Rogers v. Artuz
| Decision Date | 30 November 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 03-MISC-0066 (JBW).,No. 00-CV-2718 (JBW).,00-CV-2718 (JBW).,03-MISC-0066 (JBW). |
| Citation | 524 F.Supp.2d 193 |
| Parties | Juan ROGERS, Petitioner, v. Christopher ARTUZ, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Harry Conrad Batchelder, Jr., Law Offices of Harry C. Batchelder, Jr., New York, NY, for Petitioner.
Patricia A. Murphy, Riverhead, NY, for Respondent.
This phase of a long pending series of collateral attacks on a state judgment of conviction is required because of a remand by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit directing the district court to grant or deny a certificate of appealability from a Rule 60(b) motion the district court denied and treated as a second habeas petition — a remand characterized by counsel as "puzzling." See pp. 14-45, infra. It represents a recurrent theme associated with the amendments to federal habeas corpus law by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) — finding ways to circumvent the statute's limitation on successive petitions. The most popular avenue is a motion pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure attacking a district court judgment denying a petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A) ().
Rule 60(b) provides that a district court, "[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just, ... may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding" for one of several enumerated grounds, including fraud, mistake, and newly discovered evidence. Subsections one through five delineate specific grounds for relief; subsection six, the Rule's catch-all (relied upon by Rogers), provides that relief may be granted "for any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6).
There is no legal basis suggested by Petitioner Juan Rogers, counsel or the court's own research for the Rule 60(b) motion seeking to set aside this court's judgment dismissing petitioner's habeas corpus petition, with a certificate of appealability denied by the district court and court of appeals and the appeal dismissed because Rogers failed to make a "substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right." See Rogers v. Artuz, No. 00-CV-2718, 2003 WL 21817490, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13623 (E.D.N.Y. July 7, 2003) (), affirmed on appeal by, Mandate of the Court of Appeals (2d Cir. July 12, 2004), No. 00-CV-2718 E.D.N.Y. Docket Sheet Entry ("Docket Entry") No. 55.
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has remanded Rogers's appeal from the district court's denial of the Rule 60(b) motion with what is in effect an order to the district court to grant or deny a "a certificate of appealability." See Rogers v. Artuz, No. 00-CV-2718, 2007 WL 2815692, *1, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70949, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2007) (denying Rogers's Rule 60(b) motion); Mandate of the Court of Appeals (07-4249) (2d Cir. Oct. 4, 2007), Docket Entry No. 86. Pursuant to the mandate, by order of this court dated October 30 2007, counsel for petitioner was appointed and an expedited hearing was ordered. See Order dated Oct. 30, 2007, Docket Entry No. 87. The hearing was held on November 29, 2007.
One of AEDPA's chief purposes was to ensure speed and finality in collateral attacks of convictions. See Jones v. United States, 304 F.3d 1035, 1039 (11th Cir.2002) (); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436, 120 S.Ct. 1479, 146 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) (); (H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-518, 110th Cong., 2d Sess., 1996, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 944) (AEDPA sought to make "reforms to curb the abuse of the ... writ of habeas corpus, and to address the acute problem of unnecessary delay"). Instead the statute has resulted in more delay and lack of finality. See Muhammad Faridi, Streamlining Habeas Corpus While Undermining Judicial Review: How 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) Violates the Constitution, 19 St. Thomas L.Rev. 361, 374-79 (). As the Supreme Court has noted, "[a]ll we can say is that in a world of silk purses and pigs' ears, the Act is not a silk purse of the art of statutory drafting." Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997).
A recent empirical study of habeas cases found that petitions filed by state prisoners under AEDPA "take longer to complete in district court" than before the statute's passage. See Nancy J. King et al., Habeas Litigation in U.S. District Courts (Executive Summary), National Center for State Courts (2007), at 3, available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219559.pdf. The report ranks the Eastern District of New York as the sixteenth worse federal district court in the country for taking an average of some five hundred days to reach a final decision on a state habeas petition. See id. at 44. The other federal districts in New York state have even longer delays. Id.
