Rogers v. Boyd

Decision Date29 August 2016
Docket NumberCIVIL ACTION NO.: 2:13-CV-227-WHA [WO]
PartiesJASON E. ROGERS, #254 032, Petitioner, v. WARDEN BOYD, et al., Respondents.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama
RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. INTRODUCTION

This cause is before the court on a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for habeas corpus relief filed by Petitioner, Jason Rogers, on April 8, 2013.1 Petitioner presents claims challenging the constitutionality of his May 8, 2007 conviction in the Autauga County Circuit Court, pursuant to his plea of guilty, for violating Alabama Code § 13A-6-110 (solicitation of a minor by a computer). Specifically, Petitioner claims:

1. He was illegally extradited from Oklahoma without the Governor's approval;
2. The trial court engaged in "illegal non-action" regarding his Rule 32 petition;
3. The grand jury returned a defective indictment against him;
4. Trial counsel operated under a conflict of interest;5. His conviction violated the Ex Post Facto Clause;
6. Alabama Code §§ 13A-6-110 and -111 were misinterpreted and § 13A-6-122 is defective;
7. He was subjected to illegal entrapment;
8. His mother's home was subjected to an illegal search and seizure;
9. His guilty plea was involuntary and coerced;
10. The trial court conspired and engaged in fraudulent acts with other State actors to illegally convict him.

Doc. 1.2

Respondents maintain that the petition is time-barred by the one-year federal limitation period applicable to § 2254 petitions. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Respondents also maintain that Petitioner failed to exhaust his remedies in the state courts, but simultaneously argue that Petitioner's claims can no longer be presented in state court, and therefore are procedurally default. Doc. 5. Upon review of the pleadings, evidentiary materials, and applicable law, the court concludes that no evidentiary hearing is required and that that petition should be denied as untimely in part and unexhausted in part.

II. DISCUSSION

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") provides the statute of limitations for federal habeas petitions:

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of—
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

A. State Court Proceedings

The exhibits submitted by Respondents reflect that on August 18, 2006 an Autauga County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner on one count of soliciting a child by computer in violation of Alabama Code § 13A-6-110 and one count of transmitting obscene material to a child by computer in violation of Alabama Code § 13A-6-111. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Petitioner entered a guilty plea on May 8, 2007, admitting to a violation of § 13A-6-110.3 The charge under § 13A-6-111 was dismissed. On June 27, 2007, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to ten years in prison. He did not file a direct appeal. Doc. 5, Exhs. A-C.

On June 24, 2010, Petitioner sought post-conviction relief under Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 in the trial court. The trial court denied the Rule 32 petition on March 30, 2011, holding that the petition established no material issues of fact that would entitle him to relief. Petitioner did not appeal the denial. Doc. 5, Exhs. D-F.

Prior to the trial court's order denying his Rule 32 post-conviction petition, Petitioner, on November 5, 2010, filed with the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals a "Petition for Writ of Certiorari and/or Motion for Default Judgment and/or Writ of Mandamus." The appellate court denied the petition on November 22, 2010. On January 12, 2011, the Alabama Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition for mandamus and on January 25, 2011 it struck Petitioner's motion for default. Doc. 5, Exhs. G-J.

B. Application of the Federal Limitation Period

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) directs that the limitation period for filing a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition begins to run when the time for seeking direct review of the challenged judgment expires. As noted, Petitioner filed no direct appeal of his 2007 conviction. Since Petitioner failed to undertake the direct appeal process, he could not petition the United States Supreme Court for review of his conviction. For purposes of federal habeas review, Petitioner's conviction became final on August 8, 2007—42 days after imposition of sentence—as this is the date on which histime to seek direct review expired. See Alabama Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b)(1). The one-year period of limitation in § 2244(d)(1)(A) therefore began to run on this date, and ran uninterrupted until the limitation period expired on August 7, 2008.

1. Statutory Tolling

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) provides that "[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this section." Although Petitioner filed a Rule 32 petition with the trial court on June 24, 2010, this petition was not pending during the running of the federal limitation period because it was filed after expiration of this time period. "[E]ven 'properly filed' state-court petitions must be 'pending' [during the one-year period of limitation] in order to toll the limitations period. A state court petition . . . that is filed following the expiration of the limitations period cannot toll that period because there is no period remaining to be tolled." Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 2000); Tinker v. Moore, 255 F.3d 1331, 1333-35 n.4 (11th Cir. 2001) ("[A] properly filed petition in state court only tolls the time remaining within the federal limitation period."). It is, therefore, clear that the state post-conviction petition filed by Petitioner on June 24, 2010 had no effect on the running of the limitation period applicable to the instant federal habeas petition. Webster, 199 F.3d at 1259.

2. Equitable Tolling

The Supreme Court has determined that the one-year limitation period is subject to equitable tolling when a petitioner "shows '(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way' and prevented timely filing." Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)); Sandvik v. United States, 177 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that the limitation period"may be equitably tolled" on grounds apart from those specified in the habeas statute "when a movant untimely files because of extraordinary circumstances that are both beyond his control and unavoidable even with diligence"); Steed v. Head, 219 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir. 2000); Knight v. Schofield, 292 F.3d 709, 711 (11th Cir. 2002). The diligence required is "reasonable diligence," not "maximum feasible diligence," Holland, 560 U.S. at 653, and the extraordinary circumstance prong requires a causal connection between the circumstance and the late filing. San Martin v. McNeil, 633 F.3d 1257, 1267 (11th Cir. 2011). "Equitable tolling will not be available in most cases, as extensions of time will only be granted if 'extraordinary circumstances' beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file a petition on time." Calderon v. United States District Ct., 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other grounds, 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998); Miller v. New Jersey St. Dept. of Corr., 145 F.3d 616, 618-19 (3rd Cir. 1998); Jones v. United States, 304 F.3d 1035, 1039-40 (11th Cir. 2002); Drew v. Dept. of Corr., 297 F.3d 1278, 1286 (11th Cir. 2002). "The burden of establishing entitlement to this extraordinary remedy plainly rests with the petitioner." Drew, 297 F.3d at 1286; see Helton v. Sec. for the Dept. of Corr., 259 F.3d 1310, 1313-14 (11th Cir. 2001).

The court granted Petitioner an opportunity to show why his federal habeas petition should not be denied as filed outside the one-year limitation period prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). See Doc. 6. Petitioner argues that equitable tolling is justified by his ignorance of the law. Doc. 9. But the law is well settled that an inmate's lack of legal knowledge, failure to understand legal principles, and inability to recognize potential claims for relief in a timely manner do not constitute extraordinary circumstances sufficient to warrant equitable tolling of the limitation period. Wakefield v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 131 F.3d 967, 969 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that ignorance of the law "is not a factor that can warrant equitable tolling"); United States v. Sosa, 364 F.3d 507,512 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that pro se status and ignorance of the law do not justify equitable tolling); Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that a petitioner's pro se status and ignorance of the law are insufficient to support equitable tolling of the statute of limitations); ...

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