Roether v. Pearson

• Decision Date: 16 August 1955
• Docket Number: No. A--470,A--470
• Citation: 36 N.J.Super. 465,116 A.2d 529
• Parties: Dorothy A. ROETHER and John J. Roether, her husband, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Thomas R. PEARSON, Defendant-Respondent. . Appellate Division
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Page 465

36 N.J.Super. 465

116 A.2d 529

Dorothy A. ROETHER and John J. Roether, her husband Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Thomas R. PEARSON, Defendant-Respondent.

No. A--470.

Superior Court of New Jersey.

Appellate Division.

Argued Aug. 8, 1955.

Decided Aug. 16, 1955.

Robert P. Hanley, Morristown, argued the cause for appellants (Edward F. Broderick, Morristown, attorney).

Robert L. Clifford, Newark, argued the cause for respondent (Mead, Gleeson, Hansen & Pantages, Newark, attorneys).

Before Judges CONFORD, KNIGHT and SULLIVAN.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

SULLIVAN, J.S.C. (temporarily assigned).

This is an automobile intersection accident case where the jury returned a verdict of no cause of action in favor of the defendant. Plaintiffs now seek to have the jury verdict set aside as against the weight of the evidence having duly moved for a new trial on that ground before the trial judge, which motion was denied.

R.R. 1:5--3(a) provides that on civil appeals:

'* * * A verdict of a jury shall be set aside as against the weight of the evidence if, having given due regard to the opportunity of the trial court and the jury to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses, it clearly and convincingly appears that the verdict was the result of mistake, partiality, prejudice or passion.'

Without reciting the evidence in detail, a review of it indicates that plaintiffs and defendant gave conflicting versions of how the accident happened and as to who was at fault. The determination of where the truth lay therefore was exclusively the function of the jury and its verdict is final. Heick v. Eiser, 5 N.J.Super. 416, 69 A.2d 345 (App.Div.1949); Moore v. Public Service Coordinated Transport, 15 N.J.Super. 499, 83 A.2d 725 (App.Div.1951). The physical evidence while tending to corroborate the plaintiffs' version was not conclusive and did not bar the jury from coming to the conclusion that the plaintiff-driver was himself negligent and that his negligence either caused or contributed to the happening of the accident. There was testimony adduced which, if believed, would indicate that plaintiff-driver, in entering upon a though street, made a left turn at a 'T' intersection in an imprudent manner and without making due observation of vehicles approaching from the left. R.S. 39:4--90, N.J.S.A.

The plaintiffs' principal contention is that since the defendant admitted pleading guilty to a criminal charge of drunken driving arising out of the accident, the jury should have disregarded his testimony and held him solely responsible for the happening of the accident. The fact that a driver of an automobile has been drinking and gives physical appearance of being under the influence of liquor or even pleads guilty to a charge of drunken driving is all proper evidence of negligence to be submitted to the jury. However, this evidence is not conclusive and is merely something to be weighed and considered by the jury along with all of the other evidence in the case. Unless the jury concludes that the intoxication was the proximate cause of the accident there is no civil responsibility.

'It has been held that intoxication on the part of the operator of an automobile which...