Roettgen v. Jardins

• Decision Date: 06 April 2015
• Docket Number: Civil No. 14-cv-02913-BAS(JMA)
• Citation: Roettgen v. Jardins, Civil No. 14-cv-02913-BAS(JMA) (S.D. Cal. Apr 06, 2015)
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of California
• Parties: JOHN ROETTGEN, CDCR #V05152, Plaintiff, v. MICHELLE DES JARDINS, ET AL., Defendants.

JOHN ROETTGEN, CDCR #V05152, Plaintiff, v. MICHELLE DES JARDINS, ET AL., Defendants.

Civil No. 14-cv-02913-BAS(JMA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

April 6, 2015

ORDER:

1) GRANTING MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS(ECF No. 2)

AND

2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION FOR FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM AND AS FRIVOLOUS PURSUANT TO28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii) AND § 1915A(b)(1)

John Roettgen("Plaintiff"), a prisoner currently incarcerated at Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility ("RJD") in San Diego, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil complaint entitled "Application to Appear Before the Grand Jury."(ECF No. 1.)

Plaintiff seeks a writ of mandamus compelling the U.S. Attorney General, California's Attorney General, and one of her Assistant Supervising Deputy Attorneys General, to convene a federal grand jury in order that he may present evidence of allegedcriminal conduct committed against him by several RJD officials and arising on July 8, 2013.(SeeCompl., ECF No. 1, at 5-7, 13-14.)

Plaintiff has not prepaid the $400 filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) to commence a federal civil action; instead, he has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis("IFP") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(ECF No. 2.)

I.MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $400.See28 U.S.C. § 1914(a).¹An action may proceed despite a plaintiff's failure to prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).SeeAndrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051(9th Cir.2007);Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177(9th Cir.1999).However, a prisoner who is granted leave to proceed IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in "increments,"seeWilliams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185(9th Cir.2015), and regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed.See28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2);Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847(9th Cir.2002).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), a prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a "certified copy of [his] trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint."28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2);Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119(9th Cir.2005).From the certified trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets.See28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1);28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4).The institution having custody of the prisonerthen collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month's income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid.See28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a certified copy of his trust account statement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2)andS.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2 (ECF No. 3).Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119.The Court has reviewed Plaintiff's trust account statement, as well as the attached prison certificate issued by a correctional official at RJD verifying his available balances.Plaintiff's statements show that he has had no monthly deposits, has carried no balance, and had no available funds in his account during the 6-month period preceding the filing of this action, and nothing on the books at the time of filing.See28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4)(providing that "[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.");Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850(finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a "safety-valve" preventing dismissal of a prisoner's IFP case based solely on a "failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available to him when payment is ordered.").

Therefore, the CourtGRANTSPlaintiff's Motion to Proceed IFP(ECF No. 2) and assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).However, the entire $350 balance of the filing fees mandated will be collected by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation("CDCR") and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

II.INITIAL REVIEW OF PLAINTIFF'S PLEADING

A.Standard of Review

Notwithstanding IFP status or the payment of any filing fees, the PLRA also obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are "incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,""as soon as practicable after docketing."See28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)and1915A.Under these provisions of the PLRA, the Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions thereof, which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who are immune.See28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)and1915A(b);Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27(9th Cir.2000)(en banc)(discussing§ 1915(e)(2));Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004(9th Cir.2010)(discussing28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).

"[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff."Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447(9th Cir.2000);see alsoBarren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194(9th Cir.1998)(noting that § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)"parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)").However, while a plaintiff's allegations are taken as true, courts"are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences."Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681(9th Cir.2009)(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).Thus, while the court has an "obligation . . . where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt,"Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7(9th Cir.2010)(citingBretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1(9th Cir.1985)), it may not, in so doing, "supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled."Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268(9th Cir.1982)."Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations" are simply not "sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss."Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268.

"The first step in a civil action in a United States district court is the filing of [a] complaint with the clerk or the judge."4 Wright, Miller, Kane, Marcus & Steinman, Fed. Prac. &Proc. Civ. § 1052 (3d ed. 2002 & Supp. 2014);Fed. R. Civ. P. 3("A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.").Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), each complaint must contain: "(1) a short and plain statementof the grounds for the court's jurisdiction," . . . (2) a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought."Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)-(3);Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78(2009).Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice."Id. at 678(citingBell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555(2007))."Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense."Id. at 679.The "mere possibility of misconduct" falls short of meeting this plausibility standard.Id.;see alsoMoss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969(9th Cir.2009).

B.Plaintiff's Complaint

Plaintiff claims his case arises "from the unwillingness of the [Defendants] to allow [him] to inform the grand jury of violations of federal statutes18 U.S.C. §§ 241,242,1001,371,1521(b)(3), as well as others, 18 U.S.C. § 1501," and is related to a specific incident of alleged excessive force committed against him by RJD correctional officials on July 8, 2013.(SeeCompl., ECF No. 1, at 5-6, 7.)He invokes federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 based on purported violations of his First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and seeks a writ of mandamus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1361and1651, as well as declaratory relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201and2202.(Id. at 6.)

C.Federal Criminal Code Violations

First, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to compel the prosecution of RJD officials based on their alleged violation of various federal criminal statutes, his Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.See28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), § 1915A(b)(1);Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27;Rhodes, 621 F.3d at 1004.This is because no private cause of action exists under any of the statutesPlaintiff cites.See, e.g., Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 F.3d 1044, 1048(9th Cir.2006)(affirming the dismissal of claims under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241and242 because the they"are criminal statutes that donot give rise to civil liability");Rockefeller v. U.S. Court of Appeals Office, for Tenth Circuit Judges, 248 F. Supp. 2d 17, 23(D. D.C.2003)(18 U.S.C. § 371 does not contain a private right of action);see alsoDugar v. Coughlin, 613 F. Supp. 849, 852 n. 1(S.D.N.Y.1985)(holding that prisoner...