Rohrer v. Humane Soc'y of Wash. Cnty.

Decision Date27 June 2017
Docket NumberNo. 32, Sept. Term, 2016,32, Sept. Term, 2016
Citation454 Md. 1,163 A.3d 146
Parties Daniel ROHRER v. HUMANE SOCIETY OF WASHINGTON COUNTY
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland

Argued by Rebekah D. Lusk (Thienel & Lusk, LLC, Frederick, MD), on brief, for Petitioner.

Argued by Adam D. Greivell (Greivell & Garrott Johnson, LLC, Hagerstown, MD), on brief, for Respondent.

Argued before: Barbera, C.J., Greene, Adkins, McDonald, Watts, Hotten, Getty, JJ.

McDonald, J.

This case concerns the application of a State statute designed to remedy mistreatment of animals. In particular, we must construe Maryland Code, Criminal Law Article ("CR"), § 10–615 which, among other things, authorizes an officer of a humane society to take possession of an animal from its owner "if necessary to protect the animal from cruelty" or "if necessary for the health of the animal." Pondering laws that regulate the treatment of animals by people can provoke profound questions concerning the nature of human beings and their relationship to the natural world.1 A statute that deputizes an officer of a private entity to seize an animal belonging to another without prior judicial process and that provides only cryptic direction concerning the consequences of that seizure raises serious constitutional questions under the Fourth Amendment, the Due Process Clause, and their analogs in the Maryland Constitution.2

We will not resolve those questions. Our task is more mundane. We must determine whether the circumstances under which a humane society exercised its authority under CR § 10–615 to take possession of a farmer's animals based on allegations of animal cruelty were consistent with that statute in two respects. We must also decide how that action may have affected the farmer's ownership interest in the animals. The resolution of those issues in this case turns in part on the existence of a parallel criminal prosecution and the execution of a criminal search and seizure warrant involving the same animals.

In late 2014, officers of the Respondent Humane Society of Washington County ("Humane Society"), together with other law enforcement officers, executed a criminal search and seizure warrant at the farm of Petitioner Daniel Rohrer. The search and seizure warrant, which was based on an affidavit of a Humane Society officer alleging abuse and neglect of animals at the farm, resulted in the seizure and removal of nearly 100 animals from Mr. Rohrer's farm. Acting as an agent of the State, the Humane Society placed the animals with foster farms while the animals remained in State custody.

In early 2015, the Humane Society decided that, regardless of the outcome of the criminal animal cruelty charges pending against Mr. Rohrer, the seized animals should not be returned to him. Invoking its authority under CR § 10–615, the Humane Society notified Mr. Rohrer of its intent to "seize/remove" those animals. Pursuant to the same statute, Mr. Rohrer petitioned the District Court for their return. The District Court denied Mr. Rohrer's petition in light of the pending criminal charges.

Ultimately the vast majority of the animal cruelty charges against Mr. Rohrer were disposed of by dismissal or acquittal.

The District Court found him guilty of five misdemeanor counts related to three animals, sentenced him to probation before judgment, released all of the animals from seizure under the warrant, and required him to implement a farm management plan under the supervision of the Humane Society. Although the disposition of the criminal charges released the animals from the warrant, the Humane Society retained possession of the animals, relying on the District Court's earlier denial of Mr. Rohrer's petition for their return under CR § 10–615.

Mr. Rohrer appealed the District Court decision denying his petition for return of the animals to the Circuit Court for Washington County. He argued that possession of the animals by the Humane Society did not satisfy the standards set forth in CR § 10–615 and that, in any event, the Humane Society had failed to follow that statute's procedures. The Circuit Court rejected those challenges and affirmed the District Court decision.

In this Court, Mr. Rohrer again raises questions about the authority of the Humane Society to act under CR § 10–615, as well as the legal status of animals seized under that law.

We hold that, while the statute does not provide for seizure of an animal that is already in State custody in connection with a criminal proceeding, an officer of a humane society may notify the animal's owner or custodian of an intent to take possession of the animal upon the animal's release from State custody in the criminal case. In addition, seizure of an animal under the statute need not occur contemporaneously with the alleged mistreatment of the animal. However, the temporal remoteness of the alleged mistreatment is relevant to whether it is "necessary to protect the animal from cruelty" or "necessary for the health of the animal" for the humane society to take—and retain—possession of the animal. The statute gives a humane society the authority to temporarily possess an animal when those standards are satisfied, although that authority expires when the necessity ends. The statute does not purport to determine ownership of the animal.

IBackground
A. Animal Cruelty Law and Procedure Maryland Animal Cruelty Laws

Under the common law, farm animals, such as horses, cattle, sheep, and pigs, were treated as a form of personal property. See City of Hagerstown v. Witmer , 86 Md. 293, 300–01, 37 A. 965 (1897) ; 3B C.J.S. Animals § 3. Mistreatment of animals had legal significance only to the extent that it interfered with someone's property interest in the animal. See S. M. Wise, The Legal Thinghood of Nonhuman Animals , 23 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 471, 525–28 & n.372 (1996) ; see also Maryland Code, Article 27, §§ 80–81 (1914); cf. Hurd v. State , 190 Md.App. 479, 988 A.2d 1143 (2010) (affirming conviction for malicious destruction of property based on shooting of pet dog).

