Roger S., In re, Cr. 19558

• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Citation: 19 Cal.3d 921,141 Cal.Rptr. 298,569 P.2d 1286
• Docket Number: Cr. 19558
• Parties: , 569 P.2d 1286 In re ROGER S., a minor, on Habeas Corpus.
• Decision Date: 18 July 1977

Page 298

141 Cal.Rptr. 298

19 Cal.3d 921, 569 P.2d 1286

In re ROGER S., a minor, on Habeas Corpus.

Cr. 19558.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

July 18, 1977.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing Sept. 15, 1977.

Paul N. Halvonik, State Public Defender, Clifton R. Jeffers, Chief Asst. State Public Defender, Ezra Hendon, Deputy State Public Defender, William C. Connel, Public Defender, and Thomas Petersen, Deputy Public Defender, for petitioner.

Robert L. Walker and Peter B. Sandmann, San Francisco, as amici curiae on behalf of petitioner.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Jack R. Winkler, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Edward P. O'Brien, Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert R. Granucci and Ronald E. Niver, Deputy Attys. Gen., for respondent.

WRIGHT, ^* Justice.

By petition for writ of habeas corpus Roger S., a 14-year-old minor, seeks release from the Napa State Hospital to which he was admitted on May 10, 1976, on application by his mother made pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 6000, subdivision (b). ¹ Petitioner asserts that his confinement is unlawful, arguing that section 6000, subdivision (b) ² does not afford procedural due process to minors "voluntarily" admitted thereunder. He further asserts that section 6000, subdivision (b) denies equal protection to such minors because it permits their admission even though they are neither "gravely disabled" nor dangerous to themselves or others, a standard which applies to minor wards of the court, and denies them the procedural protections to which wards are entitled under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act. (§§ 5000-5401; In re Michael E. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 183, 123 Cal.Rptr. 103, 538 P.2d 231.)

We have concluded that although the personal liberty interest of a minor is less comprehensive than that of an adult, and a parent or guardian not only may but must curtail that interest in the proper exercise of his obligation to guide the child's development, in the area of admission to a state hospital a minor of 14 years or more possesses rights which may not be waived by the parent or guardian. Among these rights is the right guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and article I, section 7(a) of the California Constitution, to procedural due process in determining whether the minor is mentally ill or disordered, and whether, if the minor is not gravely disabled or dangerous to himself or others as a result of mental illness or disorder, the admission sought is likely to benefit him. ³ We shall explain below the basis for our conclusion and, as guidance to the Legislature in formulating new statutory procedures to protect these minors against possible arbitrary admission to mental hospitals, we shall outline those procedures which will afford at least those minimum protections to which they are constitutionally entitled.

The Liberty Interest of Minors

"Personal liberty is a fundamental interest, second only to life itself, as an interest protected under both the California and United States Constitutions." (People v. Olivas (1976) 17 Cal.3d 236, 251, 131 Cal.Rptr. 55, 64, 551 P.2d 375, 384.) It is beyond dispute that a principal ingredient of personal liberty is "freedom from bodily restraint" (Meyer v. Nebraska (1923) 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042) and that minors as well as adults are "persons" under the Constitution who are entitled to the protection of that right. (Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist. (1969) 393 U.S. 503, 511, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731.) Only last term the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the right of minors to constitutional rights and protection. "Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights." (Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth (1976) 428 U.S. 52, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 2843, 49 L.Ed.2d 788.)

It is equally well established, however, that the liberty interest of a minor is not coextensive with that of an adult. "Even where there is an invasion of protected freedoms 'the power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults.' " (Ginsberg v. New York (1968) 390 U.S. 629, 638, 88 S.Ct. 1274, 1280, 20 L.Ed.2d 195; Prince v. Massachusetts (1944) 321 U.S. 158, 170, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645.) Parents, of course, have powers greater than that of the state to curtail a child's exercise of the constitutional rights he may otherwise enjoy, for a parent's own constitutionally protected "liberty" includes the right to "bring up children" (Meyer v. Nebraska, supra, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042), and to "direct the upbringing and education of children." (Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925) 268 U.S. 510, 534-535, 45 S.Ct. 571, 573, 69 L.Ed. 1070.) As against the state, this parental duty and right is subject to limitation only "if it appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or have a potential for significant social burdens." (Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) 406 U.S. 205, 234, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1542, 32 L.Ed.2d 15.)

