Rojas v. Martell

• Decision Date: 06 March 2020
• Docket Number: No. 2-19-0215,2-19-0215
• Citation: 161 N.E.3d 336,443 Ill.Dec. 212,2020 IL App (2d) 190215
• Parties: Sandra ROJAS, f/k/a Sandra Mendoza, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sandra MARTELL, in Her Official Capacity as Public Health Administrator of the Winnebago County Health Department; James Powers, in His Official Capacity as Chair of the Winnebago County Board of Health; and Winnebago County, Illinois, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2020 IL App (2d) 190215

161 N.E.3d 336

443 Ill.Dec. 212

Sandra ROJAS, f/k/a Sandra Mendoza, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Sandra MARTELL, in Her Official Capacity as Public Health Administrator of the Winnebago County Health Department; James Powers, in His Official Capacity as Chair of the Winnebago County Board of Health; and Winnebago County, Illinois, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 2-19-0215

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

Opinion filed March 6, 2020

Michael J. Atkus and Elizabeth A. Knight, of Knight Hoppe Kurnik & Knight, Ltd., of Rosemont, for appellants.

Whitman H. Brisky, of Mauck & Baker, LLC, of Chicago, and Noel W. Sterett, of Dalton Tomich PLC, and Nathan J. Noble, of Nathan J. Noble, P.C., both of Belvidere, for appellee.

JUSTICE HUDSON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 This interlocutory appeal arises out of plaintiff Sandra Rojas's former employment as a licensed practical nurse with the Winnebago County Health Department (Health Department). Defendants are Dr. Sandra Martell, the Public Health Administrator of the Health Department; James Powers, the Chair of the Winnebago County Board of Health (Board); and Winnebago County. Plaintiff's complaint raises claims under the Health Care Right of Conscience Act (Right of Conscience Act) ( 745 ILCS 70/1 et seq. ) (West 2014) and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (Religious Freedom Act) ( 775 ILCS 35/1 et seq. (West 2014)). Plaintiff alleges that defendants discriminated against her after she asserted that her religious beliefs as a practicing Catholic prevented her from providing birth control, from providing "Plan B" emergency contraception (or "the morning-after pill"), and from making a referral for an abortion.

¶ 2 The trial court denied the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment but granted defendants' motion to certify four questions pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308 (eff. July 1, 2017), as set forth below, involving burdens of proof and defenses with respect to Right of Conscience Act and Religious Freedom Act claims. Defendants timely filed an application for leave to appeal in this court pursuant to Rule 308 ; plaintiff filed an answer in opposition. We granted the application for leave to appeal.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 The following is derived from the materials set forth in the supporting record and filed in support of the parties' summary judgment motions. Plaintiff began working at the Health Department in 1996 as a part-time licensed practical nurse in the pediatric immunization clinic. In August 2014, plaintiff began working full-time at the Health Department in the areas of adult immunization and phlebotomy, in addition to pediatrics.

¶ 5 Meanwhile, in January 2014, the Board adopted a strategic plan for the Health Department, including an initiative to evaluate opportunities for cross-connection, improved customer service, and consolidation. At the time, the Health Department operated the following eight clinics, located in two separate buildings: pediatric immunization, adult immunization, refugee, blood work, travel immunization, sexually transmitted disease /infection, family planning/women's health, and tuberculosis control. Pursuant to the objectives of the strategic plan, Dr. Martell announced a goal to integrate the eight clinics by June 2015. Toward that end, in January 2015, the nurses in the various clinics were advised that they would be cross-trained to provide all services in the combined clinic, including family planning and women's health services.

¶ 6 In May or June 2015, plaintiff spoke with Kimberly Ponder, Winnebago County's director of human resources, about her discomfort with providing certain family planning and women's health services, based on her religious beliefs. Ponder directed plaintiff to Dr. Martell, who had the authority to determine whether an accommodation could be provided.

¶ 7 Plaintiff informed Dr. Martell that as a practicing Catholic her religious beliefs prevented her from providing birth control, from providing Plan B emergency contraception, and from making a referral for an abortion. In a June 30, 2015, letter, Dr. Martell responded to plaintiff:

"On June 24, 2015, you approached management at the Health Department requesting a religious accommodation due to the consolidation of duties at the various Health Department clinics which is to occur on July 1, 2015. You are currently working in the Pediatric Immunization Clinic and indicated a preference to stay with pediatrics. You conveyed that your religious beliefs would not permit you to perform a number of the required duties at the combined clinics. Unfortunately, business necessity has compelled the consolidation of the clinics, including the Pediatric Immunization Clinic, requiring cross-training of all employees.

