Rohrer v. Humane Soc'y of Wash. Cnty., 32
| Decision Date | 27 June 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 32,32 |
| Parties | DANIEL ROHRER v. HUMANE SOCIETY OF WASHINGTON COUNTY |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Animals - Abuse or Neglect of Animals - Seizure of Animal from Owner. Under Maryland Code, Criminal Law Article, §10-615, an officer of a humane society may take possession of an animal from its owner "if necessary to protect the animal from cruelty" or "if necessary for the health of the animal." When an animal has already been removed from its owner pursuant to a criminal search and seizure warrant based on alleged animal cruelty, a humane society officer may not exercise its authority under §10-615 to seize the animal from State custody. However, the humane society may notify the owner of its intent to exercise its authority to take possession of the animal upon its release from State custody under the warrant. Maryland Code, Criminal Law Article, §10-615.
Animals - Abuse or Neglect of Animals - Timeliness of Evidence Justifying Seizure of Animal from Owner. The decision of a humane society officer to take possession of a mistreated animal under Maryland Code, Criminal Law Article, §10-615, may not be based upon "stale" information. The temporal relationship between the alleged circumstances of abuse or neglect and the time that a humane society officer takes possession of the animal is relevant to a determination whether the officer's action was "necessary to protect the animal from cruelty" or "necessary for the health of the animal." In a case where an animal is seized pursuant to a criminal search and seizure warrant based on a finding of probable cause of contemporaneous violations of the animal cruelty laws, a humane society officer may take possession of the animal upon the animal's release from seizure under the warrant, on the basis of the same allegations that supported the warrant. Whether the humane society may continue to possess the animal is subject to determination in an administrative proceeding or a judicial proceeding concerning a petition for return of the animal. Maryland Code, Criminal Law Article, §10-615.
Animals - Abuse or Neglect of Animals - Seizure of Animal - Petition for Return of Animal. An owner of an animal that has been seized by a humane society officer pursuant to the authority of Maryland Code, Criminal Law Article, §10-615, may - if no administrative remedy is available - file a petition for return of the animal as provided in that statute. Denial of a petition for return of the animal resolves temporarily whether the owner has a right to possess the animal, but does not divest the owner of the ownership interest in the animal. The right to possess the animal reverts back to the owner when possession by the humane society is no longer "necessary to protect the animal from cruelty" or "necessary for the health of the animal." Maryland Code, Criminal Law Article, §10-615.
Circuit Court for Washington County
Case No. 21-C-15-054127
Barbera, C.J., Greene Adkins McDonald Watts Hotten Getty, JJ.
Opinion by McDonald, J.
This case concerns the application of a State statute designed to remedy mistreatment of animals. In particular, we must construe Maryland Code, Criminal Law Article ("CR"), §10-615 which, among other things, authorizes an officer of a humane society to take possession of an animal from its owner "if necessary to protect the animal from cruelty" or "if necessary for the health of the animal." Pondering laws that regulate the treatment of animals by people can provoke profound questions concerning the nature of human beings and their relationship to the natural world.1 A statute that deputizes an officer of a private entity to seize an animal belonging to another without prior judicial process and that provides only cryptic direction concerning the consequences of that seizure raises serious constitutional questions under the Fourth Amendment, the Due Process Clause, and their analogs in the Maryland Constitution.2
We will not resolve those questions. Our task is more mundane. We must determine whether the circumstances under which a humane society exercised its authority under CR §10-615 to take possession of a farmer's animals based on allegations of animal cruelty were consistent with that statute in two respects. We must also decide how that action mayhave affected the farmer's ownership interest in the animals. The resolution of those issues in this case turns in part on the existence of a parallel criminal prosecution and the execution of a criminal search and seizure warrant involving the same animals.
In late 2014, officers of the Respondent Humane Society of Washington County ("Humane Society"), together with other law enforcement officers, executed a criminal search and seizure warrant at the farm of Petitioner Daniel Rohrer. The search and seizure warrant, which was based on an affidavit of a Humane Society officer alleging abuse and neglect of animals at the farm, resulted in the seizure and removal of nearly 100 animals from Mr. Rohrer's farm. Acting as an agent of the State, the Humane Society placed the animals with foster farms while the animals remained in State custody.
