Rojas v. Pine Ridge Farms, L.L.C., No. 8-884/08-0554 (Iowa App. 2/4/2009)
| Decision Date | 04 February 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 8-884/08-0554,8-884/08-0554 |
| Parties | JODY PEREZ ROJAS, alleged spouse, and SAMUEL DAVID PEREZ, minor child, Petitioners-Appellants, YOLANDA CARRERAS NARVAEZ, alleged spouse, and RAUL PEREZ CARRERAS, JUAN CARLOS PEREZ CARRERAS, VINCIO PEREZ CARRERAS, YOLANDA PEREZ CARRERAS, and MERCEDES PEREZ CARRERAS, alleged minor children of RAUL PEREZ ROJAS, Deceased, Petitioners-Appellants, v. PINE RIDGE FARMS, L.L.C., Employer, and COMMERCE & INDUSTRY INS. CO., Insurance Carrier, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | Iowa Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Douglas F. Staskal, Judge.
Dependents of deceased employee separately appeal from a district court judicial review ruling affirming the appeal decision of the workers' compensation deputy commissioner.
AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.
Randall P. Schueller of Hopkins & Huebner, P.C., Des Moines, for appellants Yolanda Carreras Narvaez, Raul Perez Carreras, Juan Carlos Perez Carreras, Vincio Perez Carreras, Yolanda Perez Carreras, and Mercedes Perez Carreras.
Thomas J. Reilly of Thomas J. Reilly Law Firm, P.C., Des Moines, for appellants Jody Perez Rojas and Samuel David Perez.
Jean Z. Dickson of Betty, Neuman & McMahon, P.L.C., Davenport, for appellees.
Heard by Mahan, P.J., and Miller and Doyle, JJ.
These are appeals from a district court judicial review ruling affirming the appeal decision of the workers' compensation deputy commissioner apportioning survivors' benefits following the death of Raul Perez Rojas. We affirm the judgment of the district court.
Raul Perez Rojas was born and raised in a small town in Mexico. He married Yolanda Carreras Narvaez, a young girl from his town, in a religious ceremony in 1987. Soon after marrying Yolanda, Raul began traveling into the United States to work. He returned to Mexico periodically and fathered five children with Yolanda: Raul, born in June 1987, Juan Carlos, born in May 1989, Yolanda, born in October 1991, Vincio, born in 1995, and Mercedes, born in February 1998. Raul regularly sent money to Yolanda. She relied on that money as her "major, if not sole, source of income."
In 1999, while living and working in Iowa, Raul married Jody Perez Rojas. They had one child together: Samuel, born in 2002. Jody was not aware Raul had a wife and five children in Mexico. She believed the money he sent to Mexico was for his parents. Yolanda was also not aware Raul had married Jody and fathered a child with her.
On February 15, 2004, Raul was killed in an accident while working at Pine Ridge Farms, L.L.C. Jody and Yolanda each applied for survivors' benefits on behalf of themselves and their children under Iowa Code section 85.31 (2005). Following an arbitration hearing, the deputy workers' compensation commissioner found that Jody was Raul's surviving spouse because Yolanda's marriage to Raul was not legally recognized in Mexico.1 However, the deputy determined Yolanda was a dependent of Raul under sections 85.31(1)(d) and 85.44. The deputy accordingly allocated fifty percent of the death benefits to Jody as the surviving spouse and twenty percent to Samuel. The remaining thirty percent was assigned equally to Yolanda and her children. The deputy further ordered that one-half of the benefits apportioned to Yolanda and her children should be paid to the Second Injury Fund of Iowa (the Fund) as mandated in section 85.31(5).2
Both parties separately appealed, and a different deputy workers' compensation commissioner3 affirmed the arbitration decision with additional analysis. The deputy on appeal found that because "Yolanda and her family received approximately fifteen percent of Raul Rojas's earnings," they should likewise "receive fifteen percent of Raul's death benefits." He further found the hearing deputy was correct in apportioning thirty percent of the death benefits to Yolanda and her children because that would result in them actually receiving fifteen percent due to the effect of section 85.31(5).
Jody and Yolanda each filed petitions for judicial review. Following a hearing, the district court affirmed the agency decision. Both parties now separately appeal the district court's decision on behalf of themselves and their children. Jody and Yolanda each claim the agency erred in its apportionment of Raul's death benefits. Yolanda additionally claims that section 85.31(5) violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Iowa Constitutions and irreconcilably conflicts with section 85.51.
