Rogers v. Giurbino, 072018 FED9, 17-55693
|Party Name:||TYRONE ROGERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. G. J. GIURBINO; et al., Defendants-Appellees.|
|Judge Panel:||Before: GOODWIN, LEAVY, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.|
|Case Date:||July 20, 2018|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit|
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Submitted July 18, 2018 [**]
Appeal from the United States District Court No. 3:11-cv-00560-WQH-RBB for the Southern District of California William Q. Hayes, District Judge, Presiding
Before: GOODWIN, LEAVY, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Tyrone Rogers appeals pro se the district court's judgment dismissing Rogers's action alleging that defendants implemented prison lockdowns violating his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc, et seq. ("RLUIPA"). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Rogers's individual-capacity claims against Giurbino, the director of the Division of Adult Operations for the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, because Rogers failed to allege Giurbino's personal involvement in any constitutional violation or a causal connection between his conduct and any such violation. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (a plaintiff must allege facts that "allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged"); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) ("A defendant may be held liable as a supervisor under § 1983 if there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court properly dismissed Rogers's official-capacity claims seeking money damages because those claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984) ("It is clear . . . that in the absence of consent a suit in which the State or one of...
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