Rogers v. Louisville-Winston Cnty. Airport Auth.
| Decision Date | 05 August 2016 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13-CV-197-SA-DAS |
| Parties | TIM ROGERS PLAINTIFF v. LOUISVILLE-WINSTON COUNTY AIRPORT AUTHORITY DEFENDANT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi |
This matter comes before the Court on the Louisville-Winston County Airport Authority's Motion for Summary Judgment [72]. Rogers filed the Complaint [1] in this case on October 9, 2013 alleging that the Airport Authority, and its individual commissioners, discriminated against him by refusing to lease a suitable airplane hangar to him. This Court entered an Order [41] granting qualified immunity to the individual Defendants on March 31, 2015. Under the current posture of the case the Plaintiff is pursuing two claims, both brought under 42 U.S.C. §1983.1 The Plaintiff's first claim alleges that the Airport Authority violated his constitutional right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Plaintiff's second claim alleges that the Airport Authority retaliated against him for exercising his free speech rights protected by the First Amendment. The Airport Authority now requests summary judgment on both of the Plaintiff's claims [72].
After the summary judgment briefing was completed in this case, the Airport Authority moved to strike the exhibits attached to the Plaintiff's summary judgment response under FederalRule of Civil Procedure 37 because the Plaintiff failed to respond to interrogatories and requests for production in the discovery process. Rule 37 provides in part:
"If a party fails to provide information or identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless."
The Plaintiff concedes that he did not respond but argues that any such failure was harmless, as the exhibits relied on in his summary judgment response are already part of the record, or were produced by the Airport Authority in the discovery process.
"In performing a Rule 37(c)(1) harmless error analysis . . . this court looks to four factors: (1) the importance of the evidence; (2) the prejudice to the opposing party of including the evidence; (3) the possibility of curing such prejudice by granting a continuance; and (4) the explanation for the party's failure to disclose." Miles v. HSC-Hopson Servs. Co., 625 F. App'x 636, 639 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Primrose Operating Co. v. Nat'l Am. Ins. Co., 382 F.3d 546, 563-64 (5th Cir. 2004)). The Airport Authority has not articulated any prejudice, nor has the Court identified any, that it will suffer by the Plaintiff's reliance on its own documents.
The Court finds that the exhibits attached to the Plaintiff's summary judgment response are not the type of information contemplated by Rule 37, because these exhibits are already part of the record in this case, having either already been produced, or by way of attachment to the Airport Authority's own pending motion for summary judgment.
The exhibits attached to the Plaintiff's summary judgment response will not be stricken. The Plaintiff's failure to produce documents already in the Defendant's possession is harmless in this situation. The Defendant has had ample notice of both the existence of these documents, andthe Plaintiff's reliance on them. For these reasons, the Airport Authority's motion to strike [81] is denied.
In October of 2010, Plaintiff Rogers inquired with the commissioners of the Airport Authority about leasing a hangar for his airplane. In January of 2011, the Airport Authority offered Rogers a lease on Hangar B at a rate of $100 per month. Rogers rejected this offer on the basis that his airplane would not fit in Hangar B.2 The Plaintiff inquired about other hangars at the airport, and complained that several of the hangars, while occupied, were being used for non-aviation purposes.3
It is undisputed that there were only two lockable hangars not under lease at the time of Rogers' inquiries, B and F.4 According to Rogers, his plane would not fit inside Hangar B. Hangar F is the largest at the airport and is capable of housing a large plane or multiple smaller aircraft. The Airport Authority told Rogers that renovations to Hangar F were in progress or planned, and that the Hangar was best suited for multiple aircraft, or for a plane much larger than the one Rogers owned.5 Rogers complained, and at a board meeting on March 20, 2011, theAirport Authority offered to lease Hangar F to Rogers for $500 per month once the renovations were completed. Rogers responded by offering to lease half of Hangar F at a rate of $100 per month. The Airport Authority rejected Rogers' offer citing liability concerns with storing multiple aircraft with different owners in the same space.
Although the majority of the planned renovations to Hangar F were eventually completed, as of April 2012 the roof was in a state of disrepair. At a board meeting on April 19, 2012, at which Rogers was present, the Board decided to accept a new offer from Custom Air to lease Hangar F "as-is" at a rate of $300 per month.6 Custom Air promised to relocate its commercial flying operation to the airport, to lease an additional 4,600 square feet of newly constructed hangar space when completed, and to relocate two maintenance personnel to the airport. Rogers asserted that his request to lease Hangar F should have priority over Custom Air's later request. The Board indicated that Rogers' request had long since expired, that leasing the hangar to Custom Air was in the best interest of the airport, and that it would be inappropriate to use a 4,000 square foot hangar for anything other than a commercial flying operation.
In August of 2012, Rogers emailed the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to complain that the Airport Authority would not lease a hangar to him and that many of the hangars at the airport were being used for non-aviation purposes in violation of FAA policies. Ultimately, all of the hangars were returned to aviation use, and in October of 2012, one of the Airport Authority board members agreed to vacate his hangar, C5, to make it available forRogers. Rogers subsequently signed a lease for Hangar C5 for $100 per month. Rogers' informal complaint to the FAA was thus resolved without the filing of an official complaint.7
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 governs summary judgment. Summary judgment is warranted when the evidence reveals no genuine dispute regarding any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The rule "mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986).
The moving party "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548. The nonmoving party must then "go beyond the pleadings" and "designate 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 324, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (citation omitted).
In reviewing the evidence, factual controversies are to be resolved in favor of the non-movant, "but only when . . . both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts." Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. When such contradictory facts exist, the Court may "not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence." Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150, 120 S. Ct. 2097. Conclusory allegations, speculation, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic arguments are not an adequate substitute for specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. TIG Ins. Co. v. Sedgwick James ofWash., 276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 2002); SEC v. Recile, 10 F.3d 1093, 1097 (5th Cir. 1997); Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.
Rogers alleges that the Airport Authority violated his constitutional right to equal protection by refusing to lease a suitable hangar to him, and instead leased hangars to other preferred individuals on more favorable terms. According to Rogers, although he was eventually given a lease for an enclosed hangar, his airplane was damaged and suffered unnecessary weathering in the interim. During much of the relevant time, Rogers parked his airplane in an open-air tie-down space at the airport. Rogers further alleges that members of the Airport Authority board personally disliked him, and refused to lease a hangar to him out of personal vindictiveness.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV. Plaintiff concedes that he is not a member of a protected class and that his only claim is a "class of one" claim brought under Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 120 S. Ct. 1073, 145 L. Ed. 2d 1060 (2000). To assert such a claim successfully in the Fifth Circuit, a plaintiff must meet a high standard. Mata v. City of Kingsville, Tex., 275 Fed. App'x. 412, 415 (5th Cir. 2008); Shipp v. McMahon, 234 F.3d 907, 916 (5th Cir. 2000). "[T]he plaintiff must show that (1) he or she was intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and (2) there was no rational basis for the difference in treatment." Lindquist v. City of Pasadena, Tex., 669 F.3d 225, 233 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Olech, 528 U.S. at 564, 120 S. Ct. 1073); see also Stotter v. Univ. of Tex. at San Antonio, 508 F.3d 812, 824 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Olech, 528...
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