Rogers v. Ford Motor Co.

Decision Date16 May 1996
Docket NumberNo 3:94cv819 AS.,3:94cv819 AS.
Citation925 F. Supp. 1413
PartiesGail ROGERS and Robert Rogers, Plaintiffs, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Bendix Safety Restraints, Inc. and AlliedSignal, Inc., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Patrick F. O'Leary, Goshen, IN, for Gail Rogers and Robert Rogers.

Mark D. Boveri, John T. Mulvihill, Sr., Barnes and Thornburg, South Bend, IN, Amy L. Mader, Baker and Daniels, South Bend, IN, Richard E. Steinbronn, Barnes and Thornburg, Fort Wayne, IN, Byron K. Mason, Indianapolis, IN, Kathleen M. Anderson, Barnes and Thornburg, Fort Wayne, IN, for Ford Motor Co.

Eric A. Riegner, Lloyd H. Milliken, Locke Reynolds Boyd and Weisell, Indianapolis, IN, for Bendix Safety Restraints, Inc. and AlliedSignal, Inc.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ALLEN SHARP, Chief Judge.

This matter is before the court on the parties' motions for summary judgment. The plaintiffs have moved for partial summary judgment against defendants Bendix Safety Restraints, Inc., and AlliedSignal, Inc., on the ground that defendants Bendix and AlliedSignal are collaterally estopped from disputing the issue of defective design. Bendix and AlliedSignal (collectively "AlliedSignal")1 have moved for complete summary judgment on both the plaintiffs' common law negligence and statutory strict liability claims. Defendants Ford Motor Company ("Ford") and AlliedSignal also have moved for partial summary judgment as to the issue of punitive damages. This court has jurisdiction based upon diversity of citizenship pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

I. FACTS

Plaintiff Gail Rogers was injured in an automobile accident on November 11, 1992, when the vehicle she was riding in sustained a driver's side impact in a collision with another vehicle. She was a front-seat passenger in a 1988 Lincoln Town Car operated by her husband, plaintiff Robert Rogers. The Rogers's vehicle was manufactured by defendant Ford and contained seat belt assemblies manufactured by defendant Allied-Signal.

The plaintiffs claim that Ms. Rogers sustained enhanced bodily injuries when the seat belt in the Rogers's vehicle inadvertently released during the accident, allowing Ms. Rogers to strike the dashboard and windshield.2 Specifically, the plaintiffs contend that the seat belt assembly in their Lincoln Town Car was vulnerable to "inertial actuation," an engineering phenomenon which theoretically can occur when the housing of the seat belt buckle is abruptly accelerated from the back side while the spring-loaded seat belt button and attached portions of the latching mechanism remain momentarily at rest relative to the housing of the buckle, thereby simulating the ordinary depression of the button.3 The plaintiffs' complaint seeks compensatory damages for Ms. Rogers's injuries and for Mr. Rogers's loss of consortium, as well as punitive damages and court costs.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with any affidavits, show that there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED.R.CIV.P. 56; Russo v. Health, Welfare & Pension Fund, Local 705, 984 F.2d 762 (7th Cir.1993). A thorough discussion of Rule 56 can be found in a trilogy of cases decided in 1986 by the Supreme Court of the United States. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Celotex addressed the initial burdens of the parties under Rule 56, and Anderson addressed the standards under which the record is to be analyzed within the structure of Rule 56. Although the Supreme Court revisited the trilogy in Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 112 S.Ct. 2072, 119 L.Ed.2d 265 (1992), a case born in the context of antitrust law, the most that can be said for Eastman Kodak is that it did not tinker with Celotex and Anderson, and possibly involved an attempt to clarify Matsushita. This view is well-supported by an in-depth academic analysis in Schwarzer, Hirsch, and Barrans, The Analysis and Decision of Summary Judgment Motions, 139 F.R.D. 441 (1991).

The initial burden is on the moving party to demonstrate, with or without supporting affidavits, the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and that judgment as a matter of law should be granted in the moving party's favor. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. A question of material fact is a question which will be outcome determinative of an issue in the case. The Supreme Court has instructed that the facts which are material in a specific case shall be determined by the substantive law controlling the given case or issue. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. Once the moving party has met its initial burden, the opposing party must "go beyond the pleadings and ... designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine material issue for trial.'" Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553 (quoting Rule 56) (alteration added). The nonmoving party may not rest on its pleadings, McGrath v. Gillis, 44 F.3d 567, 569 (7th Cir.1995); Hughes v. Joliet Correctional Ctr., 931 F.2d 425, 428 (7th Cir.1991), nor may the party resisting summary judgment rely upon conclusory allegations in affidavits. Cusson-Cobb v. O'Lessker, 953 F.2d 1079, 1081 (7th Cir.1992).

During its summary judgment analysis, the court must construe the facts and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Smith v. Fruin, 28 F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 735, 130 L.Ed.2d 638 (1995); Brennan v. Daley, 929 F.2d 346, 348 (7th Cir.1991). Furthermore, the court is required to analyze summary judgment motions under the standard of proof relevant to the case or issue. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252-55, 106 S.Ct. at 2512-14.

