Rogers v. State
| Decision Date | 04 November 1942 |
| Docket Number | No. 27688.,27688. |
| Citation | 220 Ind. 443,44 N.E.2d 343 |
| Parties | ROGERS v. STATE. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Walter Rogers was convicted of issuing a fraudulent check, and he appeals.
Judgment reversed with instructions.Appeal from Franklin Circuit Court; Roscoe C. O'Byrne, Judge.
Tague & McCarty, of Brookville, and David A. Myers, of Greensburg, for appellant.
George N. Beamer, Atty. Gen., James K. Northam, Asst. Atty. Gen., and C. Ballard Harrison, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.
The appellant was charged in a criminal prosecution with issuing a fraudulent check, under § 10-2105, Burns' 1933, § 2749, Baldwin's 1934. This appeal is from a judgment of conviction.
Error properly assigned questions the sufficiency of the evidence.
The statute provides: ‘Whoever with intent to defraud by obtained money, merchandise, property, credit, or thing of value, although no express representation is made in reference thereto, or who, in the payment of any obligation, shall make, draw, utter or deliver any check, draft or order for the payment of money upon any bank, depository, person, firm or corporation, knowing at the time of such making, drawing, uttering or delivering that the maker or drawer has not sufficient funds * * *.’
The affidavit upon which the appellant was prosecuted charges making, drawing, uttering and delivering of a fraudulent check ‘in the payment of an obligation.’ The evidence shows that the appellant delivered a check as cash payment for the purchase of a steer. Appellant contends that this is a fatal variance.
In Rutherford v. State, 1927, 199 Ind. 231, 156 N.E. 559, the appellant had been convicted upon a charge of issuing a fraudulent check ‘in payment of an obligation.’ The judgment was reversed upon the ground that the title of the act was not broad enough to include the offense of issuing a fraudulent check in payment of an obligation. It is said in the opinion that the statute upon which the prosecution was based defines two separate and distinct offenses: (1) The issuing of a fraudulent check for the purpose of defrauding by obtaining money, merchandise, property, credit, or thing of value, and (2) the issuing of a fraudulent check in payment of an obligation. It was held that the second offense was not within the title of the act; that it was entirely separate and not properly connected with the subject of the act as expressed in the title. In Nedderman v. State, 1926, 198 Ind. 187, 152 N.E. 800, the defendant...
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Madison v. State, 29188
...96 N.E.2d 340 (vehicle taking); Gentry v. State, 1945, 223 Ind. 459, 61 N.E.2d 641 (receiving stolen goods); Rogers v. State, 1942, 220 Ind. 443, 44 N.E.2d 343, 143 A.L.R. 1074 (issuing fraudulent check); McCallister v. State, 1940, 217 Ind. 65, 26 N.E.2d 391 (buying stolen goods); Hicks v.......
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Addis v. State
... ... State, (1968) 250 Ind. 161, 235 N.E.2d 198; Coates v. State, (1967) 249 Ind. 357, 229 N.E.2d 640 (Subsections of theft code relating to theft by the defendant and theft by obtaining control over properties stolen by another present two separate crimes.); Rogers v. State, (1942) 220 Ind ... 443, 44 N.E.2d 343 (The giving of a check to obtain property and the giving of a check in payment of an obligation are separate and distinct offenses.); see also Carson v. State, (1979) Ind.App., 384 N.E.2d 620 (The offenses of abuse and cruelty to a child require ... ...
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Coates v. State
...provisions this Court has previously interpreted a single statutory section as providing multiple crimes. Rogers v. State (1942), 220 Ind. 443, 44 N.E.2d 343, 143 A.L.R. 1074; Tullis v. State (1951), 230 Ind. 311, 103 N.E.2d 353. The language in the latter case is somewhat confusing wherein......
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Ferrell v. State
...defendant is charged with one of the offenses and the evidence tends to show the other, the variance is fatal. Rogers v. State (1942), 220 Ind. 443, 44 N.E.2d 343, 143 A.L.R. 1074; McCormick v. State (1955), 234 Ind. 393, 127 N.E.2d It is argued by the appellee that the grand jury indictmen......