It is settled that a minor is entitled to the protections of due process whenever the state itself initiates action, whether civil or quasi-criminal, to deprive a minor of his liberty. (In re Gault (1967) 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527; Goss v. Lopez (1975) 419 U.S. 565, 574, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725; In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 367, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368; In re Arthur N. (1976) 16 Cal.3d 226, 127 Cal.Rptr. 641, 545 P.2d 1345.) We have not had occasion heretofore, however, to consider whether the minor may assert the same or similar rights when a parent already entitled to his custody and control initiates the action in the exercise of the parent's responsibility to obtain for the minor that care which the parent reasonably believes necessary to the proper upbringing of his child.

Petitioner assumes, and respondent does not dispute, that the detention of Roger in a state hospital is "state action," and that the state, albeit at the behest of Roger's mother, is therefore a significant participant in depriving Roger of the greater personal liberty which he would have outside the hospital. Respondent also recognizes, as he must, that even a conditional liberty interest, such as that of a minor, is entitled to the protections of due process when the state is involved to any significant degree in its diminution. (Cf. Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, 484, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484.) The parties do not agree, however, on what process is due, nor do they address themselves to the question of a parent's power to waive or otherwise relinquish his child's due process rights. We shall address the latter question first.

The Extent of Parental Power

If, within his power to direct his child's upbringing, a parent may place the child in a state operated mental hospital and require him to remain there, just as he may place the child in a public hospital for treatment of a physical condition, it follows that he may waive those due process rights that the child might assert if the state sought the hospitalization. As noted above, we have concluded that as to minors 14 years of age or older, the parental power is not this comprehensive. The consequences of confining a person, minor or adult, involuntarily in a mental hospital are quite different and impinge much more directly on the liberty interest of the patient than does confinement for treatment of physical illness. Not only is there physical restraint but there is injury to protected interests in reputation (see Goss v. Lopez, supra, 419 U.S. 565, 574, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725; Wisconsin v. Constantineau (1971) 400 U.S. 433, 437, 91 S.Ct. 507, 27 L.Ed.2d 515), an interest in not being improperly or unfairly stigmatized as mentally ill or disordered. (People v. Burnick (1975) 14 Cal.3d 306, 321, 121 Cal.Rptr. 488, 535 P.2d 352.) Additionally, we note again the uncertainties in psychiatric diagnosis and the divergence of expert views (People v. Burnick, supra, 14 Cal.3d 306, 326, 121 Cal.Rptr. 488, 535 P.2d 352) which render the possibility of mistake significantly greater than in diagnosis of physical illness. We are not alone in recognizing these uncertainties. (See O'Connor v. Donaldson (1975) 422 U.S. 563, 579, 95 S.Ct. 2486, 45 L.Ed.2d 396, conc. opn. of Burger, C. J.) The serious consequences attendant upon involuntary commitment of a minor as a mentally ill or disordered person, and the significant potential for error in diagnosis convinces us that a minor who is mature enough to participate intelligently in the decision to independently assert his right to due process in the commitment decision must be permitted to do so.

We recognize that permitting the child to independently assert his right does to some extent conflict with parental authority, but a substantial state interest justifies recognition of the minor's right. The United States Supreme Court, in confirming the right of a parolee to due process in proceedings to revoke parole, recognized a similar interest. "The parolee is not the only one who has a stake in his conditional liberty. Society has a stake in whatever may be the chance of restoring him to normal and useful life within the law. Society thus has an interest in not having parole revoked because of erroneous information or because of an erroneous evaluation of the need to revoke parole . . .. And society has a further interest in treating the parolee with basic fairness: fair treatment in parole revocations will enhance the chance of rehabilitation by avoiding reactions to arbitrariness." (Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, 408 U.S. 471, 484, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2601, 33 L.Ed.2d 484.) Here, too, society has an interest in the future development of the child, in avoiding diagnosis and/or commitment...