Rogers v. Webster

• Decision Date: 22 October 1985
• Parties: Unpublished Disposition NOTICE: Sixth Circuit Rule 24(c) states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Sixth Circuit. C. PAUL ROGERS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. R. HOWARD WEBSTER, Defendant-Appellant. 84-1096
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 52

779 F.2d 52

Unpublished Disposition

NOTICE: Sixth Circuit Rule 24(c) states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Sixth Circuit.

C. PAUL ROGERS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. R. HOWARD WEBSTER, Defendant-Appellant.

84-1096

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

10/22/85

AFFIRMED

E.D.Mich.

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division

BEFORE: ENGEL and KENNEDY, Circuit Judges; and NEESE, Senior (retired District) Judge. ^*

PER CURIAM.

The appellant Mr. R. Howard Webster appeals from a post-judgment order of the District Court issued to assist the appellee Mr. C. Paul Rogers in satisfying a money judgment against Webster. Mr. Webster contends that the order (1) was not authorized by the law of Michigan, (2) violates international law, and (3) requires him to breach the laws of a foreign nation. We find no merit to the appeal and affirm the District Court.

Mr. Rogers, a citizen of Michigan, sued Mr. Webster, a citizen of Canada, in the District Court for wrongful termination of his employment as president of a Michigan corporation. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1332(a)(2). Judgment was entered against Mr. Webster for $1,000,000, ^** and Mr. Rogers sought to execute thereon. In aid of such execution, the District Court entered an order (1) restraining Mr. Webster preliminarily from disposing of his stock in two Canadian corporations, (2) directing him to deliver his stock certificates (and related documents) to the clerk of the District Court for eventual sale to satisfy the judgment, and (3) appointing a receiver of Mr. Webster's assets and directing him to deliver to the receiver all income or property he might thereafter possess, receive or control.

Initially, we note that Mr. Webster has disputed neither the District Court's jurisdiction of the subject-matter nor its jurisdiction of his person. That jurisdiction was not exhausted by the District Court's rendition of its judgment against Mr. Webster but continued until such time as the judgment might be satisfied. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 22, 6 L.Ed. 263 (1825).

The jurisdictional power of the District Court to render the judgment included the power to issue proper process to enforce it. Riggs v. Johnson County, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 166, 187, 18 L.Ed. 768 (1867). 'Process subsequent to judgment is as essential to jurisdiction as process antecedent to judgment, else the judicial power would be incomplete and entirely inadequate to the purposes for which it was conferred by the Constitution.' Id.

The procedures for execution on the judgment of a district court 'shall be in accordance with the practice and procedure of the state in which the district court is held, existing at the time the remedy is sought, except that any statute of the United States governs to the extent it is applicable.' Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a). This means that, in the absence of a controlling federal statute, the district court has the same authority to aid judgment creditors as that provided by local law to courts of the state in which the district court sits. Duchek v. Jacobi, 646 F.2d 415, 417 (9th Cir. 1981). The clear import of Rule 69(a) is to limit the execution remedies available to the district court 'to those generally provided by state law.' United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 355, 86 S.Ct. 500, 508, 15 L.Ed.2d 404 (1966).

We disagree with Mr. Webster's position that the order of the District Court was not authorized by Michigan law; Michigan has given its courts extremely broad authorization to aid execution on their judgments, including ordering satisfaction out of liquidated or unliquidated property and the appointment of a receiver. See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. Secs. 440.8317(2), 600.6104(3), (4), (5). Even though a court of Michigan may not directly affect title to property located outside the state, it may compel the defendant to do equity in relation to the property by exercising its in personam jurisdiction over him, and thereby affect title to such foreign property indirectly. Long v. Earle, 277 Mich. 505, 522-524, 269 N.W. 577 (1936); Emmons v. Emmons, 136 Mich. App. 157, 355 N.W.2d 898, 902 (1984).

Thus, where a Michigan court has acquired jurisdiction of a defendant's person, it may order him to do acts with respect to property located outside Michigan, id. (defendant ordered to convey title to Florida condominium), and even with respect to property located outside the United States, Carnahan v. Carnahan, 143 Mich. 390, 107 N.W. 73 (1906) (party ordered to deliver a specific fund on deposit in a Canadian financial institution); Schaheen v. Schaheen, 17 Mich. App. 147, 169 N.W.2d 117 (1969) (defendant ordered to convey title to real property in Beruit, Lebanon).

We reject also the appellant's contention that principles of international law precluded the District Court from exercising its in personam jurisdiction over him to affect property located in Canada. Subject to the interest of the state where the information is located, a court in the United States may order a person subject to its jurisdiction to produce documents, objects, or other information, even if the information or the person in possession of the information is outside the United States. Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised) Sec. 437(a)(1) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985).

The fact that Mr. Webster's stock certificates and other items were situated outside the territorial reach of the District Court was immaterial, because that Court had jurisdiction of his person, and its order was directed at him, and not at the property itself. As was stated more than a century ago:

Where the necessary parties are before a court of equity, it is immaterial that the res of the controversy, whether it be real or personal property, is beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the tribunal. It has the power to compel the defendant to do all things necessary, according to the lex loci rei sitae, which he could do voluntarily, to give full effect to the decree against him.

Without regard to the situation of the subject matter, such courts consider the equities between the parties, and decree in personam according to those equities, and enforce obedience to their decrees by process in personam.

Phelps v. McDonald, 99 U.S. (9 Otto) 298, 308, 25 L.Ed. 473 (1879).

'[I]f a judicial proceeding is begun with jurisdiction over the person of the party concerned, it is within the power of a [court] to bind him by every subsequent order in the cause,' and this is true 'whether the party remain within the jurisdiction or not.' Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U.S. 346, 353, 33 S.Ct. 550, 552, 57 L.Ed. 867 (1913). Since the District Court retained herein personal jurisdiction over Mr. Webster, it had the power clearly to order him to deliver his personal property to the clerk or...