Rogers v. Tristar Products Inc.

• Decision Date: 02 June 2011
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 11–1111.
• Parties: Bruce A. ROGERS, Plaintiff,v.TRISTAR PRODUCTS, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

793 F.Supp.2d 711

99 U.S.P.Q.2d 1438

Bruce A. ROGERS, Plaintiff,

v.TRISTAR PRODUCTS, INC., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 11–1111.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

June 2, 2011.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HEREWest CodenotesHeld Unconstitutional35 U.S.C.A. § 292(b) Edward T. Kang, Benjamin E. Schmidt, Steven E. Angstreich, Weir & Partners LLP, Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiff.Allan D. Goulding, Jr., Curtin & Heefner, Morrisville, PA, Edward P. Bakos, Noam J. Kritzer, Bakos & Kritzer, Florham Park, NJ, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

EDUARDO C. ROBRENO, District Judge.

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                ¦I.  ¦INTRODUCTION                                                    ¦713    ¦
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                ¦II. ¦BACKGROUND                                                      ¦713    ¦
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                ¦III.¦DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM      ¦714    ¦
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    A.   Legal Standard                                                 714
                    B.   Discussion                                                     715
                

                IV. DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS             717
                

    A.   Historical Background                                          717
                

         1.  Legislative History                                        717
                         2.  Recent Caselaw Developments                                717
                

    B.   Current Constitutional Landscape                               719
                

         1.  Morrison' s Sufficient Control Test                        719
                         2.  Caselaw Finding Section 292(b) Unconstitutional            720
                         3.  Caselaw Rejecting Constitutional Challenges to Section 292 722
                             (b)
                

    C.   Discussion                                                     722
                

         1.  Morrison' s Sufficient Control Test Governs                723
                         2.  Application of Morrison                                    724
                

                V.  CONCLUSION                                                          726
                

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Bruce Rogers (“Plaintiff”) brings this qui tam action against Defendant Tristar Products, Inc. (“Defendant”). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant falsely marked one of its products as patented for the purpose of deceiving the public in violation of the False Marking Statute, 35 U.S.C. § 292, and seeks recovery under a qui tam enforcement provision in the statute that permits “[a]ny person [to] sue for the penalty.” Id. § 292(b). Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint on two grounds. First, Defendant contends that Plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Second, Defendant urges that the qui tam provision of the False Marking Statute is unconstitutional under Article II of the United States Constitution.¹

As outlined below, the Court finds that Plaintiff's complaint states a claim under the False Marking Statute. The Court concludes, however, that the qui tam provision under which Plaintiff proceeds violates the Take Care Clause in Article II of the United States Constitution and is therefore unconstitutional. Consequently, Defendant's motion to dismiss will be granted. ²

II. BACKGROUND ³

Defendant markets and sells the Jack LaLanne Power Juicer (the “Power Juicer”) line of products in the United States and abroad. ( See Compl. ¶¶ 7, 25.) The Power Juicer products have been successful, exceeding $300 million in sales. ( See id. ¶ 8.) Defendant markets the Power Juicer products as having “Special Patented Extraction Technology” that “delivers up to 30% more juice than other juicers.” ( Id. ¶ 9.) Such references appear on both the Power Juicer's website, and Defendant's corporate website. ( Id. ¶¶ 10–11.) They also appear in infomercials and other advertisements. ( Id. ¶¶ 12, 17.) For example, television infomercials aired by Defendant refer to the Power Juicer products as having “Patented Extraction Technology,” “Patented Extraction Technique,” “Patented 3600 RPM Super Extraction Motor,” and similar patented technology. ( Id. ¶ 12.) One such infomercial aired on or about January 16, 2011. ( Id.)

Notwithstanding the representations made in Defendant's advertisements, the only patent held for the Power Juicer line is a Chinese patent (the “China Patent”) that covers the products' design aspects only. ( See id. ¶¶ 13–15.) This patent represents Defendant's “complete and collective efforts to obtain any patent with respect to its Power Juicer line,” ( id. ¶ 14), and does not cover any of the Power Juicer lines' technology or address functional aspects such as juice extraction, ( see id. ¶¶ 15–16.) Put another way, the China Patent has “nothing to do” with any of the abovementioned patent references made in Defendant's advertisements. ( Id. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff confirmed as much by undertaking a “diligent patent search,” which led Plaintiff to believe that Defendant's claims of having a patent on the Power Juicer's functional aspects, including juice extraction, are false and misleading. ( Id. ¶ 16.)

III. DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIMA. Legal Standard

In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court must “accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and view them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” DeBenedictis v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 492 F.3d 209, 215 (3d Cir.2007) (internal citations omitted). In order to withstand a motion to dismiss, a complaint's “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 & n. 3, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). This “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (internal citation omitted).

Although a plaintiff is entitled to all reasonable inferences from the facts alleged, a plaintiff's legal conclusions are not entitled to deference and the court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) (cited with approval in Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). The pleadings must contain sufficient factual allegations so as to state a facially plausible claim for relief. See, e.g., Gelman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 583 F.3d 187, 190 (3d Cir.2009). A claim possesses such plausibility “ ‘when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’ ” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)).

B. Discussion

The False Marking Statute provides that “[w]hoever marks upon, or affixes to, or uses in advertising in connection with any unpatented article, the word ‘patent’ ... for the purpose of deceiving the public ... [s]hall be fined not more than $500 for every such offense.” 35 U.S.C. § 292(a). “Any person may sue for the penalty, in which event one-half shall go to the person suing and the other to the use of the United States.” Id. § 292(b). A plaintiff proceeding on a false marking claim must therefore “establish (1) the marking of an unpatented article; (2) with the intent to deceive the public.” Hollander v. B. Braun Med., Inc., No. 10–835, 2011 WL 1376263, at *2 (E.D.Pa. Apr. 12, 2011); see also Rogers v. Conair Corp., No. 10–1497, 2011 WL 1809510, at *2 (E.D.Pa. May 12, 2011).

A plaintiff shows that an article is “unpatented” under the statute if “the article in question is not covered by at least one claim of each patent with which the article is marked.” Clontech Labs., Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., 406 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed.Cir.2005). This necessarily requires consideration of whether “the claims of a patent cover the article in question.” Id. In addition to showing that such an item is falsely marked, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant “act[ed] with sufficient knowledge that what it is saying is not so and consequently that the recipient of its saying will be misled into thinking that the statement is true.” Id. Because this element sounds in fraud, Rule 9(b) applies and plaintiffs must therefore “state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b); see In re BP Lubricants USA Inc., 637 F.3d 1307, 1311 (Fed.Cir.2011) (applying Rule 9(b)'s “gatekeeping function” to claims under the False Marking Statute). This particularity requirement, however, does not apply to “[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person's mind.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). Nevertheless, a plaintiff proceeding on a false marking claim must “allege sufficient underlying facts from which a court may reasonably infer that a party acted with the requisite state of mind.” In re BP Lubricants, 637 F.3d at 1311 (quoting Exergen Corp. v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1327 (Fed.Cir.2009)).

Here, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's complaint fails to satisfy the pleading standards set forth in Rules 8(a) and 9(b). Specifically, Defendant contends that Plaintiff's pleading does not allege any facts from which an intent to deceive the public may be inferred. In support of this contention, Defendant points to what is missing from Plaintiff's...