Rohlf v. Kasemeier

• Decision Date: 18 November 1908
• Citation: 140 Iowa 182,118 N.W. 276
• Parties: ROHLF v. KASEMEIER ET AL.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

140 Iowa 182

118 N.W. 276

ROHLF

v.KASEMEIER ET AL.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Nov. 18, 1908.

Appeal from District Court, Bremer County; C. H. Kelley, Judge.

This is a habeas corpus proceeding brought to determine the legality of an indictment returned against the plaintiff by the grand jury of Bremer county, Iowa. A demurrer to the petition was overruled, and the trial judge discharged the plaintiff, and released him from the custody of the sheriff by whom he was held. Defendants appeal. Affirmed.Bernard Stenzel, County Atty., and J. T. Sullivan, for appellants.

Sager & Sweet and Hagemann & Farwell, for appellee.

DEEMER, J.

Plaintiff, who is a physician and surgeon, with 13 others of like profession, were indicted by the grand jury of Bremer county for the crime of entering into an agreement, combination, or understanding to fix and maintain fees and charges to be exacted for medical and surgical services in said county. Plaintiff was arrested under the indictment, and thereafter brought habeas corpus proceedings before the Honorable C. H. Kelley, Judge, to secure his release from custody, claiming that he was unduly and illegally restrained of his liberty, for the reason that the indictment charges no offense known to our laws, and that, if there be a law forbidding such acts as are charged against him, it is unconstitutional and void, in that it deprives him of his liberty, prevents him from acquiring or possessing property, and deprives him of his safety and the pursuit of his happiness, and deprives him of the right of contract and of the equal protection of the laws. The charging part of the indictment reads as follows: “The said L. C. Kern, Dr. C. T. Brown, Dr. O. L. Chaffee, Dr. W. A. Rohlf, Dr. H. C. Jungblut, Dr. B. C. Dunkelberg, Dr. C. H. Graening, Dr. Stafford, Dr. A. G. Rennison, Dr. Patterson, Dr. J. F. Auner, Dr. Murphy, Dr. Bradford, Dr. Cross, on the 30th day of July, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and seven in the county aforesaid, being physicians and surgeons located and practicing their professions in the county of Bremer, state of Iowa, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and maliciously conspire, combine, confederate, and agree with each other to create, organize, and enter into, and did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and maliciously enter into and become, a member of and a party to a trust, pool, agreement, contract, combination, confederation, and understanding to fix, establish, and regulate and maintain the price of a commodity in the county of Bremer, state of Iowa, and did then and there willfully and unlawfully fix, regulate, and establish the price of medical service and medical skill, and the profit, benefit, fee, and compensation to be received therefor, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the state of Iowa.” The demurrer challenges these contentions of plaintiff, and it is stoutly insisted upon this appeal that the indictment does charge an offense, and that the statute under which it was found is a valid exercise of legislative power.

As the case must turn upon the construction of a statute, we here copy the material parts of the section under which the indictment was found. It is No. 5060 of the Code, reading as follows: “Pools and Trusts. Any corporation organized under the laws of this or any other state or country for transacting or conducting any kind of business in this state, or any partnership, association or individual, creating, entering into or becoming a member of, or party to any pool, trust, agreement, contract, combination, confederation or understanding with any other corporation, partnership, association, or individual, to regulate or fix the price of any article of merchandise or commodity, or to fix or limit the amount or quantity of any article, commodity, or merchandise to be manufactured, mined, produced or sold in this state, shall be guilty of conspiracy.” The first point to be decided is: Do the acts charged constitute a crime under this section of the Code? It will be noticed that it forbids a combination, agreement, or understanding to regulate or fix the price of any article of merchandise, or commodity, or of merchandise to be manufactured, mined, produced, or sold in this state. The primary inquiry is: Are the charges of a physician or surgeon for his medical skill or ability an article of merchandise or commodity to be produced or sold in this state. For appellant it is contended that the word “commodity” is broad enough to cover the charge made for professional services or skill, and that the trial court was in error in holding to the contrary. It must be remembered that the word is found in a criminal statute, and that in the interpretation of such statutes different rules apply from those which obtain in civil matters, or where contracts are involved. Nothing is to be added to such statutes by intendment, and, as a rule, they are to have a strict construction. Moreover, it is well settled that, in construing any statute, all the language shall be considered, and such interpretation placed upon any word appearing therein as was within the manifest intent of the body which enacted the law. Much of necessity depends upon the context and upon the usual and ordinary significance of the language used. Now, the word “commodity” is derived from the Latin “Commodetas,” and means primarily a convenience, profit, benefit, or advantage; but in referring to commerce it comprehends everything moveable--that is, bought or sold--except animals. See Webster's International Dictionary; Best v. Bauder, 29 How. Prac. (N. Y.) 489;Barnett v. Powell, 16 Ky. 409;Queen Ins. Co. v. State, 86 Tex. 250, 24 S. W. 397, 22 L. R. A. 483. This word appearing in another statute (McClain's Code, § 5454) was held to cover insurance, and it was decided that a combination to fix insurance rates was illegal. See Beechley v. Mulville, 102 Iowa, 602, 70 N. W. 107, 71 N. W. 428, 63 Am. St. Rep. 479. But in that case the parties were not selling their own services. They were, as the opinion says, selling insurance, which was regarded as a commodity as used in the statute then under consideration. Here the indicted defendants were for a price giving their own services, or perhaps selling them, and the question is: Were these personal services a commodity?

As already indicated, the word must be taken in connection with the others used in the statute, and it is manifest that the commodity referred to must have been such as could be manufactured, mined, produced, or sold in the state, and the price was to be of an article or merchandise or commodity. If the contention of appellant be correct, the statute covers all kinds of personal labor, both skilled and unskilled, under the term “commodity.” Indeed, this is the broad claim made by counsel. Now, whilst there is a class of political economists who treat labor as so much merchandise, the wage being regulated simply by supply and demand, there is another class, which, taking account of the personal equation, sees in it something more than a commodity, and refuses to subscribe...