Rohn v. Gilmore

Decision Date27 July 1923
Citation217 P. 602,37 Idaho 544
PartiesJ. F. ROHN, Appellant, v. LUARD E. GILMORE and FLOY GILMORE, His Wife, Respondents
CourtIdaho Supreme Court

MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED-MISTAKE-OVERPAYMENT.

Money paid under a mistake of fact may be recovered if it was not due or payable, and in good conscience ought to be returned.

APPEAL from the District Court of the Second Judicial District, for Latah County. Hon. Edgar C. Steele, Judge.

Action for money had and received. Judgment for defendant. Reversed.

Reversed and remanded, with instructions. Costs awarded to appellant.

Morgan & Keane and E. C. Boom, for Appellant.

Money paid under a mistake may be recovered back if the money was not due or payable and in good conscience ought to be returned. (Supreme Council Catholic Knights of America v. Fenwick, 169 Ky. 269, 183 S.W. 906; Green v. E H. Taylor & Sons, 184 Ky. 739, 212 S.W. 925; Dunham v. McDonald, 34 Cal.App. 744, 168 P. 1063; Prowinsky v. Second Nat. Bank, 265 F. 1003, 49 App. D. C. 363, 12 A. L. R. 358; United States v. D'Olier Engineering Co., 215 F. 209; Shinn v. Shinn, 78 W.Va. 44 88 S.E. 610, L. R. A. 1916E, 618; Michalke v. Brown (Tex Civ.), 185 S.W. 429; Ragsdale v. Turner, 141 Iowa 604, 120 N.W. 109; Fidelity Savings Bank v. Reeder, 142 Iowa 373, 120 N.W. 1029; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Flour City etc. Iron Works, 120 Minn. 463, 139 N.W. 955.)

Whenever one party has in his possession money which in equity and good conscience belongs to another, the law raises a promise upon his part to repay it. (Milner v. Pelham, 30 Idaho 594, 166 P. 574; Kreutz v. Livingston, 15 Cal. 344.)

Where a mistake occurs in the payment of the amount of the consideration expressed in a deed or where said expressed consideration is erroneous, it is not necessary to reform said deed in order to recover money so erroneously paid. ( Shoenhair v. Merrill, 165 Iowa 384, 145 N.W. 919; Flynn v. Flynn, 68 Mich. 20, 35 N.W. 817; Ragsdale v. Turner, supra.)

Parol testimony is competent and proper with reference to the consideration in a deed to explain or contradict it where such explanation or contradiction does not impeach the validity of the deed nor impair its operation as a conveyance. (Shehy v. Cunningham, 81 Ohio 289, 90 N.W. 805, 25 L. R. A., N. S., 1194; Cheesman v. Nicholl, 18 Colo. App. 174, 70 P. 797; Kee v. Davis, 137 Cal. 456.

Geo. G. Pickett, for Respondents.

Where the facts are equally known to both parties, and where each has equal means of information, moneys paid under a mistake of facts cannot be recovered in the absence of fraud or duress. (Behing v. Somerville, 63 N.J.L. 568, 44 A. 641; Richey v. Clark, 11 Utah 467, 40 P. 717; Wheeler v. Hatheway, 58 Mich. 77, 24 N.W. 780; 34 Cyc. 1319, and cases cited therein.)

Where a deed is delivered and accepted as performance of a contract to convey, the contract is merged in the deed. The contract is functus officio, and the rights of the parties rest thereafter solely on the deed. (Farrant v. Troutman, 42 Okla. 418, 141 P. 777; Hunt v. Amidson, 4 Hill (N. Y.), 345, 40 Am. Dec. 283; Simmons v. Northern Pacific R. R. Co., 88 Wash. 384, Ann. Cas. 1918C, 1184, 153 P. 321, 155 P. 1039; Hampe v. Higgins, 74 Kan. 296, 85 P. 1091; Bryan v. Swain, 56 Cal. 616; Enos v. Anderson, 40 Colo. 395, 93 P. 475; West Boundary Real Estate Co. v. Bayless, 80 Md. 495, 31 A. 442.)