We have diligently considered your request for an accommodation and have determined that we cannot accommodate you within the clinic environment at the Health Department. The terms of the grants that we work under require the nursing staff in the clinics to utilize a non-directed approach with our clients. Frequently, this will involve job duties that you have indicated are objectionable to you. We have determined that we cannot segregate you, as the only full-time Licensed Practical Nurse (LPN), from these job duties without creating an undue hardship for the other employees in the clinics and the Health Department as a whole.

While we cannot accommodate you in the Health Department clinics, we can offer some alternatives outside of the clinics. The first position would be as a temporary part-time food inspector for the Health Department. The second would be as an LPN at River Bluff Nursing Home, which is owned by the County of Winnebago. Should you have any questions or be interested in either of these positions, please let me know and we can assist you or direct you to the appropriate personnel to assist you.

I realize that you have a lot to consider. We will continue to make a temporary accommodation for you for the next fourteen (14) days to give you time to decide what you would like to do. I look forward to your response within that time frame."

¶ 8 Plaintiff did not receive the letter until Dr. Martell provided plaintiff a copy after following up with her about the status of her decision, on July 14, 2015, because the letter was sent to the wrong address. As a result, the response deadline was extended to July 18, 2015.

¶ 9 In a July 14, 2015, e-mail, Dr. Martell informed Ponder that plaintiff "indicated that she would like to consider River Bluff as an option." Dr. Martell also requested information as to "how we can facilitate the process for her to tour/interview/consider the position." Dr. Martell further informed Ponder that plaintiff "wanted to know if she would have to resign or would she be terminated if the option is not acceptable" and that Dr. Martell "essentially informed [plaintiff] that [they] would work through the process with her to consider her options." However, in a July 16, 2015, e-mail, Dr. Martell informed Ponder that plaintiff telephoned her to "verbally indicate[ ] that she has decided not to pursue the accommodations at River Bluff or the food inspector with the Health Department and will submit her 2[-]week letter of resignation to her supervisor Mary Weyand tomorrow."

¶ 10 It was undisputed that plaintiff submitted her resignation on July 17, 2015, effective July 31, 2015. Plaintiff wrote: "Please accept this letter as my formal notice of resignation from Winn. Co. Health Dept effective on 7-31-15. I have enjoyed my employment here and appreciate all [I] have learned[.]"

¶ 11 Plaintiff subsequently sued defendants, alleging Right of Conscience Act and Religious Freedom Act claims. Following a round of unsuccessful summary judgment motions by both sides, defendants again moved for summary judgment and plaintiff moved for summary judgment on liability. Regarding plaintiff's Right of Conscience Act claim, defendants argued that the framework for analyzing an employment discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) ( 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (2012) ) should apply. Accordingly, defendants argued that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case under the Right of Conscience Act because it was undisputed that she did not suffer an adverse employment action. Moreover, defendants maintained that they were entitled to summary judgment because they offered plaintiff a reasonable accommodation, which plaintiff failed to pursue, and that allowing plaintiff to remain in her position would have amounted to an undue hardship on their business.

¶ 12 Noting the dearth of authority on the issue, the trial court applied principles of statutory construction in rejecting the application of the Title VII framework to the Right of Conscience Act claim. As such, the trial court pointed out that the legislature did not expressly adopt a Title VII analysis for claims under the statute. Rather, "the legislature has plainly stated [ (in the Right of Conscience Act) ] that it ‘shall be unlawful’ to ‘discriminate against any person * * * because of such person's conscientious refusal to participate in any particular form of health care services contrary to his or her conscience,’ and it further described that an act of discrimination includes a ‘transfer’ made due to the employee's invocation of an objection of conscience." Thus, the court concluded, "[r]egardless of the wisdom of that decision, it is not the [c]ourt's place to engraft upon the statute a provision which the legislature could have included but did not." The court nevertheless noted its concern with plaintiff's analysis in that the act of purportedly transferring plaintiff to accommodate her conscience-based objection would be the very act that would establish defendants' liability under the Right of Conscience Act.

¶ 13 The trial court rejected plaintiff's argument that liability was...