Rogers v. Robson, Masters, Ryan, Brumund, and Belom
| Citation | 81 Ill.2d 201,407 N.E.2d 47,40 Ill.Dec. 816 |
| Decision Date | 20 June 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 52548,52548 |
| Parties | , 40 Ill.Dec. 816 James D. ROGERS, Appellee, v. ROBSON, MASTERS, RYAN, BRUMUND AND BELOM, Appellants. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Illinois |
O'Brien & Garrison, Ltd., Joliet (James E. Garrison and James R. Fabrizio, Joliet, of counsel), for appellants.
James D. Rogers, pro se.
Howard H. Braverman, Springfield, for amicus curiae Illinois State Bar Ass'n.
John E. Guy, of Abramson & Fox, Chicago, for amicus curiae Illinois Defense Counsel.
Plaintiff, James D. Rogers, M. D., appealed from the judgment of the circuit court of Will County entered in favor of defendants, Robson, Masters, Ryan, Brumund and Belom, upon allowance of their motion for summary judgment. The appellate court reversed and remanded (74 Ill.App.3d 467 30 Ill.Dec. 320, 392 N.E.2d 1365), and we allowed defendants' petition for leave to appeal.
In plaintiff's complaint, filed pro se, it is alleged that he had been named as a party defendant in an action alleging that a post-operative wound infection was due to the negligence and carelessness of the plaintiff and his codefendants; that discovery depositions taken by defendants, the attorneys employed by plaintiff's insurance company, showed that there was no negligence on the part of plaintiff; that despite that fact and contrary to plaintiff's wishes and instructions conveyed to the defendants, a settlement was negotiated in the malpractice action. The complaint alleged damages suffered by plaintiff.
Defendants' motion for summary judgment shows that at the time of the alleged negligent acts out of which the malpractice action arose plaintiff was insured by Employer's Fire Insurance Company, and that defendants negotiated a settlement with the plaintiff in the malpractice action and, upon execution of a covenant not to sue, paid $1,250 and effected dismissal of the action as to plaintiff. The policy under which plaintiff was insured provided that the written consent of a former insured was not required before the insurer made any settlement of any claim or suit "even if such claim or suit was made, preferred or alleged while such former insured was an insured under this policy."
In an affidavit filed in opposition to the motion for summary judgment plaintiff stated that during the pendency of the malpractice action he repeatedly informed one of the partners in the defendant law firm that he would not consent to the settlement of the action, that he was assured that the action would be defended, and that at no time was he advised that defendants intended to settle the malpractice suit.
The circuit court allowed defendants' motion for summary judgment and plaintiff appealed. In reversing, the appellate court held that under the terms of the policy plaintiff's insurer was authorized to settle the medical malpractice action without plaintiff's consent. It held, however, that when defendants became aware that a settlement was imminent and that plaintiff did not wish the case settled, a conflict arose which prevented their continuing to represent both plaintiff and the insurer without a full and frank disclosure of the circumstances. The appellate court held that defendants, having continued to represent both plaintiff and the insurer without the requisite disclosure, breached their duty to plaintiff and would be liable to him for any loss caused by the lack of disclosure.
Defendants contend that they did not breach an independent duty owed to plaintiff; that because the insurer was authorized to settle the malpractice litigation without plaintiff's consent, no conflict of interest arose between the parties to the insurance contract; and that the alleged conflict upon which the majority opinion of the appellate court rests was not argued by plaintiff. They argue, too, that plaintiff suffered no damage as a proximate result of the alleged failure to advise him of the impending settlement. Amici curiae, the Illinois Defense Counsel and Illinois State Bar Association, argue that ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Michigan Chemical Corp. v. American Home Assur. Co.
...v. Robson, Masters, Ryan, Brumund & Belom, 74 Ill.App.3d 467, 470, 30 Ill.Dec. 320, 392 N.E.2d 1365 (1979), aff'd., 81 Ill.2d 201, 40 Ill.Dec. 816, 407 N.E.2d 47 (1980); Illinois Casualty Company v. Peters, 73 Ill.App.3d 33, 34, 29 Ill.Dec. 284, 391 N.E.2d 547 (1979); Rivota v. Kaplan, 49 I......
-
Ball v. Kotter
...citing In re Smith, 168 Ill.2d 269, 213 Ill.Dec. 550, 659 N.E.2d 896, 902 (1995). See Rogers v. Robson, Masters, Ryan, Brumund & Belom, 81 Ill.2d 201, 40 Ill.Dec. 816, 407 N.E.2d 47, 48–49 (1980). But a violation of the Rules in and of itself does not establish liability in a legal malpract......
-
Ball v. Kotter, Case No. 08–CV–1613.
...with their clients such that they can make informed and intelligent decisions. See Rogers v. Robson, Masters, Ryan, Brumund & Belom, 81 Ill.2d 201, 40 Ill.Dec. 816, 407 N.E.2d 47, 48–49 (1980). However, Illinois law is clear that expert testimony is needed to guide a jury through contours o......
-
Hoagland v. Sandberg, Phoenix & Von Gontard
...An attorney's throwing one client to the wolves to save the other is malpractice. Rogers v. Robson, Masters, Ryan, Brumund & Belom, 81 Ill.2d 201, 40 Ill.Dec. 816, 407 N.E.2d 47 (1980); Nagy v. Beckley, 218 Ill.App.3d 875, 161 Ill.Dec. 488, 578 N.E.2d 1134, 1136-38 (1991); Barth v. Reagan, ......
-
Cba Ethics Committee Opinion
...relationship." Rogers v. Robson, Masters, Ryan, Brumund and Belom, 74 Ill.App.3d 467, 392 N.E.2d 1365, 1372 (1979), aff'd 811 Ill.2d 201, 407 N.E.2d 47 (1980). 1. Disclosures Made Within the Attorney-Client Relationship. Where the insured discloses information to the attorney within the att......