Rogoz v. City of Hartford
| Decision Date | 22 July 2013 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:11-cv-00500 (VLB) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | DAVID ROGOZ, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF HARTFORD, CHIEF OF POLICE DARYL K. ROBERTS, DETECTIVE G. WATSON, DETECTIVE RIVERA, OFFICER GEORGE WATER, OFFICER JAMES RUTKAUSKI, OFFICER BRANDON FLORES, OFFICER STEVEN J. PILESKI, OFFICER CESAR A. BEIROS, Defendants. |
The Plaintiff, David Rogoz ("Rogoz"), brings this action against Defendants City of Hartford (the "City"), Chief of Police Daryl Roberts ("Chief Roberts"), Detectives Watson and Rivera, and Officers Water, Rutkauski, Flores, Pileski, and Beiros (the Detectives and Officers, collectively, the "Defendant Officers"). After both the Court's September 24, 2012 decision granting the City's and Chief Roberts' Motion to Dismiss in part, and the Plaintiff's withdrawal of certain claims1 in his oppositions to the Defendants' summary judgment motions, fourcounts remain in this action. Count One alleges claims against the Defendant Officers in their individual capacities for violations of Rogoz's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as his rights under Article First, section 7 of the Connecticut Constitution (), on the basis that the Defendant Officer or Officers employed excessive force against him at the time of his arrest and/or failed to protect or intervene. Count Two alleges state common law negligence, assault and battery, and negligent and/or intentional infliction of emotional distress as against the Defendant Officers in their individual capacities. Count Three alleges Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment and Connecticut constitutional violations against Chief Roberts in his individual capacity both for the Chief's alleged failure to investigate Rogoz's civilian complaint to the Police Department, and for his alleged failure to screen, train, or supervise the Defendant Officers. Finally, Plaintiff alleges in Count Four that the City is liable for the negligent acts of theDefendant Officers pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stats. § 52-557n and § 7-465, in connection with the Officers' alleged negligent use of excessive force and their alleged negligent failure to protect or intervene. Currently pending before the Court are Defendant City of Hartford's and Chief Roberts' Motion for Summary Judgment [dkt. 52], and the Defendant Officers' Motion for Summary Judgment [dkt. 54]. For the reasons that follow, Defendants' Motions are GRANTED as to Plaintiff's federal law claims and certain state law claims. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the balance of Plaintiff's state law claims.
As an initial matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff has failed to comply with Rule 56(a) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for the District of Connecticut. Local Rule 56 requires that a party filing a summary judgment motion annex a "concise statement of each material fact as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried." D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 56(a)1. Local Rule 56(a)2 requires that a party opposing a motion for summary judgment must then file an answering document which states "whether each of the facts asserted by the moving party is admitted or denied" and must also include a "list of each issue of material fact as to which it is contended there is a genuine issue to be tried." D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 56(a)2. Each statement of material fact in a Local Rule 56(a)1 or Local Rule 56(a)2 statement, as well as each denial in a summary judgment opponent's Local Rule 56(a)2 statement, "must be followed by a specific citation to (1) the affidavit of a witness competent to testify as to the facts at trial and/or (2) evidence that would be admissible at trial." D. Conn. L. Civ. R.56(a)3. Further, "[a]ll material facts set forth in [a moving party's 56(a)1] statement and supported by the evidence will be deemed admitted unless controverted by the statement required to be filed and served by the opposing party." D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 56(a)1. Where a party fails to appropriately deny material facts set forth in the moving party's 56(a)1 statement, and where those facts are supported by evidence in the record, those facts are deemed to be admitted. See SEC v. Global Telecom Servs. L.L.C., 325 F.Supp.2d 94, 109 (D. Conn. 2004); Knight v. Hartford Police Dep't, 3:04CV969 (PCD), 2006 WL 1438649 (D. Conn. May 22, 2006).
Here, Defendants have submitted a Local Rule 56(a)1 statement with specific citations to evidence in the record. Plaintiff, however, has failed to properly deny many of the specific facts the Defendants have proffered, either by failing to support his denials with citations to evidence in the record contradicting the Defendants' alleged facts, or by simply stating that he "is without sufficient information to admit or deny" certain statements. Thus, where Plaintiff has objected to Defendants' facts but has failed to support his objection with any admissible evidence in the record, where the record itself does not support Plaintiff's denials, or where the Plaintiff has neither admitted nor denied a fact, those facts are deemed to be admitted. See Buell v. Hughes, 568 F. Supp. 2d 235, 237 (D. Conn. 2008) on reconsideration, 596 F. Supp. 2d 380 (D. Conn. 2009) (); Henton v. City ofNew London, CIV.3:06 CV 2035 (EBB), 2008 WL 2185933 (D. Conn. May 23, 2008) (same); Knight, 2006 WL 1438649 (); Walton v. State of Conn., Dep't of Soc. Servs., 3:03CV2262 JBA, 2006 WL 533793 (D. Conn. Mar. 2, 2006) (); Reynolds v. Town of Suffield, 3:10CV1528 JBA, 2012 WL 3135896, at *1 n.1 (D. Conn. July 31, 2012) (). See also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) ().
The following facts relevant to the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment are undisputed or admitted unless otherwise noted.
On Friday May 8, 2009, David Rogoz drove to Lawrence Street in Hartford, Connecticut, pulled his 1999 Chevy Blazer to the side of the street, and paid an unidentified individual $50.00 in exchange for "a bundle" - or several baggies - of heroin. .Rogoz then proceeded to make a right turn onto a one way street and pulled his car over once again. . As he pulled his car to the curb, Rogoz noticed a small red Honda pull up "right behind" him. . Rogoz found this to be suspicious, so for a third time Rogoz "pulled back out, went down the street, [and] pulled over again." [Dkt. 52-13, P's Depo. p.65]. The red Honda then "pulled up in front of [Rogoz]" approximately twenty feet from his front bumper and "someone started to get out." [Id. at pp.65, 66].
Alarmed, Rogoz backed his car up "a little bit" on the one way street and, as he was looking backward, noticed an oncoming car driving toward him, so he turned his head to the front and began to drive forward. . At that point the individual from the red Honda began running toward Rogoz's car. [Dkt. 52-13, P's Depo. pp.68-69]. Rogoz, who did not recognize the car or the individual who emerged from the driver's door, then "took off" because he was scared. [Id. at pp.65, 68, 69]. Rogoz drove up over the curb on his left, drove on the sidewalk around the man's car at approximately twenty miles per hour, and re-entered the roadway. . The man who had exited the red Honda was in the roadway at the time. [Dkt. 52-13, P's Depo. p.69]. Rogoz testified that he could provide no identifying details as to this individual at the time the individual was running toward Rogoz's car, because [Id. at p.68]. Rogoz also testified that at that point he was unsure if the individual was alone, but that he had only noticed one person exiting the red Honda. [Id. at p.70].
Rogoz then turned onto various city streets, accelerating and driving through the city at approximately fifty miles per hour before entering onto Interstate 84. [Id. at p.72-73]. At his deposition, Rogoz testified: [Id. at p.73]. He further testified that "I knew when I was scared I drove unreasonably fast to get to the highway; I did." [Id. at p.76]. As he was driving through the city, Rogoz "possibly" ran a red light without...
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