably to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors the movant that no contrary verdict based on the evidence could ever stand. (Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co. (1967), 37 Ill.2d 494, 229 N.E.2d 504.) In so doing, it is not the court's function to determine the credibility of witnesses (Bartolomucci v. Clarke (1965), 60 Ill.App.2d 229, 208 N.E.2d 616), nor are we to substitute our judgment for that of the jury. (Morse v. Johnson (1980), 81 Ill.App.3d 552, 36 Ill.Dec. 813, 401 N.E.2d 654.) Instead, we are required to consider all of the evidence, together with any reasonable inferences which might be drawn therefrom, in a view most favorable to the plaintiff. (Schoen v. Harris (1969), 108 Ill.App.2d 186, 246 N.E.2d 849.) In addition, a trial court's decision denying a directed verdict or a judgment n.o.v. will be overturned only where that decision is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Hemken v. First National Bank of Litchfield (1979), 76 Ill.App.3d 23, 31 Ill.Dec. 666, 394 N.E.2d 868.

In the case at bar, defendant Pryor admitted that the weather conditions on the night of the accident were poor, that he had traveled the particular section of bridge (on which the accident occurred) many times previously, and that he lost control of his vehicle and thereafter collided with the auto being driven by Dorenzo. After Pryor collided with the Dorenzo vehicle, the two vehicles came to rest perpendicular to the roadway thereby blocking traffic. It was because the roadway was blocked that plaintiff Roeseke was forced to stop her vehicle. Soon thereafter, another vehicle collided with Roeseke's auto resulting in Roeseke suffering serious physical injuries.

However, several witnesses including Roeseke and Dorenzo, testified that they never lost control of their vehicles even though they were driving under the same conditions and over the same strip of bridge as Pryor. Roeseke, in fact, was able to bring her vehicle to a complete stop without any problem even though she was driving at the same speed as Pryor.

Thus, it appears that there was contradictory evidence regarding whether drivers could, under the circumstances presented, control their vehicles on the night of the...