Rohrbaugh v. Lincoln Intermediate Unit

• Decision Date: 16 June 2017
• Docket Number: 1:16-cv-2358.
• Parties: Ranay ROHRBAUGH, BY AND THROUGH Linda ROHRBAUGH and James Rohrbaugh as Parents and Natural Guardians and in their own right, Plaintiffs, v. LINCOLN INTERMEDIATE UNIT, West York Area School District, and Maryanne Kreuz, Defendants
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

255 F.Supp.3d 589

Ranay ROHRBAUGH, BY AND THROUGH Linda ROHRBAUGH and James Rohrbaugh as Parents and Natural Guardians and in their own right, Plaintiffs,

v.LINCOLN INTERMEDIATE UNIT, West York Area School District, and Maryanne Kreuz, Defendants,

1:16-cv-2358.

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed June 16, 2017

Beth G. Cole, Christopher Markos, Gerald J. Williams, Philadelphia, Williams Cuker Berezofsky, Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiff.

Christopher J. Conrad, Sharon M. O'Donnell, Thomas A. Specht, Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman and Goggin, Camp Hill, PA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

John E. Jones, III, District Judge

Presently pending before the Court are two motions to dismiss filed by the Defendants. (Docs. 21, 23). Plaintiffs are Ranay Rohrbaugh ("Ranay"), a minor, by and through her parents Linda and James Rohrbaugh, and Linda and James Rohrbaugh individually. Defendants are Lincoln Intermediate Unit ("Lincoln"), West York Area School District ("West York"), and Maryanne Kreuz. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on January 27, 2017. (Doc. 16). Count I is against all Defendants and claims a violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. ("Section 504"). Count II is against all Defendants and claims a violation of Due Process, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Count III is against Kreuz only and claims assault and battery under Pennsylvania common law. West York filed a motion to dismiss on February 10, 2017, along with a brief in support. (Docs. 21, 22). Lincoln and Kreuz also filed a motion to dismiss and a brief in support on February 10, 2017. (Docs. 23, 24). Plaintiffs filed a brief in opposition to both motions on March 13, 2017. (Doc. 29). The Defendants filed replies on March 27, 2017. (Docs. 31, 32). The motions are fully briefed and ripe for our review. For the reasons that follow, the motions are granted and the case closed.

I. BACKGROUND

The parties do not dispute that Ranay is, and was at all times, disabled pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 – 1482 ("IDEA"), and Section 504. (Doc. 16, ¶ 10). Ranay has been in special education programs in West York since elementary school, which are provided by Lincoln. (Id. , at ¶ 13). Ranay had an Individualized Education Plan ("IEP"), which noted her continued need for a Personal Care Assistant ("PCA"). (Id. , at ¶ 16). The IEP noted the need for a PCA to implement her behavior intervention plan and safety in the school environment. (Id. ). The behavior intervention plan requires the use of de-escalation techniques rather than physical intervention. (Id. , at ¶ 18). Similarly, Ranay's IEP did not include the use of restraints. (Id. , at ¶ 17).

On October 17, 2013, Ranay became aggressive in her classroom, but de-escalation techniques were successful and no physical restraint was used. (Id. , at ¶ 20). On November 7, 2014, Ranay's PCA was Kreuz, who had been recently hired by Lincoln and been Ranay's PCA for a short time. (Id. , at ¶ 21).

During lunchtime in the school cafeteria on November 7, 2014, Kreuz applied a restraint on Ranay, causing bruising and scratches on Ranay's arms, neck, and face. (Id. , at ¶ 22). The use of the restraint was not authorized by the IEP or any other legitimate purpose, and it was applied incorrectly and inappropriately such that it caused injury to Ranay. (Id. , at ¶ 25). Contrary to Lincoln's policies, the daily report prepared by Kreuz and sent home with Ranay did not make mention of the use of the restraint. (Id. , at ¶ 27).

