Rogers v. City of Whitehall

• Decision Date: 16 July 1986
• Docket Number: No. 85-1747,85-1747
• Citation: 25 OBR 89,494 N.E.2d 1387,25 Ohio St. 3d 67
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court
• Parties: , 25 O.B.R. 89 ROGERS, Appellee, v. CITY OF WHITEHALL, Appellant.

Page 67

25 Ohio St.3d 67

494 N.E.2d 1387, 25 O.B.R. 89

ROGERS, Appellee, v.CITY OF WHITEHALL, Appellant.

No. 85-1747.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

July 16, 1986.

Rogers' lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, was brought pursuant to Section 1983,Title 42, U.S.Code, claiming deprivation of Rogers' constitutional rights, including due process.Hereinafter, we discuss in detail the scope of the federal action, but do note that ultimately it terminated with the filing of a judgment entry and settlement decree and a covenant not to sue.The covenant not to sue incorporated therein by reference the judgment entry and settlement decree.The judgment entry and settlement decree provided for Whitehall to pay to Rogers a total of approximately $71,000 plus Rogers' legal fees.These monies were paid.

The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Rogers & Godbey Co., L.P.A., James D. Godbey and George C. Rogers, Toledo, for appellee.

Ted Zwayer, City Atty., Paul R. Edgar and Kevin Durkin, for appellant.

KEEFE, Justice.

This court is confronted with the following issues: (1) Whether appellee Rogers' action and judgment in his favor in the federal court is res judicata to the unpaid salary action he brought in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County; (2) What is the legal significance of the covenant not to sue executed at the time of the settlement of the federal suit?

Appellee argues that the claim for unpaid salary he had against Whitehall was not included in the Section 1983 civil rights action he brought in the federal court.The federal action, he contends, sounded in tort and the later complaint filed in common pleas court was predicated upon a contract or quasi-contract theory of law.¹The common pleas judge, in examining the complaint filed by Rogers in the United States district court, concluded that a salary issue was in fact very conspicuously embraced.We agree.This is not a case where the complainant in federal court could have included an additional claim, and should have, but failed to do so.Examination of the complaint filed April 29, 1980 by Rogers in the United States district court overwhelmingly demonstrates Rogers' inclusion in his litany of claimed damages the wrong done to him by Whitehall by not paying his salary for the period hereinabove indicated.The complaint in the United States district court expressly claims that Rogers' salary was not paid.²

The doctrine of res judicata is an integral part of the law of this state.For purposes of the matters before us, this doctrine is that an existing final judgment or decree between the parties to litigation is conclusive as to all claims which were or might have been litigated in a first lawsuit.³Furthermore, it has long been recognized that the doctrine of res judicata applies in a proper case as between federal court and state court judgments.The general principle was set forth in the early case of Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Sargent(1875), 27 Ohio St. 233, in which it was expressed, inter alia, that the judgment or decree of a court possessing competent jurisdiction shall be final as to the subject matter thereby determined, a rule which " 'can admit of no doubt.' "Id. at 238(quoting from the case of Le Guen v. Gouverneur & Kemble[1800], 1 Johns.Cas. 492).There are many appellate decisions before and after Sargent espousing the same res judicata principle.The doctrine seems so well established as not to require a listing of further authorities.

We do reference, however, Henderson v. Ryan(1968), 13 Ohio St.2d 31, 233 N.E.2d 506[42 O.O.2d 65], because we find especially apt the following language from Justice Schneider's opinion:

"To save time and to relieve court congestion, parties are encouraged, if not commanded, to litigate all their claims in one action, except to the extent that joinder of multifarious and complex issues would produce confusion and prejudice."Id. at 38, 233 N.E.2d 506.

No perceivable problem exists by joining the unpaid salary issue with the principal issue, viz., deprivation of rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and under Section 1983,Title 42, U.S. Code, in the federal court action.It seems illogical to attempt to argue that litigation of the unpaid salary issue simultaneously with Rogers' federal claims might have produced confusion and/or prejudice when the federal suit was resolved by a settlement decree entered into by "agreement of the parties and their attorneys, and with the approval of the Court."

We approve the rule of law enunciated in the recent case of Lakewood Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. Lakewood(1984), 20 Ohio App.3d 338, 486 N.E.2d 194.In Lakewood, the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, in a well-reasoned opinion authored by Judge Pryatel, decided that a cause of action which has been litigated in federal court determining that a zoning ordinance did not violate the ...