In May 1995, a Suffolk County jury convicted Rogers of murder in the second degree for the January 1993 killing of Sandra Mathys. See Rogers v. Artuz, No. 00-CV-2718, 2007 WL 2815692, *1, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70949, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2007) (denying Rogers's Rule 60(b) motion). Rogers was Ms. Mathys's Kung Fu instructor and lover. Id. When Ms. Mathys complained of Rogers's refusal to tell his wife about their affair, he terminated the extra-marital relationship by shooting Ms. Mathys twice in the head. Id. He was sentenced to twenty-five years to life in prison. Id., 2007 WL 2815692, *1, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70949 at *2.
Upon his conviction, Rogers filed a direct appeal to the Appellate Division Second Department, which was denied. Id. Leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was also denied. Id. Rogers then began challenging his conviction in labyrinthine state collateral proceedings. Id., 2007 WL 2815692, *1, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70949 at *3. Denied were Rogers's trial court motions to vacate the judgment, leave to appeal, and an application for a writ of error coram nobis. Id.
After exhausting collateral remedies in state court, Rogers filed his original petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Southern District of New York in March 2000. See Transfer Order filed on May 10, 2000, Docket Entry No. 1. That petition was transferred to the Eastern District and assigned to a judge of this court. See Order to Show Cause signed by Judge Joanna Seybert, filed on May 22, 2000, Docket Entry No. 4. It was transferred to the judge now responsible for the case as part of a major consolidation of the district's habeas corpus petitions. See Docket Entry dated April 25, 2003.
In his federal habeas petition, Rogers presented a Brady claim only — that the prosecution's failure to disclose that Ms. Mathys was a prime suspect in an unrelated double homicide investigation violated his constitutional rights. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). Rogers later amended his habeas petition to contend that both his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective in failing to raise the Brady claim at trial and on appeal. After a full analysis of his claims, this court dismissed Rogers's petition for lack of substantial merit and denied a certificate of appealability. See Rogers v. Artuz, No. 00-CV-2718, 2003 WL 21817490, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13623 (E.D.N.Y. July 7, 2003).
In October 2003 Rogers filed an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. See Notice of Appeal filed October 6, 2003, Docket Entry No. 49. The Court of Appeals "ordered that the motion for a certificate of appealability is denied and the appeal dismissed because appellant has not made a `substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.'" See. Mandate of the Court of Appeals (2d Cir. July 12, 2004), Docket Entry No. 55.
In December 2006 Rogers moved in the district court pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to vacate this court's judgment denying habeas corpus relief. See Rogers's Rule 60(b) Motion dated Dec. 13, 2006, Docket. Entry No. 60. He suggested three issues in this motion: (1) the prosecution's peremptory challenges to two African-American venire panelists during the voir dire stage of his trial violated Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986); (2) his Miranda rights were violated by police officers when he voluntarily subjected himself to a polygraph test regarding the murder of Ms. Mathys; and (3) to the extent that AEDPA bars the relief he now seeks, it is an unconstitutional restraint on this court's inherent powers under Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution. Counsel was appointed on January 23, 2007. See Order dated Jan. 23, 2007, Docket Entry No. 61. After a number of adjournments sought by the parties, an evidentiary hearing was held on June 25, 2007. The court ordered further briefing. See Docket Entry No. 76.
By Memorandum, Judgment and Order dated September 12, 2007, the district court found that Rogers had attempted to file a second 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition couched in the language of a motion under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rogers v. Artuz, Nos. 00-CV-2718 (JBW), 2007 WL 2815692, **3-4, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70949, at * 8 (E...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Crenshaw v. Supt. of Five Points Corr. Facility
...denying a petition.'" McLean v. McGinnis, No. 97-CV-3593 (JG), 2008 WL 312765, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2008) (quoting Rogers v. Artuz, 524 F.Supp.2d 193, 194 (E.D.N.Y.2007)). Here, Crenshaw's claim of newly discovered evidence does not challenge the integrity of his habeas petition. Crensha......