The contention of one party that there are no issues of material fact preventing entry of judgment in its favor does not bar that party from asserting that there are issues of fact sufficient to prevent the court from entering judgment as a matter of law against it. Where, as here, the opposing parties each submit motions for summary judgment, the court is not required to grant judgment as a matter of law for one side or the other. Heublein, Inc. v. United States, 996 F.2d 1455, 1461 (2d Cir.1993); Judsen Rubber Works, Inc. v. Manufacturing, Prod. & Serv. Workers Union Local No. 24, 889 F.Supp. 1057, 1060 (N.D.Ill.1995). Instead, the court must evaluate each party's motion on its own merits, resolving factual uncertainties and drawing all reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is under consideration. Heublein, 996 F.2d at 1461; Judsen, 889 F.Supp. at 1060; Buttitta v. City of Chicago, 803 F.Supp. 213, 217 (N.D.Ill.1992), aff'd, 9 F.3d 1198 (7th Cir. 1993).

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs Gail and Robert Rogers maintain that the defendants are liable under a theory of common law negligence for their failure (a) to design and manufacture seat belts not subject to inertial actuation; (b) to conduct reasonable tests to discover said defects; and (c) to undertake or conduct a recall campaign prior to the date of Ms. Rogers's accident. In addition to their common law negligence claim, the plaintiffs also contend that the defendants are strictly liable under Indiana's Strict Product Liability Act, IND.CODE § 33-1-1.5-1 et seq.

A. Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

The plaintiffs claim that the seat belt design installed in their Lincoln Town Car, known in the automotive industry as a "Type I" buckle, was conclusively adjudged defective by the verdict in Hoch v. Ford Motor Co., No. 355962 (Cal.Sup.Ct. Nov. 13, 1991), aff'd sub. nom Hoch v. Allied-Signal, Inc./Bendix Safety Restraints Div., 24 Cal. App.4th 48, 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 615 (Cal.Ct.App. 1994). In Hoch, a case which involved the fatal rollover of a 1987 Ford Bronco II, a San Mateo, California jury returned a special verdict finding that the design of the seat belt in the Bronco was defective at the time it left AlliedSignal's control. Accordingly, the plaintiffs argue that the use of collateral estoppel against AlliedSignal is appropriate here.

The doctrine of collateral estoppel operates to bar relitigation of an issue that was necessarily adjudicated in a prior suit, provided that there was a final judgment on the merits in a court of competent jurisdiction and an identity of issues between the prior and subsequent lawsuits. Adams v. Marion County Office of Family & Children, 659 N.E.2d 202, 205-06 (Ind.Ct.App.1995); Hayworth v. Schilli Leasing, Inc., 644 N.E.2d 602, 604 (Ind.Ct.App.1994); see Kimberlin v. DeLong, 637 N.E.2d 121, 125 (Ind. 1994), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 98, 133 L.Ed.2d 53 (1995); Sullivan v. American Casualty Co., 605 N.E.2d 134, 137-39 (Ind.1992). Collateral estoppel is termed `offensive' when, as here, "a plaintiff seeks to foreclose the defendant from litigating an issue the defendant has previously litigated unsuccessfully in an action with another party." Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n. 4, 99 S.Ct. 645, 649 n. 4, 58 L.Ed.2d 552, 559 n. 4 (1979); see Kimberlin, 637 N.E.2d at 125; Tofany v. NBS Imaging Sys., Inc., 616 N.E.2d 1034, 1037 (Ind. 1993).

Whether the device of offensive collateral estoppel should be allowed is subject to the trial court's discretion. Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 331, 99 S.Ct. at 651-52. Even if the threshold requirements for collateral estoppel have been met, the court must consider two additional factors in determining whether the use of collateral estoppel is proper: (1) whether the party against whom the prior judgment is...

To continue reading

Request your trial
3 cases
  • Rogers v. Ford Motor Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana
    • 21 d2 Janeiro d2 1997
    ...of the court's remark, which dealt with the consequences of a complete failure to file — not a delayed filing. Rogers v. Ford Motor Co., 925 F.Supp. 1413, 1422-23 (N.D.Ind.1996); see N.D.IND.R. 56.1. Moreover, it is well established that the decision whether to apply local rules strictly or......
  • Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fag Bearings Corp.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • 10 d4 Julho d4 2003
    ...should not ... be based simply on a conclusion that the first determination was patently erroneous."). But see Rogers v. Ford Motor Co., 925 F.Supp. 1413, 1419 (N.D.Ind.1996) (stating that "[c]onfidence in the correctness of [an] earlier determination is fundamental to the principles of col......
  • Rogers Ex Rel. Rogers v. Cosco, Inc.
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • 2 d4 Novembro d4 2000
    ...(Ind.Ct.App.2000) (citing Whittaker v. Federal Cartridge Corp., 466 N.E.2d 480, 482 (Ind.Ct.App.1984)). But see, Rogers v. Ford Motor Co., 925 F.Supp. 1413 (N.D.Ind.1996). The upshot is that although certain procedural portions of the Act are to be strictly construed as in derogation of com......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT