Rojas v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Rochester

• Decision Date: 04 October 2011
• Docket Number: Docket No. 10–4132–cv.
• Citation: 113 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 708,660 F.3d 98
• Parties: Sandra ROJAS, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. The ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF ROCHESTER, The Pastoral Center of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Rochester, & Pastor Peter Enyan–Boadu, Individually, Defendant–Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

113 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 708

660 F.3d 98

Sandra ROJAS, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.The ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF ROCHESTER, The Pastoral Center of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Rochester, & Pastor Peter Enyan–Boadu, Individually, Defendant–Appellees.

Docket No. 10–4132–cv.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Argued: Aug. 23, 2011.Decided: Oct. 4, 2011.

Steven E. Laprade, Christina A. Agola PLLC, Brighton, NY, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Daniel J. Moore, Harris Beach PLLC, Pittsford, NY, for Defendants–Appellees the Roman Catholic Diocese of Rochester and the Pastoral Center of the Roman Catholic Dioceses of Rochester.

Charles A. Schiano, Sr., Schiano Law Office, P.C., Rochester, NY, for Defendant–Appellee Pastor Peter Enyan–Boadu.

Before: MINER, CABRANES, and HALL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Plaintiff-appellant Sandra Rojas (“Rojas”) appeals from a judgment entered October 6, 2010, in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York (Charles J. Siragusa, Judge) granting summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees the Roman Catholic Diocese of Rochester (“the Diocese”), the Pastoral Center of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Rochester, and Pastor Peter Enyan–Boadu (“Enyan–Boadu” or “Father Peter”) (jointly, “defendants”) on her claims of sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (2006), and the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290–301 (McKinney 2010 & Supp.2011). The primary issue before us on appeal is whether the District Court properly disregarded certain purported issues of fact in holding that no reasonable jury could find in favor of Rojas. Because the record shows that this was one of the “rare circumstance[s] where the plaintiff relies almost entirely on [her] own testimony, much of which is contradictory and incomplete,” and where “the facts alleged are so contradictory that doubt is cast upon their plausibility,” Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549, 554, 555 (2d Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks omitted), we hold that the District Court properly made a limited assessment of the evidence Rojas offered in opposition to summary judgment and concluded that no reasonable jury could believe it. Accordingly, we affirm the District Court's judgment dismissing Rojas's claims under Title VII and the NYSHRL.¹

BACKGROUND

An exhaustive description of the facts of this case, including an analysis of various inconsistencies and contradictions within Rojas's account, is contained in the District Court's Decision and Order of October 6, 2010, granting the defendants' motions for summary judgment. See Rojas v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Rochester (“ Rojas II”), 783 F.Supp.2d 381, 385–406, 407–09 (W.D.N.Y.2010). For purposes of resolving this appeal, the following overview suffices.

Rojas was employed by the Diocese as its Coordinator for Hispanic Migrant Ministry for the Brockport Area from May 2, 2004, through November 9, 2006. Her immediate supervisor was Bernard Grizard (“Grizard”), the Diocese's Director of Parish Support Ministries. Rojas's office was located on the campus of the Church of the Nativity of the Blessed Virgin Mary (“Church of the Nativity” or “the parish”), in Brockport, New York. The Church of the Nativity is a separate corporate entity from the Diocese, though it had an arrangement with the Diocese allowing the Hispanic Migrant Ministry to operate out of offices in its Parish Center. During the time that Rojas was employed by the Diocese, Enyan–Boadu was the pastor of the Church of the Nativity. Enyan–Boadu was not an employee of the Diocese, but rather of the Church of the Nativity. In her complaint, Rojas alleged that she was the victim of sexual harassment by Enyan–Boadu, which created a hostile work environment, and that the Diocese fired her in retaliation for her complaining about Enyan–Boadu's sexual harassment.

At the summary judgment stage, the critical issue was whether liability for Enyan–Boadu's alleged harassment could be imputed to the Diocese. This depended on (1) whether Enyan–Boadu was a “supervisor” of Rojas and (2) whether she had made any complaints to the Diocese such that the Diocese knew or should have known of the alleged sexual harassment. As explained at length in the District Court's opinion, see Rojas II, 783 F.Supp.2d at 385–406, 407–09, 410–11, the only evidence suggesting that Enyan–Boadu was Rojas's supervisor or that the Diocese knew or should have known of the alleged harassment was Rojas's own testimony, in the form of an affidavit submitted in opposition to summary judgment, and excerpts from her depositions. This evidence, the District Court found, contradicted the allegations in Rojas's complaints as well as other sworn statements that Rojas had made during the course of discovery and in a separate criminal trial of Enyan–Boadu, which had ended in his acquittal.² Id. at 406–09.