Where there is no fraud in the execution or delivery of a deed a grantee who has accepted the deed by which he "assumes and agrees to pay" a certain mortgage on the premises, and to "save the grantor harmless therefrom," cannot show by parol evidence that he made no such agreement. (Muhling v. Fiske, 131 Mass. 110; Whitney v. Dewey, 10 Idaho 633, 69 Am. St. 572, 80 P. 1117; Josslyn v. Daly, 15 Idaho 137, 96 P. 568.)

In case of a mistake by the scrivener in the drawing of an instrument, the mistake should be corrected by reforming the instrument. (34 Cyc. 910.)

MCCARTHY, J. Dunn, William A. Lee and Wm. E. Lee, JJ., concur.

OPINION

MCCARTHY, J.

This is an action for money had and received tried to the court without a jury. May 23, 1919, appellant and respondents entered into a written contract, by which appellant agreed to buy, and respondents agreed to sell, certain real estate for $ 34,000, of which $ 1,700 was paid in cash and $ 32,300 was to be paid on or before August 1, 1919. The Potlatch State Bank held two mortgages on the land for $ 6,000 each. On July 31, 1919, the day before the final payment, interest had accrued on these mortgages in the amount of $ 542. On that day appellant claims it was agreed that if he would assume and agree to pay the amount then owing from respondents to the bank on said mortgages, respondents would accept this in lieu of cash. Appellant paid respondents $ 20,300 in cash. Thereupon respondents executed and delivered to appellant a warranty deed to the premises in which it is stated that the consideration is $ 22,000 in money, and that the conveyance is made subject, to the two mortgages for $ 6,000 each, which the grantee assumes and agrees to pay. Subsequently, when the interest fell due, appellant discovered that $ 542 interest had accrued at the time of the final settlement, and he paid it. Credit had been given him for only the $ 12,000 principal of the mortgages. Appellant brought an action for money had and received claiming that he had overpaid respondents by $ 542. Respondents contended that the relief sought by appellant called for a reformation of the deed, and the trial court shared this view. A demurrer was sustained to the first complaint, and appellant filed an amended complaint, in which he asked that the deed be reformed if the court found it necessary. The amended complaint sets up substantially the facts as above outlined, and seeks to recover the $ 542. The answer admits there was $ 542 interest due on the mortgages at the time of the settlement and that appellant paid it. It denies that respondents agreed to accept in lieu of cash the total amount then owing by them to the bank on account of the mortgages. The trial court found that the contract was merged in the deed, and the deed became the contract between the parties, that under it respondents continued to remain personally liable on the notes secured by the mortgages, and this was sufficient consideration for appellant's paying the interest. The court further found that the assumption of the mortgages included the interest, that appellant paid the $ 542 voluntarily and with full knowledge of all the facts, and that there was no mistake. Judgment was entered for respondents.

Stripped of all nonessentials the case is a very simple one, the only question being whether appellant overpaid respondents by mistake. There is no question here of varying the terms of a written instrument. It is elementary that the statement of consideration in a written instrument is not subject to the general rule against varying a writing, and the true facts may be shown as to what was agreed to be paid and what was actually paid. There is no necessity here for reforming the deed.

There is really no conflict in the evidence as to the material facts. Appellant testified that respondent Luard Gilmore said the whole consideration was $ 34,000, that Mr. Bottjer, cashier of the Potlatch State Bank, who drew the deed for them, deducted the $ 1,700 which had been paid, and the amount of the mortgages, and appellant gave a check for the balance. Bottjer testified that they told him the total consideration was $ 34,000, that he deducted the $ 12,000 represented by the two mortgages, and the $ 1,700 initial payment, and appellant gave a check for the balance of $ 20,300. He testified that accrued interest on the mortgages was not considered or discussed in any manner. Respondent Luard Gilmore testified that appellant proposed to assume the two mortgages just as they stood and pay respondents $ 22,000, that there was nothing said about the interest at the time the settlement was made. He stated:

"No there was never a question raised as to the interest at all. He said he would assume the mortgages, and I didn't figure that there was any interest due, any more than there would be taxes due at that time. If you could figure the interest due at that time, I would figure there would be so much...

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  • First Bank of Homedale v. McNally
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • April 28, 1926
    ...in equity and good conscience belongs to another, the law raises a promise upon his part to repay it." Again, in the case of Rohn v. Gilmore, 37 Idaho 544. 217 602, this court held that money paid under a mistake of fact may be recovered if it was not due or payable and in good conscience o......

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