Ranay's classroom teacher, Tabitha Miller, prepared a "Report of Restraint" and provided it to Lincoln and West York. (Id. , at ¶ 28). Miller called Ranay's mother after school that same day, on November 7, 2014, to inform her of Kreuz's use of a restraint on Ranay. (Id. , at ¶ 29). In their amended complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Lincoln and West York failed to properly train Kreuz for her position as Ranay's PCA. (Id. , at ¶ 31).

In Count I, Plaintiffs claim that the Defendants "subjected Ranay to discrimination compared to similarly situated students with IEPs and PCAs, and as compared to all West York Area School District Students," in violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. (Id. , at ¶ 41). Count II is brought pursuant to § 1983 and alleges that the Defendants "violated Ranay's 14th Amendment right to bodily integrity." (Id. , at ¶ 49). Counts I and II are brought by all Plaintiffs. Finally, Count III is on behalf of Ranay only and alleges assault and battery against Kreuz. (Id. , at ¶¶ 56–60).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Rule 12(b)(1) Standard

When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), a court must distinguish between facial and factual challenges to its subject matter jurisdiction. See Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n , 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). A facial attack challenges whether the plaintiff has properly pled jurisdiction. Id. "In reviewing a facial attack, the court must only consider the allegations of the complaint and documents referenced therein and attached thereto, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Gould Elecs., Inc. v. United States , 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Mortensen , 549 F.2d at 891 ). A factual attack, in contrast, challenges jurisdiction based on facts apart from the pleadings. Mortensen , 549 F.2d at 891. "When a defendant attacks subject matter jurisdiction ‘in fact,’ ... the Court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself whether it has power to hear the case. In such a situation, ‘no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff's allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.’ " Carpet Group Int'l v. Oriental Rug Importers Ass'n, Inc. , 227 F.3d 62, 69 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Mortensen , 549 F.2d at 891 ). Here, the Defendants' motions present a factual attack on subject matter jurisdiction due to Plaintiffs' alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See Jupiter v. United States , 2014 WL 2505670, at *2 (M.D. Pa. May 28, 2014) (Caputo, J.).

B. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard

In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), courts "accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny , 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings, Ltd. , 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002) ). In resolving a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court generally should consider only the allegations in the complaint, as well as "documents that are attached to or submitted with the complaint, ... and any matters incorporated by reference or integral to the claim, items subject to judicial notice, matters of public record, orders, [and] items appearing in the record of the case." Buck v. Hampton Tp. Sch. Dist. , 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006).

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the sufficiency of the complaint against the pleading requirement of Rule 8(a). Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, "in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson , 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) ). While a complaint attacked by Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss need not contain detailed factual allegations, it must contain "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). To survive a motion to dismiss, a civil plaintiff must allege facts that "raise a right to relief above the speculative level...." Victaulic Co. v. Tieman , 499 F.3d 227, 235 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). Accordingly, to satisfy the plausibility standard, the complaint must indicate that defendant's liability is more than "a sheer possibility." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. "Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’ " Id. (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

Under the two-pronged approach articulated in Twombly and later formalized in Iqbal , a district court must first identify all factual allegations that constitute nothing more than "legal conclusions" or "naked assertions." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Such allegations are "not entitled to the assumption of truth" and must be disregarded for purposes of resolving a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Next, the district court must identify "the ‘nub’ of the ... complaint—the well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegation[s]." Id. Taking these allegations as true, the district judge must then determine whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief. See id.

However, "a complaint may not be dismissed merely because it appears unlikely that the plaintiff can prove those facts or will ultimately prevail on the merits." Phillips , 515 F.3d at 231 (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556–57, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). Rule 8 "does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage, but instead simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element." Id. at 234.

III. DISCUSSION

West York moves for the dismissal of Counts I and II on two grounds: (1) this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiffs did not exhaust administrative remedies under the IDEA; and (2) the claims...