Rohrbaugh v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., OWENS-CORNING
| Decision Date | 26 May 1992 |
| Docket Number | 90-5206 and 90-5211,OWENS-CORNING,Nos. 90-5205,s. 90-5205 |
| Citation | 965 F.2d 844 |
| Parties | Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 13,178 Suzan ROHRBAUGH, Barbara Ann Clay, and Debra Mae Ambler, Individually and as Personal Representatives of the Heirs and Estate of Dorothy Mae Palmer, deceased, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v.FIBERGLAS CORPORATION, Defendant, the Celotex Corporation, Defendant-Appellant. Suzan ROHRBAUGH, Barbara Ann Clay, and Debra Mae Ambler, Individually and as Personal Representatives of the Heirs and Estate of Dorothy Mae Palmer, deceased, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v.FIBERGLAS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant, the Celotex Corporation, Defendant. Suzan ROHRBAUGH, Barbara Ann Clay, and Debra Mae Ambler, Individually and as Personal Representatives of the Heirs and Estate of Dorothy Mae Palmer, deceased, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.FIBERGLAS CORPORATION and the Celotex Corporation, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Scott M. Rhodes (Gerald P. Green, D. Lynn Babb, Frances E. Patton, Scott A. Law, and Larry G. Cassil, Jr., with him on the briefs) of Pierce, Couch, Hendrickson, Johnston & Baysinger, Oklahoma City, Okl., for defendant-appellant/cross-appellee Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.
Kevin T. Gassaway of Morlan and Associates, P.C., Tulsa, Okl., for defendant-appellant/cross-appellee Celotex Corp.
David L. Weatherford (Mark H. Iola and Randall L. Iola, with him on the briefs) of Ungerman & Iola, Tulsa, Okl., for plaintiffs-appellees/cross-appellants.
Before ANDERSON and SETH, Circuit Judges, and SAFFELS, District Judge *.
This products liability suit was brought by Suzan Rohrbaugh, Barbara Ann Clay and Debra Mae Ambler to recover for the alleged wrongful death of their mother, Dorothy Mae Palmer. Mrs. Palmer died of mesothelioma which the Plaintiffs claim was the result of exposure to asbestos containing products manufactured by Defendants/Appellants. On appeal, Appellants challenge the jury instructions given by the district court on Oklahoma manufacturer's products liability law. Appellants also challenge the trial format and the district court's limitation of direct and cross-examination of expert witnesses. Finally, Appellants claim that the district court erred in its award of prejudgment interest. On cross-appeal, Plaintiffs contend that the district court erred by allowing Appellants a credit for the amount of settlements with other Defendants.
The material facts in this case are not in dispute. For sixteen years the decedent, Mrs. Palmer, was married to Mr. Schultz, an insulator who worked with asbestos products. Mrs. Palmer was not exposed to asbestos dust in a factory setting; rather, she was exposed to it when Mr. Schultz brought his work clothes home to be washed. Mrs. Palmer died of mesothelioma in 1986.
Appellees, Mrs. Palmer's daughters, filed suit against Appellants claiming that Appellants' products caused the decedent's mesothelioma and that the products were defective and unreasonably dangerous. Appellees also alleged that Appellants were negligent in failing to warn of the dangers associated with their products. Appellants answered with a general denial that their products were defective and that they were negligent.
The case was tried to a jury and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Plaintiffs and against the Defendants and awarded Plaintiffs the amount of $450,000.00. The judgment was then amended to allow the Defendants a credit of $256,469.00 for sums that were paid to the Plaintiffs as a result of settlements with other Defendants.
Appellants' first point on appeal is that the district court erred in its instructions to the jury on the Oklahoma law of manufacturer's products liability. Specifically, Appellants claim that the instructions given by the district court erroneously imposed a duty on Appellants to warn the decedent of the dangers associated with their products.
We review a challenge to a jury instruction "to determine whether the instruction states the governing law and provides the jury with an ample understanding of the relevant issues and the applicable law." Street v. Parham, 929 F.2d 537, 539 (10th Cir.1991). An error in the jury instructions requires reversal only if the error is determined to have been prejudicial in light of the whole record. United States v. Denny, 939 F.2d 1449, 1454 (10th Cir.1991).
Appellants challenge the district court's instructions titled "Warning Required" and "Warning." Appellants claim that those two instructions imposed a duty on them, contrary to Oklahoma law, to warn the decedent of the risks of exposure to asbestos. We agree. The instructions in question read, in part:
(Addendum Exhibit "A" at 16, 21) (emphasis added).
The Oklahoma Supreme Court, in Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1363 (1974), set out the elements of a cause of action in manufacturer's products liability. In order to prevail, a plaintiff must prove that the product was the cause of the injury, that the product was defective at the time it left the defendant's control, and that the defect made the product unreasonably dangerous. Id.
The jury instructions given by the district court had the effect of relieving Plaintiffs of their burden to prove one of the elements of a manufacturer's products liability claim; namely, that the product was unreasonably dangerous. The instructions in question allowed the jury to find the Defendants' products defective and unreasonably dangerous if no warning was given to Mrs. Palmer. Thus, a burden was placed on Appellants to prove that their products were not defective by showing that they warned Mrs. Palmer. Appellants, however, did not have a duty to warn Mrs. Palmer of the dangers of exposure to their products.
Under Oklahoma law, a manufacturer may have a duty to warn consumers of potential hazards which occur from the use of its product. McKee v. Moore, 648 P.2d 21, 23 (Okla.1982). A failure to warn may result in a product being defective and unreasonably dangerous. Id. This duty to warn, however, only extends to ordinary consumers and users of the products. See Woods v. Fruehauf Trailer Corp., 765 P.2d 770,...
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