Roger v. Yellow Freight Systems, Inc., 92-1304.
| Decision Date | 30 June 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-1304.,92-1304. |
| Citation | 849 F. Supp. 1256 |
| Parties | Pat ROGER, Plaintiff, v. YELLOW FREIGHT SYSTEMS, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois |
Jerry Serritella, Peoria, IL, for plaintiff.
Jeffrey Lee Madoff, Steven L. Brenneman, Matkov Salzman Madoff & Gunn, Chicago, IL, for defendant.
Before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is in one count alleging that he was discharged "in retaliation for the Plaintiff filing a workmens' compensation claim against the Defendant." ). The Court has jurisdiction of this diversity case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
"A motion for summary judgment is not an appropriate occasion for weighing the evidence; rather, the inquiry is limited to determining if there is a genuine issue for trial." Lohorn v. Michal, 913 F.2d 327, 331 (7th Cir.1990). See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.ED.2d 202 (1986). This Court must "view the record and all inferences drawn from it in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Holland v. Jefferson National Life Ins. Co., 883 F.2d 1307, 1312 (7th Cir.1989). When faced with a Motion for Summary Judgment, the non-moving party may not rest on its pleadings. Rather, it is necessary for the non-moving party to demonstrate, through specific evidence, that there remains a genuine issue of triable fact. See, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Bank Leumi Le-Israel, B.M. v. Lee, 928 F.2d 232, 236 (7th Cir.1991).
Defendant is a trucking company engaged in the business of freight transportation services. In 1986, Plaintiff resigned his position as a road driver for Defendant to accept the position of Safety Training Specialist. (Thompson Affidavit p. 1). The duties of the Safety Training Specialist involved touring the United States with Yellow Freight's Safety Training Unit to present a variety of safety programs to various audiences. Id. The Safety Training Unit was a tractor-trailer outfitted with VCRs, a monitor, safety video tapes, displays, and its own generator. (Id. p. 2).
On October 31, 1990, Plaintiff fell off the tractor-trailer and injured his back. (Plaintiff's Dep. p. 32-34). Plaintiff continued to work until June 6, 1991, but eventually stopped working because of pain. On January 23, 1992, Plaintiff was laid off. (Thompson Affidavit Ex. C). His status was changed to "termination due to lack of work" on April 9, 1992. (Thompson Affidavit, Ex. D).
Kenneth Thompson was employed by Defendant as Vice President-Linehaul Safety throughout 1991. In the fall of 1991, Thompson was instructed by Robert Bostick, his supervisor and Defendant's Senior Vice President-Operations, to review the Safety Department and make recommendations to Bostick regarding expense reduction. (Thompson Affidavit p. 3, Bostick Affidavit p. 3).
In November of 1991, Thompson recommended the elimination of four Safety Coordinators, and those positions were eliminated. Thompson subsequently recommended that Plaintiff's position as Safety Training Specialist be eliminated. The stated reason for eliminating Plaintiff's position is as follows:
The reasons that we selected the Safety Training Specialist job to be eliminated as part of the downsizing and restructuring of my department included the high costs of operating and maintaining the Safety Training Unit, the fact that the Safety Training Unit did not directly contribute to revenue for Yellow Freight, the fact that the Safety Training Unit and the Safety Training Specialist job were largely nonessential public relations efforts on behalf of Yellow Freight, and Yellow Freight's desire not to alienate its customers by operation of the rather extravagant Safety Training Unit when, at the same time, it was implementing rate increases for its customers' shipment of freight.
After the Safety Training Specialist position was eliminated, the duties that had been performed by Plaintiff were no longer performed by anyone in Defendant's employ. The Safety Training Unit was put up for sale and eventually purchased by the Pennsylvania Trucking Association in 1992. Id. at 6. Subsequent to his discharge, Plaintiff filed workers' compensation claims in both Illinois and Kansas. These claims were filed at approximately the same time in "May or June" of 1992. (Rogers Dep. p. 137-38).
"Illinois courts have recognized a cause of action when a Plaintiff is discharged in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim." Washburn v. IBP, Inc., 910 F.2d 372, 373 (7th Cir.1990) (citations omitted). For Plaintiff to recover for the tort of retaliatory discharge, he must prove that "(1) he was discharged from employment; (2) in retaliation for his activities; and (3) the discharge violates a clear public policy." Id. When applied specifically to workers' compensation claims, Plaintiff must prove the following elements:
First the plaintiff must have been an employee of the defendant before the injury occurred. Second, the plaintiff must have exercised or threatened to exercise a right granted by the workers' compensation act. Finally, the plaintiff's termination must have been causally related to his or her filing of a claim or statement of intent under the act.
Mercil v. Federal Express Corp., 664 F.Supp. 315, 317 (N.D.Ill.1987) (citations omitted). "The causation element is not met if the employer has a valid basis, which is not a pretext, for discharging the plaintiff." Id. (citations omitted). However, if the plaintiff is an at-will employee who may be fired for no reason at all, "the employer need not tender a legitimate reason for the termination if the employee has not proved, or at least presented a prima facie case, that he or she was fired in retaliation for asserting workers' compensation act rights." Id.
In its Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot establish that he was discharged in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim because he did not file the claim until after his discharge.
The essential allegations in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint are set out in paragraphs nine and ten which state:
).
Thus, the only theory of recovery advanced by Plaintiff is that he was fired in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim. Defendant argues, however, that Plaintiff cannot establish that his discharge was retaliatory because his workers' compensation claim was filed after his discharge.
The evidence indicates that Plaintiff was laid off in January of 1992, and that his status was changed to "terminated" on April 9, 1992. By Plaintiff's own admission, however, he did not file a workers' compensation claim until May or June of 1992, one to two months after he was officially terminated. Plaintiff's deposition testimony casts further light on the circumstances surrounding the filing of his claim:
Plaintiff's own testimony shows that he could not have been discharged in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim because he filed the claims weeks after his discharge. In response Plaintiff argues that:
The "gravamen of the tort of retaliatory discharge is not that the Plaintiff was terminated necessarily after he filed a workmens' compensation claim. The correct terminology is that a Plaintiff is terminated after he exercises his rights pursuant to the Workmens' Compensation Act. It is true that the Amended Complaint is stated along the terms of the Plaintiff filing a workmens' compensation claim. However, the pleadings in Federal Court are notice pleadings and it is only required that they give the other side sufficient notice of what he is being charged with.
Plaintiff's argument creates a distinction without a difference. As noted above in Plaintiff's deposition, he neither discussed workers' compensation with his superiors nor contemplated filing a claim until after he was discharged. Thus, even accepting Plaintiff's "correct terminology" that he was terminated after he "exercised his rights" under the Workers' Compensation Act, he still has not established as a matter of law that he suffered retaliatory discharge. As noted, Plaintiff did not contemplate nor take any steps toward making his claim for Workers' Compensation until one to two months after he was discharged and five to six months after he was laid off. In a similar situation, the court in Springer v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 1988 WL 19243 (C.D.Ill.1987), stated as follows:
Springer was informed of his termination before there was any...
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Roger v. Yellow Freight Systems, Inc.
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