Rogers v. Pendleton

Decision Date26 February 2001
Docket NumberNo. 00-2130,00-2130
Citation249 F.3d 279
Parties(4th Cir. 2001) JONATHAN ROGERS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. M. L. PENDLETON, Officer; M. G. VINYARD, Officer, Defendants-Appellants. Argued:
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Irene M. Keeley, Chief District Judge, sitting by designation.

(CA-99-164-R)

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[Copyrighted Material Omitted] COUNSEL: ARGUED: Jim Harold Guynn, Jr., GUYNN & DILLON, P.C., Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellants. Randy Virlin Cargill, MAGEE, FOSTER, GOLDSTEIN & SAYERS, P.C., Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before WILLIAMS and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and Cynthia Holcomb HALL, Senior Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Williams wrote the opinion, in which Judge Michael and Senior Judge Hall joined.

OPINION

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge:

Jonathan Rogers brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. S 1983 (West 1994 & Supp. 2000) against Officers M.L. Pendleton and M.G. Vinyard of the Roanoke, Va. Police Department ("the officers"), alleging that the officers violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution by falsely arresting him, unreasonably assaulting him, falsely imprisoning him, and maliciously prosecuting him. The officers appeal from the district court's denial of their motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I.

In summarizing the facts in this case, we resolve all disputed factual issues in Rogers' favor, as did the district court. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1994). On the evening of August 22, 1997, Rogers and his wife hosted an outdoor party for friends and family at their home, to celebrate their daughter's admission to Harvard University. The party began at about 7:30. Rogers and his wife served finger foods and had beer and wine for the adults and sodas in ice tubs for the underage guests. A family friend (a teacher and president of the local PTA) monitored the tubs containing alcoholic beverages to ensure that underage guests did not consume alcohol. A two-person band, playing amplified guitars, provided entertainment for the party. Rogers instructed the band to stop playing at 10:00 to comply with the city's noise ordinance. At 9:47, the Roanoke police dispatcher received a call complaining of a loud party in the area of Rogers' home. At 10:08, another individual called the police dispatch center complaining of loud music at a similar location. At 10:26, the dispatcher referred the report to Officers Pendleton and Vinyard. Soon after, the officers arrived on Lake Drive near Rogers' residence. Rolling his window down, Pendleton heard no music but heard the sounds of people talking at the Rogers' residence loudly enough to be heard in the road. The road leading to Rogers' driveway is a marked private road with two speed bumps. Pendleton pulled his vehicle into Rogers' circular driveway in front of the house, where he observed Rogers holding a bottle of beer. Both officers stated that they were aware that they were entering Rogers' private property when they entered the driveway.

Rogers testified that he consumed one bottle of beer between 7:30 and 10:00 and had taken a sip from the beer he was holding at the time Pendleton arrived. The beer in Rogers' hand was the only alcohol the officers saw at the scene. Pendleton, however, asserted that Rogers appeared intoxicated and was "blowing alcohol fumes" in Pendleton's face.1 (J.A. at 60, 69.)

Rogers told Pendleton that he was the owner of the property; Pendleton told Rogers that the department had received noise complaints. Rogers stated that any noise problem had ended. Officer Pendleton testified that he viewed Rogers as irreverent and intoxicated and wished to speak to someone "who was sober" regarding the noise complaint. (J.A. at 61.) Pendleton told Rogers that he intended to search the premises, whereupon Rogers asked Pendleton whether he had a search warrant and whether he had probable cause for a search. Pendleton stated that he did not need a search warrant, because Rogers was drinking in public. After stating that he owned the premises, Rogers repeatedly asked the officers to leave. During their discussion with Rogers, the officers observed persons appearing to be younger than twenty-one leaving the yard and entering the house. Pendleton testified that Rogers invaded his"personal space" and was stepping into his way, "put[ting] his face in my face." (J.A. at 61.) Pendleton then stepped around Rogers and continued to look at Rogers, who was then speaking with Vinyard. The officers then arrested Rogers for public drunkenness and impeding an officer, handcuffed him, and placed him in the back of a police cruiser. At that point, without making any further investigation on the premises, the officers took Rogers to the police station.

II.

On March 16, 1999, Rogers filed suit against the officers pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. S 1983 (West 1994 & Supp. 2000), alleging that the officers violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and raising various Constututional claims related to his arrest, including claims of false arrest, unreasonable assault, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. The officers denied these violations in their response to the suit and asserted that the suit was barred by, inter alia, the doctrine of qualified immunity. Following discovery, the officers moved for summary judgment, arguing that they were entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law. The district court denied the motion on the ground that the search of Rogers' home and curtilage which the officers planned to conduct was clearly illegal, and thus Rogers was entitled to refuse to permit the search to occur. A district court's denial of qualified immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine, because qualified immunity confers immunity from suit and not merely from liability. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528-30 (1985).2

III.

A district court's denial of qualified immunity is reviewed de novo on appeal with the court using its "full knowledge of its own [and other relevant] precedents." Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted and alteration in original). The Supreme Court has held that "government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Qualified immunity is not lost when an officer violates the Fourth Amendment unless a reasonable officer would know that the specific conduct at issue was impermissible. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638-39 (1987). A "law enforcement officer who participates in a search that violates the Fourth Amendment may [not] be held personally liable for money damages if a reasonable officer could have believed that the search comported with the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 637. The Supreme Court has held that a right can be deemed clearly established even if there is no prior decision addressing the precise conduct at issue, so long as its illegality would have been evident to a reasonable officer based on existing caselaw. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999); Anderson v. Creighton , 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (stating that the precise conduct at issue need not have been held illegal for a right to be clearly established; instead, the particularity inquiry looks to whether "in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness [was] apparent"); cf. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 270-71 (1997).

Officers are not afforded protection when they are"plainly incompetent or . . . knowingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). But, in gray areas, where the law is unsettled or murky, qualified immunity affords protection to an officer who takes an action that is not clearly forbidden -even if the action is later deemed wrongful. Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 1992). The deference given to the judgments of law enforcement officers acting in good faith is "particularly important in cases involving law enforcement officials investigating serious crimes." Porterfield v. Lott, 156 F.3d 563, 567 (4th Cir. 1998).

To determine whether the officers are entitled to qualified immunity, the steps are sequential: we "`must first determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all,'" before "`proceed[ing] to determine whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.'" Wilson, 526 U.S. at 609 (quoting Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999)). As the precedent of the Supreme Court and this Circuit makes clear, the nature of the right allegedly violated must be defined "at a high level of particularity." Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 250-51 (4th Cir. 1999); see also Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639-40. Here, defined at the appropiate level of specificity, the question is whether a reasonable officer could have believed that a general search in the curtilage of a private home for evidence of a noise violation and evidence of underage alcohol consumption was permissible based solely upon reasonable suspicion. With these principles in mind, we now turn to the sole issue before us, whether the officers are entitled to summary judgment in this case on the basis of qualified immunity.

A.

The officers argue that they had the right to search the curtilage of Rogers' home based on reasonable suspicion.3 Their claimed basis for reasonable suspicion is that (1) they had...

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