The Iowa Administrative Procedure Act, Iowa Code chapter 17A, governs the scope of our review in workers' compensation cases. Iowa Code § 86.26; Meyer v. IBP, Inc., 710 N.W.2d 213, 218 (Iowa 2006). "Under the Act, we may only interfere with the commissioner's decision if it is erroneous under one of the grounds enumerated in the statute, and a party's substantial rights have been prejudiced." Meyer, 710 N.W.2d at 218. The district court acts in an appellate capacity to correct errors of law on the part of the agency. Grundmeyer v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 649 N.W.2d 744, 748 (Iowa 2002). In reviewing the district court's decision, we apply the standards of chapter 17A to determine whether our conclusions are the same as those reached by the district court. Clark v. Vicorp Rests., Inc., 696 N.W.2d 596, 603 (Iowa 2005).
If the claim of error lies with the agency's findings of fact, the proper question on review is whether substantial evidence supports those findings of fact. Meyer, 710 N.W.2d at 219. If, however, the findings are not challenged, but the claim of error lies with the agency's interpretation of the law, the question on review is whether the agency's interpretation was erroneous, in which case we may substitute our own interpretation for the agency's. Id.
Jody claims the agency erred in its interpretation of Iowa Code sections 85.31(3) and (5). She argues the agency was limited to the method prescribed in section 85.31(3) in apportioning benefits among Raul's dependents and thus it improperly considered the reduction of benefits mandated in section 85.31(5) in its allocation of benefits to Yolanda and her children.4 Yolanda, on the other hand, claims the agency's unequal apportionment of benefits to her and her children was not supported by substantial evidence. Before addressing these claims, we believe a brief overview of the applicable statutory framework is necessary.
Iowa Code section 85.31(1) provides that when death results from a work-related injury,
the employer shall pay the dependents who were wholly dependent on the earnings of the employee for support at the time of the injury, during their lifetime, compensation upon the basis of eighty percent per week of the employee's average weekly spendable earnings, commencing from the date of death as follows:
a. To the surviving spouse for life or until remarriage . . . if there are no children entitled to benefits.
b. To any child of the deceased until the child shall reach the age of eighteen, provided that a child beyond eighteen years of age shall receive benefits to the age of twenty-five if actually dependent . . .
. . . .
d. To all other dependents as defined in section 85.445 for the duration of the incapacity from earning.
(Emphasis added.) A surviving spouse, with certain exceptions not applicable here, and children under eighteen years of age, "whether actually dependent for support or not upon the parent at the time of the parent's death," are "conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent upon the deceased employee." Iowa Code § 85.42.
Section 85.43 consequently provides that
[i]f the deceased employee leaves a surviving spouse qualified under the provisions of section 85.42, the full compensation shall be paid to the surviving spouse, as provided in section 85.31; provided that where a deceased employee leave[s] a surviving spouse and a dependent child or children the workers' compensation commissioner may make an order of record for an equitable apportionment of the compensation payments.
However,
[i]f the employee leaves dependents only partially dependent upon the employee's earnings for support at the time of the injury, the weekly compensation to be paid as aforesaid, shall be equal to the same proportion of the weekly payments for the benefit of persons wholly dependent as the amount contributed by the employee to such partial dependents bears to the annual earnings of the deceased at the time of the injury.
Iowa Code § 85.31(3) (emphasis added); see also Iowa Code § 85.44 ().
With this framework in mind, we reject Jody's argument that the agency was required to allocate the death benefits in this case pursuant to the method detailed in section 85.31(3). Raul left both a surviving spouse and dependent children who are "conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent" upon him by operation of section 85.42. Section 85.43 accordingly provides that "full compensation shall be paid to the surviving spouse" unless the deceased employee also leaves dependent children, in which case the agency "may make an order of record for an equitable apportionment of the compensation payments." The agency was thus vested with discretion under section 85.43 to equitably apportion the death benefits among Raul's surviving spouse and dependent children.6 See Zomer v. West River Farms, Inc., 666 N.W.2d 130, 135 (Iowa 2003) (). We agree with the district court that nothing in either section 85.43 or 85.31(5) prohibited the agency from considering the...
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