Rojas's Conflicting Statements Regarding Enyan–Boadu's Supervisory Status

In her original complaint, Rojas alleged that Enyan–Boadu was her “co-worker” and referred to Grizard as her “supervisor.” The District Court subsequently granted in part a defense motion to dismiss with leave to replead. Rojas v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Rochester (“ Rojas I”), 557 F.Supp.2d 387, 400 (W.D.N.Y.2008). In its opinion, the District Court noted that, at oral argument on the motion to dismiss, “the Court sua sponte raised the issue of whether [the Diocese] could be held vicariously liable for the alleged hostile environment created by Enyan–Boadu, where, according to the Complaint, Enyan–Boadu was Plaintiff's co-worker.” Id. at 394 n. 4. Despite the District Court's identification of the issue, in her amended complaint, Rojas again alleged that Enyan–Boadu was her co-worker and that Grizard was her supervisor, and she persisted in characterizing Enyan–Boadu and Grizard in this manner in her sworn responses to defendants' interrogatories. This characterization of Enyan–Boadu's and Grizard's respective roles was consistent with Rojas's earlier testimony at Enyan–Boadu's criminal trial.

In her papers opposing defendants' motion for summary judgment, however, Rojas contended that Enyan–Boadu was, in fact, her supervisor, or at least one of her supervisors. To support this assertion, Rojas relied on her own affidavit and certain portions of her deposition testimony. In her affidavit, Rojas stated that “I was never clear on who her [sic] boss was, as no one ever clarified it to me,” and that “I asked who my boss is and Grizard said, ‘Grizard, Jesus [Flores, another priest in the Diocese], and Father Peter [Enyan–Boadu].’ ” Similarly, during her April 10, 2009, deposition, Rojas stated that she had asked Grizard to “clarify who is my boss” and “[h]e said that my boss is Bernard [Grizard], Jesus [Flores,] and Father Peter [Enyan–Boadu].”

Rojas did not dispute that Enyan–Boadu's parish was a separate corporate entity from the Diocese and that she was employed by the Diocese, not the parish.

Rojas's Conflicting Statements Regarding the Diocese's Knowledge of the Alleged Harassment

In three federal complaints—one before the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (“EEOC”) and two in the District Court—Rojas alleged that she had made the following generalized complaints about Enyan–Boadu to the Diocese: (1) On October 30, 2006, she met with Grizard and complained that “ ‘Father Peter is making my life miserable’ and ‘you need to take action.’ ”; (2) At an October 31, 2006, meeting with Grizard and Mary Bauer, the Diocese's Director of Human Resources, she “started to explain to [Bauer] about the hostile environment and work conditions in [her] work place” but was interrupted; (3) On November 2, 2006, she “wrote by e-mail to the Department of Human Resources indicating that [she] wanted to discuss Sexual Misconduct.” ³ None of the three pleadings contained an allegation that Rojas had complained specifically of sexual harassment by Enyan–Boadu.⁴ Subsequently, in a sworn response to a defense interrogatory asking her to “[d]escribe each occasion on which [she] complained to the defendants,” Rojas indicated that the only complaint she had made to the Diocese was on October 30, 2006, when she met with Grizard and told him that “ ‘Pastor Peter is making my life miserable’ and ‘you need to take action.’ ” Consistent with these statements, Rojas testified at Enyan–Boadu's criminal trial that she had not made any specific complaints to the Diocese about Enyan–Boadu's harassing behavior because she felt intimidated by Enyan–Boadu.

Rojas's story changed when she was deposed by the Diocese's attorney on April 7, 2009. There, for the first time, she stated that she had complained to Grizard during her annual performance evaluation on August 8, 2006, that Enyan–Boadu was “touching” her.⁵ She also testified that, at her October 30 meeting with Grizard, she “accuse[d] Father Peter that [sic] he's touching me and kissing me.” Rojas relied on this testimony, as well as her own affidavit, in her papers opposing summary judgment, where she asserted that she had repeatedly complained about Father Peter and “especially recall[ed] telling the Diocese and Bernard [Grizard] that she was being sexual [sic] assaulted by Father Peter. She would tell them, ‘Father Peter was touching me’ and would constantly cry to them.” Pl.'s Mem. Opp. S.J. at 11, Rojas II, No. 07–cv–6250 (CJS), (W.D.N.Y. July 1, 2010), ECF # 60–4.

While Rojas relied solely on her own testimony to support these assertions, ⁶ the Diocese supported its motion for summary judgment with affidavits and contemporaneous e-mails and meeting notes strongly suggesting that it had no knowledge of the alleged harassment until after Rojas's employment ended, when it was reported that Enyan–Boadu had been arrested.⁷

The District Court's Opinion

In a detailed, 52–page opinion granting defendants' motions for summary judgment, the...