During the mid-nineteenth century, legislatures began to enact animal protection laws that were not based primarily on the protection of a property interest. C.E. Friend, Animal Cruelty Laws: The Case for Reform , 8 U. Rich. L. Rev. 201 (1974). In Maryland, local governments took the lead in passing ordinances that barred abuse of animals. In 1890, the General Assembly enacted a statewide law prohibiting "torture or cruelty" with respect to animals, and classified a violation of that law as a misdemeanor.3 Chapter 198, Laws of Maryland 1890, then codified at Article 27, §§ 63–64; see State v. Falkenham , 73 Md. 463, 466, 21 A. 370 (1891) (holding that new statewide law superseded a local law on animal cruelty). That law defined "torture or cruelty" to "include everything whereby unjustifiable physical pain, suffering or death is caused." It defined "animal" to include "every living creature except men."

The State animal cruelty law has been amended and refined over the years. It is currently codified in Maryland Code, Criminal Law Article ("CR"), § 10–601 et seq. A key provision of this subtitle is CR § 10–604, which prohibits abuse or neglect of an animal. Among other things, that statute defines criminal sanctions both for the intentional infliction of "unnecessary suffering or pain on an animal" as well as for the failure to provide the animal with sufficient food, water, space, and shelter.4 See Silver v. State , 420 Md. 415, 23 A.3d 867 (2011) (upholding a conviction for animal cruelty under CR § 10–604). An individual who is convicted of a charge of animal cruelty may be prohibited from "owning, possessing, or residing with an animal." CR §§ 10–604(b)(3), 10–606(b)(3).

Role of Humane Societies in Enforcement of Animal Cruelty Law

Since 1900, Maryland law has authorized members of humane societies to serve as animal control units and to help carry out the State's laws concerning the protection of animals from abuse or neglect. Chapter 456, Laws of Maryland 1900, then codified at Article 27, § 46T (authorizing "any officer or agent of the Maryland Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals or of any [similar] society" to take charge of abandoned, diseased, or disabled animals). The animal cruelty law currently defines "humane society" as "a society or association incorporated in Maryland for the prevention of cruelty to animals." CR § 10–601(d). Although a humane society is a private entity,5 the criminal statutes concerning animal cruelty delegate to humane societies certain powers to carry out the State's policy against animal cruelty.6 For example, a humane society officer may arrest anyone "committing a misdemeanor that involves cruelty to an animal." CR § 10–609. Pertinent to this case, an officer of a humane society may also seize or remove an animal from its owner under CR § 10–615. This case concerns how the power conferred on a humane society by CR § 10–615 to take possession of an animal is to be exercised and the consequences of the exercise of that power.7

B. Facts and Judicial Proceedings The Farm

Mr. Rohrer owns and runs a farm in Boonsboro, Maryland. A self-described "Old MacDonald," he raises various livestock—including cattle, sheep, goats, and chickens—for slaughter and egg production. He sells meat at farmer's markets and participates in "farm-to-fork" programs. At any given time, there may be several hundred animals on his farm. Raising animals for food production is his livelihood.

The Investigation

During the fall of 2014, the Humane Society received an anonymous call from an individual concerned about whether animals on Mr. Rohrer's farm were adequately fed. In response, on November 19, 2014, Crystal Mowery, a field services officer with the Humane Society, conducted a drive-by inspection of the farm. After seeing several cattle that "appeared to be thin," Officer Mowery returned to her office and contacted Dr. Edward Wurmb, a veterinarian. They and another Humane Society...

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4 cases
  • Johnson v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • 28 d5 Fevereiro d5 2020
    ...that are provided in the recodification bill passed by General Assembly. 2002 Md. Laws, ch. 26, § 2; see Rohrer v. Humane Soc'y of Wash. Cty. , 454 Md. 1, 24 n.15, 163 A.3d 146 (2017).3 The phrase "not less than" is not defined in the most recent edition of Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. ......
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    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Maryland
    • 27 d4 Janeiro d4 2022
    ...statutes concerning animal cruelty delegate to humane societies certain powers to carry out the State's policy against animal cruelty.” Id. Carroll County Code provides that the County Commissioners shall designate an “organization, agency, or corporation” to supervise the Code's provisions......
  • Johnson v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • 28 d5 Fevereiro d5 2020
    ...that are provided in the recodification bill passed by General Assembly. 2002 Md. Laws, ch. 26, § 2; see Rohrer v. Humane Soc'y of Wash. Cty., 454 Md. 1, 24 n.15 (2017). 3. The phrase "not less than" is not defined in the most recent edition of Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Howeve......
  • Burris v. Bauer
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • 10 d5 Julho d5 2020
    ...The trial court's legal determinations and conclusions, however, receive no deference and are reviewed de novo. Rohrer v. Humane Soc'y of Wash. Cty., 454 Md. 1, 21-22 (2017) (citing Cunningham v. Feinberg, 441 Md. 310, 321-22 (2015)). When reviewing mixed questions of law and fact, "we will......

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