Rogers v. City of Baton Rouge
| Decision Date | 25 July 2016 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-170-RLB |
| Parties | CAPTAIN FLORA ROGERS v. CITY OF BATON ROUGE, THROUGH THE BATON ROUGE POLICE DEPARTMENT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana |
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment (R. Doc. 29) filed by Defendant, the City of Baton Rouge, through the Baton Rouge Police Department (Defendant). Plaintiff, Captain Flora Rogers (Plaintiff), filed an Opposition (R. Doc. 33) in response to Defendant's Motion. For the reasons given below, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
In this action, Plaintiff claims that Defendant, her employer, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623, by discriminating against her based on her race, age and participation in protected activity. Plaintiff began working for Defendant as a police officer in 1977. Plaintiff was eventually promoted from Officer to Sergeant and, in 2003, she was promoted to Lieutenant. (R. Doc. 29-3 at 1). According to Plaintiff, beginning in April of 2011, she was subjected to the following conduct and adverse employment actions because of her age and race, or participation in protected activity.
First, Plaintiff was transferred on April 7, 2011 from East Baton Rouge Parish District Court Liaison to criminal records, and was allegedly replaced by "a third year and less experienced white vetran [sic], who was Plaintiff's subordinate." (R. Doc. 1 at 7). "Upon being transferred," Plaintiff claims, she was "stripped down to doing civilian work below her level of experience and position." (R. Doc. 1 at 8). Later in April, Plaintiff was informed by Captain Mary Walsh that she would be transferred to Operational Services to work as Captain Walsh's assistant. (R. Doc. 6 at 4) (R. Doc. 29-14 at 13) (transferred to Operational Services under Captain Walsh). While working as Captain Walsh's assistant, Plaintiff claims that she was "only allowed to perform menial duties that were not congruent to her rank and position." (R. Doc. 1 at 8).
On June 2, 2011, Plaintiff was transferred out of her administrative position in Operational Services-Court Support Division to Uniform Patrol and assigned to District Two. (R. Doc. 1 at 3); (R. Doc. 29-3 at 1). According to the record, this meant that Plaintiff would be back in the field for the first time in over 24 years. (R. Doc. 29-3 at 1); (R. Doc. 29-14 at 2, 5). On September 20, 2011, Plaintiff was moved from District Two to District One within Uniform Patrol. (R. Doc. 1 at 4) (R. Doc. 29-3 at 2).
While at District Two (between June and September of 2011), Plaintiff was in the training phase of her transition to Uniform Patrol. (R. Doc. 1 at 3); (R. Doc. 29-10 at 2). During that time, Plaintiff claims she was forced to train under the supervision of subordinates and was required to take classes with new recruits. (R. Doc. 1 at 3); (R. Doc. 29-4) (Plaintiff trained under Sergeant Michael Cantu, whom she outranked). In particular, Plaintiff was required to take a law class normally intended for new recruits. (R. Doc. 1 at 6); (R. Doc. 33-3 at 6-7); (R. Doc. 29-14 at 2). According to Plaintiff, she was the only Lieutenant required to take the law class for new recruits. (R. Doc. 33-4 at 2, 5) (Candice Graham had no memory of any other Lieutenant being required to take the law class with new recruits); (R. Doc. 33-6 at 2) (Daryl Rice testified that he did not know of any other Lieutenant required to attend the law class for new recruits and that current Lieutenants don't "necessarily have to go back and take the law class, they just do in-service"). Plaintiff alleges that the above transfers amounted to demotions and were taken because of her age and race.
As further proof that Defendant took these actions because of her age, Plaintiff claims that she was subjected to ageist comments from her co-workers and supervisors. (R. Doc. 1 at 7) ; (R. Doc. 1 at 7) (other co-workers repeatedly asked Plaintiff about her retirement plans); (R. Doc. 29-14 at 2) (Plaintiff complained of being asked about her age and when she planned on retiring); (R. Doc. 29-14 at 5) (Captain Daryl Rice explained: "I did talk to her about my retirement plans and I told her that I know when it's time to leave and . . . you need to examine yourself and see if it is your time to leave."); (R. Doc. 29-14 at 4) (Captain Candace Graham reported that she told Plaintiff: "Well honey why don't you just retire.").
