Rohlfing v. Cat's Paw Rubber Co.

Decision Date18 June 1951
Docket NumberNo. 50 C 229,50 C 844.,50 C 229
Citation99 F. Supp. 886
PartiesROHLFING et al. v. CAT'S PAW RUBBER CO., Inc. et al. SHAFFER et al. v. UNITED STATES RUBBER CO. et al.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

Francis Heisler, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs.

Zimmerman & Norman, Chicago, Ill., for defendants, Hake H. Wilensky Leather Co., Scheffer & Rossum Co., Levey Distributing Co. and Landwerlen Leather Co.

Schumacher, Gilmore & Van Ness, Chicago, Ill., for defendant The Carborundum Co.

Arthur R. Seder, Jr., Chicago, Ill., for defendant, The Best Foods, Inc.

Loy N. McIntosh and Kenneth B. Kirk, Chicago, Ill., for defendants, Panther-Panco Rubber Co., Biltrite Rubber Co., Essex Rubber Co.

Charles M. Price, Chicago, Ill., for defendant Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co.

Harry Z. Perel and Bernard Perel, Chicago, Ill., for defendant K. Kaplan Sons and Co.

George Link, Jr., New York City, Roland Towle and Hansen & Towle, all of Chicago, Ill., for defendant, Behr-Manning Corp.

Jack I. Levy, Herbert M. Lautmann and John J. Faissler, all of Chicago, Ill., for defendant, Howes Leather Co., Inc.

I. Leonard Kovitz, Chicago, Ill., for defendant, Jack Klinger, A Leveton & Co.

Weymouth Kirkland, A. L. Hodson, Walter E. Tinsley, all of Chicago, Ill., for defendants, Panda Corp. and Armour and Co.

Henry Junge, Chicago, Ill., for defendant, Don Grippo trading as Grippo Co.

James S. Hays, Jack L. Ratzkin, and Kaye, Scholer, Fierman & Hays, all of New York City, for defendant, The United States Leather Co.

Goldman, Allshouse & Healy, Chicago, Ill., for defendant, U. S. Leather.

Nathan S. Blumberg, Chicago, Ill., for defendant, Public Shoe Service Corp.

Burt A. Crowe, Chicago, Ill., for defendant, Lobell and Hoehn Cavalier Co.

John T. Chadwell, Richard M. Keck, and Richard W. McLaren, all of Chicago, Ill., for defendant, U. S. Rubber Co.

Lederer, Livingston, Kahn & Adsit, for defendants, Sears, Roebuck and Co., K. Kaplan and Sons, Reick-Langendorf Co.

H. Templeton Brown and Edmund A. Stephan, Chicago, Ill., for defendant, Griffin Mfg. Co., Inc.

William N. Brady and Eugene P. Meegan, Chicago, Ill., for defendant, O'Connor & Goldberg.

John A. Barr, Chicago, Ill., for defendant Montgomery Ward & Co.

Sidley, Austin, Burgess & Smith, Chicago, Ill., for defendant, Wieboldt Stores, Inc.

Gerald Grashorn, Chicago, Ill., for defendant, Southern Leather Co.

Jay A. Pritzker, Chicago, Ill., for defendant, Goldblatt Bros.

William Klevs, Chicago, Ill., for defendants, South Clark Shoe Repair, Inc., d. b. a. Sam the Shoe Doctor.

LA BUY, District Judge.

The complaints in both of these suits are brought by alleged class plaintiffs and other similarly situated against the defendants for purported violations of Sections 1, 2, 4, 5 and 7 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1, 2, 4, 5, 15 note, and Sections 1, 12 and 16 of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 12, 22, 26, 13, 13a, 13b, 21a. Plaintiffs in the case of Rohlfing v. Cat's Paw Rubber Co., Inc. are alleged to be independent shoe repair men in the City of Chicago who sell at retail to the public certain merchandise as customarily and usually appertains to a shoe-repair service and who purchase their merchandise from the various defendants. Plaintiffs in the case of Shaffer v. United States Rubber Co. are alleged to be wholesalers of rubber, leather, shoe polish, findings, abrasives, all being material used in the shoe repair field who purchase their merchandise from the defendants. The defendants in both suits are alleged to be manufacturers of rubber goods, leather goods, polish, abrasives, owners of chair repair stores, and finders who sell merchandise commonly and usually sold by plaintiff and who sell to certain of the defendants.

It is alleged certain of these defendants are engaged in the shipping and distributing of their product from and to various states of the United States, including Illinois and Wisconsin, and such manufacturing, transportation and distribution is done directly through subsidiary and associated companies; that the defendant preferred finders purchase and sell their leather and shoe findings from without the State of Illinois and from the defendant manufacturers and are given illegal rebates and otherwise preferred against the plaintiffs in their purchases, resulting in curtailment of competition in interstate commerce; that since 1945 said preferred finders induced the defendant manufacturers to enter into a conspiracy with the defendant owners of chain repair stores and with the defendant preferred finders to monopolize the sale of shoe repair supplies in Chicago and adjoining areas, and for the purpose of granting defendant owners of chain repair stores and defendant preferred finders illegal rebates and to do other illegal acts such as establishing and maintaining a fixed, rigid price, rigid system of distribution and sale whereunder certain of the defendants purchased at prices less than plaintiffs were permitted to purchase, and gave discriminatory rebates during the period of five years preceding the filing of these complaints.

