Rogers v. Doody

• Decision Date: 05 March 1935
• Citation: 178 A. 51,119 Conn. 532
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: ROGERS v. DOODY.

178 A. 51

119 Conn. 532

ROGERS v. DOODY.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

March 5, 1935

Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; Ernest A. Inglis Judge.

Action by Philip C. Rogers against Patrick J. Doody, administrator of the estate of Beatrice Doody, for an injunction to restrain the defendant from enforcing a judgment against plaintiff. Judgment was rendered for plaintiff on trial to the court, and defendant appeals.

No error.

See also, 116 Conn. 713, 164 A. 641.

Denis T. O'Brien, of Meriden, for appellant.

Arthur Klein, of New Haven, and Louis Boyarsky, of Wallingford, for appellee.

Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HAINES, BANKS, AVERY, and JENNINGS JJ.

BANKS Judge.

On May 17, 1933, the defendant herein recovered a judgment against the plaintiff herein in the superior court for New Haven county in the sum of $6,199.12 upon a cause of action based upon the heedlessness of the defendant in that action (plaintiff herein) and his reckless disregard of the rights of others in the operation of a motor vehicle in which the present defendant's intestate was riding as a guest. On May 31, 1933, the plaintiff herein filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy and was duly adjudged a bankrupt, and on February 26, 1934, was duly discharged of all of his provable debts by the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. Thereafter the defendant threatened to take out an execution upon the judgment and to levy the same upon the property of the plaintiff and in default thereof upon his body, and the plaintiff brought this action seeking to have the defendant enjoined from so doing. The trial court granted the injunction. The sole question upon this appeal is whether the plaintiff's discharge in bankruptcy released him from the liability of this judgment.

Section 17a (2) of the United States Bankruptcy Act, 11 USCA § 35 (2), provides that: " A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, except such as *** (second) are liabilities for *** willful and malicious injuries to the person or property of another." The action in which the judgment was rendered was brought under our so-called guest statute, which exempts the owner or operator of a motor vehicle from liability to a guest in the same in case of accident, " unless such accident shall have been intentional on the part of such owner or operator or caused by his heedlessness or his reckless disregard of the rights of others." Gen. St. § 1628. We have said that this phrase meets the legislative intention where it is construed to read " or caused by his heedless and his reckless disregard of the rights of others," and that " heedless" in this connection does not add to the characterization of the conduct of the owner or operator of the car. Bordonaro v. Senk, 109 Conn. 428, 430, 431, 147 A. 136. The question thus resolves itself into this is the judgment obtained by a guest in a motor vehicle against its owner or operator for injuries received in an accident caused by the latter's reckless disregard of his rights a liability for willful and malicious injury to person or property within the meaning of section 17a (2) of the Bankruptcy Act?

A willful and malicious injury is one inflicted intentionally without just cause or excuse. It does not necessarily involve the ill will or malevolence shown in express malice. Nor is it sufficient to constitute such an injury that the act resulting in the injury was intentional in the sense that it was the voluntary action of the person involved. Not only the action producing the injury but the resulting injury must be intentional. " A willful or malicious injury is one caused by design. Willfulness and malice alike import intent. *** [Its] characteristic element is the design to injure, either actually entertained, or to be implied from the conduct and circumstances." Sharkey v. Skilton, 83 Conn. 503, 507, 77 A. 950, 951; Simenauskas v. Connecticut Co., 102 Conn. 676, 129 A. 790; 20 R.C.L. 21. In the criminal law, where an act is penalized if performed " willfully", guilt is conditioned, not on the intentional commission of the prohibited act alone, but on its commission with an evil intent or guilty purpose to violate the law. State v. Foote, 71 Conn. 737, 43 A. 488; State v. Nussenholtz, 76 Conn. 92, 55 A. 589. It is apparent that the purpose of this section of the Bankruptcy Act was to prevent the intentional wrongdoer from escaping liability for his acts, and in the cases arising under it the courts have generally held that, to come within the exception, the injury inflicted must have been international, wrongful, and without just cause or excuse. Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754; 1 Collier on Bankruptcy (13th Ed.) p. 619, and cases there cited; annotation to Ely v. O'Dell, 57 A.L.R. 153.

The liability here involved was that arising out of a cause of action based upon an injury caused by the heedless and reckless disregard by...