Plaintiff's training ended upon being moved to District One in September of 2011, at which time she began the evaluation phase of her transfer to Uniform Patrol. At the end of November, Plaintiff was ordered to take the test associated with the law class she had completed about a month before. Plaintiff, however, refused this order. (R. Doc. 29-6).
According to Plaintiff, she complained on December 16, 2011 that the above employment actions were being taken because of her race and age. (R. Doc. 1 at 8). On that same day, Plaintiff was placed on administrative leave with pay until December 27, 2011, for refusing to take the test associated with the law class. (R. Doc. 29-3). Beginning at that time, Plaintiff was also denied the ability to perform "extra duty" work, even "on her off and personal time" (R. Doc. 1 at 9), which would have allowed her to earn extra pay on top of her usual compensation. (R. Doc. 29-1 at 4); (R. Doc. 33-2); (R. Doc. 33-3 at 6). Plaintiff also filed a formal complaint with human resources in January of 2012, complaining of age and race discrimination. (R. Doc. 29-14).
On February 8, 2012, Chief Dewayne White sent a letter notifying Plaintiff that he was "considering taking official disciplinary action" against her for refusing the order to take the law test. According to Chief White's letter, a "pre-disciplinary hearing" would be held in his office on February 15, 2012. In her February 14, 2012 response to Chief White's letter, Plaintiff gave the following explanation for her refusal to take the test associated with the law class.
First, Plaintiff explained that the test is ordinarily administered within a week from the end of the course, but in her case, she was not asked to take the test until "approximately an entire month later." (R. Doc. 29-6 at 2). Plaintiff believed, based on talking with some of the trainers, that this was a "longer amount of time than [was] normal and/or suitable for taking this kind of test." (R. Doc. 29-6 at 2). Plaintiff was concerned about "why this process was prolonged for this amount of time." (R. Doc. 29-6 at 2). Moreover, Plaintiff informed Chief White that she was told by Captain Rice and Captain Roan that the "future of [her] job lied in the passing or failing of this test." (R. Doc. 29-6 at 2). Given the pressure being placed on Plaintiff and the lapse in time between the test and her completion of the law class, Plaintiff "was under a great deal of stress" and "made the decision not to take the test until [she] had some counseling to determine clarity, to address [her] concerns" and receive an "explanation as to why [she] was the only Lt. being ordered to take this test." (R. Doc. 29-6 at 2). Plaintiff also felt that being the only Lieutenant ordered to take the class with new recruits was "insulting and demeaning." (R. Doc. 29-6 at 3).
In March of 2012, following the hearing, Plaintiff was suspended, without pay, for refusing to take the test associated with the law class. (R. Doc. 29-3). This suspension was later reduced to a reprimand in July of 2012, without any explanation, and Plaintiff's back pay was restored. (R. Doc. 29-15). However, during her suspension, Plaintiff was still unable to perform "extra duty" work. (R. Doc. 1 at 9). Plaintiff claims that she was placed on administrative leave in December of 2011 and suspended in March of 2012, and precluded from earning extra pay during that period, as retaliation for complaining about age and race discrimination beginning in December of 2011. Plaintiff further claims that these actions were taken because of her age and race.
Finally, the record demonstrates that Plaintiff was promoted to Captain on June 11, 2012. (R. Doc. 29-7). However, nothing in the record indicates that Plaintiff took the test associated with the law class — either before or after her promotion to Captain.
Summary judgment shall be granted when there are no genuine issues as to any material facts and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. When a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported under Rule 56(c), the opposing party may not rest on the mere allegations of their pleadings, but rather must come forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Electric Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). The non-movant's evidence is to be believed for purposes of the motion and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in the non-movant's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, summary judgment must be entered against the plaintiff, if he or she fails to make an evidentiary showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to his or her claim. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). Without a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to the plaintiff's claim, there can be "no genuine issue as to any material fact since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all facts immaterial." Celotex Corp., ...
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