Rogers v. Robert Half Int'l, Inc.
| Decision Date | 27 October 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 17-cv-3777-PJH |
| Parties | BRIAN F. ROGERS, Plaintiff, v. ROBERT HALF INTERNATIONAL, INC., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
Defendant's motion for an order dismissing the complaint in the above-entitled case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, and alternative motion to stay the case, came on for hearing before this court on October 25, 2017. Plaintiff Brian F. Rogers appeared in propria persona, and defendant Robert Half International ("RHI") appeared by its counsel Traci Bernard-Marks. Having read the parties' papers and carefully considered their arguments and the relevant legal authority, the court hereby DENIES the motion to dismiss and GRANTS the motion to stay, as follows and for the reasons stated at the hearing.
RHI is a temporary employment agency that specializes in placing employees in accounting and related positions. Plaintiff alleges that in November 2015, he applied for a job with RHI, went in for an interview, but was not hired.
Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") concurrently with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing ("DFEH"), and on February 26, 2016, DFEH issued a Right-to-Sue notice. See Def's RJN, Exh. 1, ¶ 23. On May 6, 2016, plaintiff filed a complaint in the Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco, against RHI and Accountemps, a division of RHI (S.F. Sup. Ct. Case No. CGC 16-551854). See id.
Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint ("FAC") on September 8, 2016, and filed a second amended complaint ("SAC") on September 9, 2016. See id., Exhs. 2 & 3. The SAC asserted four causes of action - claims under FEHA for discrimination based on race and age, and for failure to take reasonable steps to prevent discrimination, and a state-law claim of discrimination in violation of public policy. Id., Exh. 3 ¶¶ 24-44.
The parties conducted discovery, including depositions, and engaged in motion practice. On January 31, 2017, RHI moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination because he had no evidence showing he was qualified for the position he sought, and because RHI had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for not hiring him. The court granted the motion on April 21, 2017, finding no evidence of animus based on race or age. See Def's RJN, Exh. 5. The court found that plaintiff's "failure to provide[ ] requested references and an updated resume is the reason why RHI did not consider [plaintiff] for a position." Id.
On May 11, 2017, before entry of judgment, plaintiff appealed the state court's decision to the California Court of Appeal, First District. (Cal. App. 1 Dist., Case No. A151655). See Def's RJN Exh. 8. A May 17, 2017, entry on the Superior Court's docket states that the case was ordered removed from the Master Court Calendar and assigned to the Case Management Department, with a case management conference set for August 16, 2017, "for judgment after order granting [RHI's] motion for summary judgment[.]" On July 31, 2017, the court continued the case management conference to December 2017, for status of notice of appeal.
Meanwhile on April 19, 2017, the EEOC issued a Right-to-Sue notice, stating that "[b]ased upon its investigation, [it] was unable to conclude that the information obtained establishes violations of the statutes." Pltf's RJN, Exh. 5. Plaintiff filed the complaint in the present action on June 30, 2017, asserting a single cause of action under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983, for racial discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The present complaint repeats almost verbatim the factual allegations in the state court SAC. The primary difference between the two is that the present complaint asserts a claim under § 1983 (although the "Introduction" states that the action "is brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for employment discrimination[,]" while the state court SAC asserted only state-law claims.
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests for the legal sufficiency of the claims alleged in the complaint. Ileto v. Glock, 349 F.3d 1191, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2003). A complaint may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) if the plaintiff fails to state a cognizable legal theory, or has not alleged sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. Somers v. Apple, Inc., 729 F.3d 953, 959 (9th Cir. 2013). While the court is to accept as true all the factual allegations in the complaint, legally conclusory statements, not supported by actual factual allegations, need not be accepted. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009); see also In re Gilead Scis. Secs. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008).
The complaint must proffer sufficient facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 558-59 (2007) (citations and quotations omitted). A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not 'show[n]' - 'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id. at 679.
Review is generally limited to the contents of the complaint, although the court canalso consider a document on which the complaint relies if the document is central to the claims asserted in the complaint, and no party questions the authenticity of the document. See Sanders v. Brown, 504 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2007). The court may consider matters that are properly the subject of judicial notice, Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005), and may also consider exhibits attached to the complaint, see Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1989), and documents referenced extensively in the complaint or that form the basis of a the plaintiff's claims, see No. 84 Emp'r-Teamster Jt. Counsel Pension Tr. Fund v. Am. W. Holding Corp., 320 F.3d 920, 925 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003).
Finally, while res judicata and collateral estoppel are affirmative defenses, it is appropriate for a defendant to assert those defenses in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, when they raise no disputed issues of fact. See Scott v. Kuhlmann, 746 F.2d 1377, 1378 (9th Cir.1984) (); see also Goldberg v. Cameron, 694 Fed. Appx. 564, 565-66 (9th Cir. 2017); Asarco, LLC v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.,765 F.3d 999, 1004 (9th Cir. 2014).
A court has broad discretion to stay proceedings pursuant to its inherent authority. "[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigant." Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936); see also Leyva v. Certified Grocers of Cal., 593 F.2d 857, 863-64 (9th Cir. 1979). "The proponent of a stay bears the burden of establishing its need." Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 708 (1997).
In determining whether to stay proceedings, the court should weigh the competing interests that will be affected by a stay, including the possible hardships and damage that will result to parties from granting a stay or forcing parties to go forward, and "the orderly course of justice measured in terms of the simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, and questions of law which could be expected to result from a stay." CMAX, Inc. v. Hall,300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962), quoted in Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005). Judicial economy, standing alone, is generally not a sufficient reason to stay proceedings. Dependable Highway Exp., Inc. v. Navigators Ins. Co., 498 F.3d 1059, 1066 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Mirant, 398 F.3d at 1112).
RHI seeks an order dismissing the case on the basis that the action is barred by collateral estoppel. Alternatively, RHI asserts that the court should stay the case to allow the state court appeal to go forward, arguing that even if this court concludes that collateral estoppel does not apply, res judicata will bar the action once the state court appeal is complete.
State court judgments are entitled to "full faith and credit" in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738. Full faith and credit "requires that federal courts give the state court's resolution of the res judicata issue the same preclusive effect that it would have had in another court of the same state." Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 474 U.S. 518, 525 (1986); In re Marciano, 708 F.3d 1123, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013). This doctrine applies to issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) and claim preclusion (res judicata). Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 374 (1996); Dodd v. Hood River Cnty., 136 F.3d 1219,1225 (9th Cir. 1998). Whether a prior state court judgment precludes litigation of claims or defenses raised in a later federal action is determined by reference to state law. Matsushita, 516 U.S. at 374.
In California, "res judicata" is used generally to refer to both claim preclusion and issue preclusion. See DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber, 61 Cal. 4th 813, 824 (2015) (). However, "[i]t is important to distinguish these two types of preclusion because they have different requirements" and effects. Id. at 823-24.
RHI argues that this case is barred...
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