Rogers v. United States, SC14–1465.
Decision Date | 05 November 2015 |
Docket Number | No. SC14–1465.,SC14–1465. |
Citation | 184 So.3d 1087 |
Parties | Stephen J. ROGERS, et al., Appellants, v. The UNITED STATES of America, Appellee. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Mark F. (Thor) Hearne, II of Arent Fox, LLP, Clayton, MO; Andrew Prince Brigham of Brigham Property Rights Law Firm, Jacksonville, FL; Raoul G. Cantero, III and David P. Draigh of White & Case LLP, Miami, FL; and James W. Ely, Jr., Professor Emeritus, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN, for Appellants.
John C. Cruden, Assistant Attorney General, and Lane N. McFadden, Appellate Attorney, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC; and Michael T. Gray, Appellate Attorney, United States Department of Justice, Jacksonville, FL, for Appellee.
Major Best Harding, James Harold Thompson, and Robert Neil Clarke, Jr. of Ausley & McMullen, P.A., Tallahassee, FL; and Kim Rice Bongiovanni, Assistant General Counsel, CSX Transportation, Inc., Jacksonville, FL, for Amicus Curiae CSX Transportation, Inc.
Robert W. Goldman of Goldman Felcoski & Stone, P.A., Naples, FL, for Amicus Curiae The Real Property, Probate & Trust Law Section of The Florida Bar.
Matthew Zane Leopold, General Counsel, Craig Deron Varn, General Counsel, Ronald Elliot D. Potter, Senior Assistant General Counsel, and Sarah Meyer Doar, Senior Assistant General Counsel, Florida Department of Environmental Protection, Tallahassee, FL, for Amicus Curiae Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund.
Kenneth Bradley Bell, Amy Brigham Boulris, and Lauren Vickroy Purdy of Gunster Yoakley & Stewart, P.A., Tallahassee, FL, for Amici Curiae Alabama & Gulf Coast Railway, LLC, The Apalachicola Northern Railway, LLC, The Bay Line Railroad, LLC, The First Coast Railroad, Inc., The Florida Central Railroad Company, Inc., Florida East Coast Railway, LLC, The Florida Midland Railroad Company, Inc., The Florida Northern Railroad Company, Inc., Georgia Southern and Florida Railway Company, Seminole Gulf Railway, LP, and The Talleyrand Terminal Railroad Company, Inc.Alexandra Jennifer Overhoff, Tallahassee, FL, for Amicus Curiae Florida Land Title Association.
Marc Allen Peoples, Assistant General Counsel, Florida Department of Transportation, Tallahassee, FL, for Amicus Curiae Florida Department of Transportation.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Allen C. Winsor, Solicitor General, and Rachel Erin Nordby, Deputy Solicitor General, Tallahassee, FL, for Amicus Curiae State of Florida.
Under the authority of article V, section 3(b)(6) of the Florida Constitution, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has certified to this Court a question of Florida law which the Court of Appeals found would be determinative of an appeal pending in that court and upon which that court found there to be "no controlling precedent in the existing decisions of the Florida Supreme Court." Rogers v. United States (Rogers III), Nos. 2013–5098 & 2013–5102, slip op. at 4 (Fed.Cir. July 21, 2014). We are authorized to answer the question. See art. V, § 3(b)(6), Fla. Const.
This case originates from claims for compensation for takings of property filed in the United States Court of Federal Claims. The claimants alleged that the conversion of a former railroad corridor into a recreational trail had effected a taking of the abutting landowners' property rights without compensation. The United States Court of Federal Claims, as explained in two opinions, each involving multiple claimants, found, insofar as the current appellants are concerned, that the claimants did not own any property interests in the land formerly used as a railroad corridor and therefore were not entitled to compensation. See Rogers v. United States (Rogers II), 107 Fed.Cl. 387 (Fed.Cl.2012) ; Rogers v. United States (Rogers I), 93 Fed.Cl. 607 (Fed.Cl.2010). The claimants appealed these two decisions, and as stated above, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit certified a question of Florida law for this Court to answer.
The Court of Appeals set forth the following under the heading "A Statement of All Facts Relevant to the Questions Certified":
Rogers III, slip op. at 5–7 (one footnote omitted). The Court of Appeals stated the certified question as follows:
Rogers III , slip op. at 5.
Considering the alternatives included in the Court of Appeals' certified question, we see that there are actually three questions: (1) Does section 2241, Revised Statutes of Florida (1892), limit the railroad's interest in the property, regardless of the language of the deeds? (2) Does state policy limit the railroad's interest in the property, regardless of the language of the deeds? (3) Do factual considerations, such as whether the railroad surveys land or lays track and begins running trains before the conveyance of a deed, limit the railroad's interest in the property, regardless of the language of the deeds? Under the circumstances found to exist by the Court of Federal Claims, we answer all three questions in the negative.
The Court of Appeals' mention of "a railbanking and interim trail use agreement," Rogers III, slip op. at 6, refers to a step in the process for converting an unused railroad corridor into a recreational trail under federal law. See16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (2012).1 The national program of conversion of unused railroad corridors into recreational trails, which is intended in part to "preserve established railroad rights-of-way for future reactivation of rail service," 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d), is a valid exercise of the authority of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. See Preseault v. I.C.C., 494 U.S. 1, 17–19, 110 S.Ct. 914, 108 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990).
The present case arises from the claims of a group of owners of land abutting the railroad corridor who claim that conveyances to the railroad by their predecessors in title granted only easements for a railroad right-of-way and did not convey fee simple title; that the abandonment of the railroad right-of-way gave them the right to claim the land free of the easements; and that the conversion of the land to a public recreational trail constitutes a taking for which they are entitled to compensation. "[A] Fifth Amendment taking occurs when, pursuant to the Trails Act, state law reversionary interests are effectively eliminated in connection with a conversion of a railroad right-of-way to trail use." Caldwell v. United States, 391 F.3d 1226, 1228 (Fed.Cir.2004) ; see also Hash v. United States, 403 F.3d 1308 (Fed.Cir.2005). In the two opinions pending on review in the Court of Appeals, the Court of Federal Claims engaged in a detailed examination and...
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