In early 2015, the Humane Society decided that, regardless of the outcome of the criminal animal cruelty charges pending against Mr. Rohrer, the seized animals should not be returned to him. Invoking its authority under CR §10-615, the Humane Society notified Mr. Rohrer of its intent to "seize/remove" those animals. Pursuant to the same statute, Mr. Rohrer petitioned the District Court for their return. The District Court denied Mr. Rohrer's petition in light of the pending criminal charges.
Ultimately the vast majority of the animal cruelty charges against Mr. Rohrer were disposed of by dismissal or acquittal. The District Court found him guilty of five misdemeanor counts related to three animals, sentenced him to probation before judgment, released all of the animals from seizure under the warrant, and required him to implement a farm management plan under the supervision of the Humane Society. Although thedisposition of the criminal charges released the animals from the warrant, the Humane Society retained possession of the animals, relying on the District Court's earlier denial of Mr. Rohrer's petition for their return under CR §10-615.
Mr. Rohrer appealed the District Court decision denying his petition for return of the animals to the Circuit Court for Washington County. He argued that possession of the animals by the Humane Society did not satisfy the standards set forth in CR §10-615 and that, in any event, the Humane Society had failed to follow that statute's procedures. The Circuit Court rejected those challenges and affirmed the District Court decision.
In this Court, Mr. Rohrer again raises questions about the authority of the Humane Society to act under CR §10-615, as well as the legal status of animals seized under that law.
We hold that, while the statute does not provide for seizure of an animal that is already in State custody in connection with a criminal proceeding, an officer of a humane society may notify the animal's owner or custodian of an intent to take possession of the animal upon the animal's release from State custody in the criminal case. In addition, seizure of an animal under the statute need not occur contemporaneously with the alleged mistreatment of the animal. However, the temporal remoteness of the alleged mistreatment is relevant to whether it is "necessary to protect the animal from cruelty" or "necessary for the health of the animal" for the humane society to take - and retain - possession of the animal. The statute gives a humane society the authority to temporarily possess an animalwhen those standards are satisfied, although that authority expires when the necessity ends. The statute does not purport to determine ownership of the animal.
Under the common law, farm animals, such as horses, cattle, sheep, and pigs, were treated as a form of personal property. See City of Hagerstown v. Witmer, 86 Md. 293, 300-01 (1897); 3B C.J.S. Animals §3. Mistreatment of animals had legal significance only to the extent that it interfered with someone's property interest in the animal. See S. M. Wise, The Legal Thinghood of Nonhuman Animals, 23 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 471, 525-28 & n.372 (1996); see also Maryland Code, Article 27, §§80-81 (1914); cf. Hurd v State, 190 Md. App. 479 (2010) ().
During the mid-nineteenth century, legislatures began to enact animal protection laws that were not based primarily on the protection of a property interest. C.E. Friend, Animal Cruelty Laws: The Case for Reform, 8 U. Rich. L. Rev. 201 (1974). In Maryland, local governments took the lead in passing ordinances that barred abuse of animals. In 1890, the General Assembly enacted a statewide law prohibiting "torture or cruelty" withrespect to animals, and classified a violation of that law as a misdemeanor.3 Chapter 198, Laws of Maryland 1890, then codified at Article 27, §§63-64; see State v. Falkenham, 73 Md. 463, 466 (1891) (). That law defined "torture or cruelty" to "include everything whereby unjustifiable physical pain, suffering or death is caused." It defined "animal" to include "every living creature except men."
The State animal cruelty law has been amended and refined over the years. It is currently codified in Maryland Code, Criminal Law Article ("CR"), §10-601 et seq. A key provision of this subtitle is CR §10-604, which prohibits abuse or neglect of an animal. Among other things, that statute defines criminal sanctions both for the intentional infliction of "unnecessary suffering or pain on an animal" as well as for the failure to provide the animal with sufficient food, water,...
To continue reading
Request your trial