The complaints pray (1) for a judgment against the defendants in the amount of the discriminatory price differential and a treble amount as liquidated damages together with costs and attorneys fees, (2) that the court order the defendants to make an accounting of all discriminatory price differentials allowed and received for a five year period preceding the suit, (3) that the defendants be ordered to supply their books and records, the exact amount of merchandise sold plaintiffs and to defendant preferred finders and defendant owners of chain repair stores, and (4) that the defendants be permanently enjoined from the continuation of said illegal acts.

Certain of the defendants have filed motions which are similar. The motions are (1) to dismiss and to quash service of summons, (2) to require plaintiffs to file an amended complaint stating various claims in separate counts, (3) to dismiss the class action and to strike from the complaint all references to persons similarly situated to plaintiffs, and (4) to drop certain plaintiffs and defendants as misjoined parties from certain claims and to sever such claims.

The defendant Panda Corporation has filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that (1) the defendant is a corporation incorporated under the laws of Wisconsin and is not and has never been an inhabitant of the Northern District of Illinois, (2) the complaint does not allege facts establishing the defendant is subject to the venue of this court, (3) the defendant is not found within this district and was not found here at the time of or subsequent to the filing of the complaint herein, and (4) the defendant does not and did not transact business within the purview of the venue section, Sec. 22, 15 U.S.C.A., at the time of the filing of the complaint or subsequent thereto.

A motion questioning the court's jurisdiction over the parties may properly be heard on affidavits. Jeffrey-Nichols Motor Co. v. Hupp Motor Car Corporation, D.C.Mass., 1930, 41 F.2d 767, reversed on other grounds 1 Cir., 1931, 46 F.2d 623; Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corporation, D.C.Pa.1950, 10 F.R.D. 123; United States v. Universal Lens, D.C.N.Y., 37 F.Supp. 459.

The venue of an action of this kind is governed by Section 12 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 22, which provides that "Any suit, action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws against a corporation may be brought not only in the judicial district whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in any district wherein it may be found or transacts business; and all process in such cases may be served in the district of which it is an inhabitant, or wherever it may be found." The burden of proof of jurisdiction and venue is upon the plaintiffs. Becker v. Angle, 10 Cir., 1947, 165 F.2d 140. The issue presented is whether Panda Corporation "transacts business" and was "found" within the Northern District of Illinois under Section 12.

Panda Corporation was served with summons on June 20, 1950 by serving same on August C. Orthmann, President, at Milwaukee, Wisconsin. In support of the aforesaid motion, movant has submitted the affidavits of the President and Vice-President. The president avers as follows:

"Defendant's business is conducted from its principal place of business in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, where it receives orders from customers in Wisconsin and other states. Among the states from which purchasers have sent orders are Arizona, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washington and Wisconsin.

Orders have also been received from customers in Canada. All orders are received in Wisconsin, accepted in Wisconsin and filled in Wisconsin. Title to the goods passes in Wisconsin. Panda Corporation retains no legal title to goods sent by it to its customers, either those in Wisconsin or in other states. Panda Corporation does not now and did not, at the time of the filing of the complaint in this case, or at any time thereafter, employ agents, distributors or salesmen to solicit or conduct business in the Northern District of Illinois. Defendant is not qualified to do business in Illinois and has no office, place of business, telephone listing, or property there. It maintains no stock of goods in Illinois nor does it own or lease a warehouse in which to store merchandise there. None of its officers or directors reside in Illinois."

The Vice President, A. L. Cords, avers:

"Defendant Panda Corporation was not in existence prior to October 27, 1947, on which date its Articles of Incorporation (a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto) were recorded with the Register of Deeds for Milwaukee County, Wisconsin, said Articles having been executed on October 21, 1947, and Certificate...

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11 cases
  • California Clippers, Inc. v. United States SF Ass'n
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
    • 2 Julio 1970
    ...provision of Clayton Act § 12 is inapplicable, since it is directed only at corporations, not individuals. Rohlfing v. Cat's Paw Rubber Co., 99 F.Supp. 886, 893 (N.D.Ill.1951); 2 Toulmin's Antitrust Laws § 24.6 at 157. Furthermore, no other general statutory provision covers such extraterri......
  • La Buy v. Howes Leather Company
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • 14 Enero 1957
    ... ... 1 Rohlfing 2 involves 87 plaintiffs, all operators of independent retail shoe repair shops. The claim of ... 1. Rohlfing v. Cat's Paw Rubber Co., D.C.N.D.Ill., 17 F.R.D. 426, and Shaffer v. U.S. Rubber Co., D.C.N.D.Ill., 99 F.Supp. 886. 2 ... ...
  • Metropolitan San. Dist. of Gr. Chicago v. General Elec. Co.
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    ...(Orange Theatre Corporation v. Rayherstz Amusement Corporation et al., 139 F.2d 871 (3rd Cir. 1944); Rohlfing v. Cat's Paw Rubber Co., Inc. et al., 99 F.Supp. 886 (D.C.1951); Huntington Imported Cars, Inc. v. Standard-Triumph Motor Company, Inc. et al., 27 F.R.D. 21 (D.C.N.Y.1960); McManus ......
  • Burwood Products v. Marsel Mirror & Glass Products
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    ...Hampton, 437 F.2d 1173 (7th Cir. 1971); Canvas Fabricators v. W. E. Hooper & Sons, 199 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1952); Rohlfing v. Cats Paw Rubber Co., 99 F.Supp. 886 (N.D.Ill.1957). Accordingly, Burwood must establish, primarily through a prima facie showing in its complaint, that it would be pr......
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