Rojes v. Riverside General Hospital, E003692

• Decision Date: 17 August 1988
• Docket Number: No. E003692,E003692
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Raymond ROJES, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. RIVERSIDE GENERAL HOSPITAL, et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Page 435

250 Cal.Rptr. 435

203 Cal.App.3d 1151

Raymond ROJES, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. RIVERSIDE GENERAL HOSPITAL, et al., Defendants and Respondents.

No. E003692.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2, California.

Aug. 17, 1988.

[203 Cal.App.3d 1155] Michael J. Fitzgerald, for plaintiff and appellant.

Thompson & Colegate and James D. Ward and Nora I. Tu, Riverside, Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland and Martin Stein, Timothy T. Coates, and Pamela E. Dunn, Beverly Hills, for defendant and respondent Riverside General Hosp.

Fidler & Bell and Stanley O. Orrock and Michael Bell, Riverside, for defendant and respondent Charles E. Stewart, III (Dr. Stewart).

OPINION

CAMPBELL, Presiding Justice.

This is an appeal from the trial court's denial of Rojes's "Petition for Order Relieving Petitioner from Provisions of Government Code Section 945.4" (petition for late claim relief).

The issues on appeal are:

(1) Is this appeal timely?

(2) Is the denial of a motion for reconsideration an appealable order?

(3) Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Rojes's motion for reconsideration?

(4) Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Rojes's petition for late claim relief?

(5) Does Government Code section 7530 ¹ require a public entity to identify itself on all its records?

(6) Is clarification and reconsideration of whether the trial court's order applies to Dr. Stewart necessary?

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Rojes was beaten and robbed while walking at a shopping mall on October 3, 1984. He drove himself to the Riverside General emergency room for treatment, where he was admitted for surgery for a fractured mandible and nasal bones and for nasal lacerations. When he was admitted, Rojes was "in mild distress, alert, and oriented." On admission to Riverside General, a county facility, Rojes signed an admissions form, which, as part of the financial agreement, stated that Rojes agreed to "reimburse the County of Riverside for all aid and Hospital services furnished...."

Dr. Stewart provided Rojes with follow-up care during Rojes's two-day hospital stay and as an outpatient from October through December, 1984.

On September 27, 1985, Rojes filed a complaint for malpractice against Dr. Stewart and Riverside General. In response, on November 14, 1985, Riverside General filed a demurrer to the complaint, arguing that Rojes had not presented a claim to Riverside County as required under the California Tort Claims Act.

Subsequently, on December 10, 1985, Rojes filed a claim and an application for leave to present a late claim with the county. Riverside County denied Rojes's claim and application for late claim relief on January 31, 1986.

Approximately five months later, on June 10, 1986, Rojes filed his petition for late claim relief in superior court, arguing that he did not discover that Riverside General was a governmental entity until November 14, 1985. In support of his argument, Rojes submitted numerous medical records, including radiology reports, urinalysis reports, electrocardiographs, patient's chart, medication record, and discharge summary, none of which designated that Riverside General was a public entity. In addition to these medical records, Rojes submitted the declaration of his subsequent treating physician, Anthony V. Abati, who stated that although he had received and reviewed numerous medical records from Riverside General, they contained no indication that Riverside General was a public entity.

Rojes also submitted his own declaration, in which he stated that although he had signed a form upon admission to Riverside General, he was unaware that the hospital was a public entity until his attorney informed him of that fact in November 1985. Rojes admitted receiving billing envelopes from Riverside General, but he did not recall that they designated that Riverside General was a public entity.

The hearing on the petition was originally set for July 3, 1986. Riverside General filed its opposition on June 23, 1986. The matter was continued to August 19, 1986, and Riverside General filed a supplemental opposition.

In support of its supplemental opposition, Riverside General filed a copy of its billing records for Rojes, and a copy of a billing envelope, which was one of four On the morning of the hearing, Rojes's attorney indicated he had not seen a copy of the supplemental opposition recently filed by Riverside General, and he was given a copy to review. After reading the supplemental opposition, the attorney stated he was ready to argue.

                such envelopes mailed to Rojes.  The upper left-hand corner of the envelope contains the following language immediately after the name and address of the hospital:  "A Department of the County of Riverside--a public entity."   Riverside General also filed a copy of a document entitled Conditions of Admission, which was signed by Rojes on October 3, 1984, and which specifies in paragraph two that "each of the undersigned agrees to reimburse the County of Riverside for all aid and hospital services furnished...."
                

After hearing argument, the court denied Rojes's petition. A formal judgment and order was signed and filed on August 26, 1986.

On September 2, 1986, Rojes filed an "Application for Motion for Reconsideration and for Clarification of Order Relieving Petitioner from Provisions of Government Code Section 945.4." In his motion, Rojes argued that he was prejudiced because he did not receive Riverside General's supplemental opposition until the morning of the hearing on his petition for late claim relief and also requested the court to clarify whether the order denying late claim relief applied to Dr. Stewart.

In support of his motion for reconsideration, Rojes submitted his attorney's declaration, in which Fitzgerald stated that Riverside General's reply papers introduced material to which he needed additional time to respond. Riverside General had sent about 100 pages of medical bills and reports to his office in response to his July 15th request, and none of the bills or reports identified Riverside General as a public entity.

Rojes submitted his own declaration in which he stated that he was in shock at the time of his admission to Riverside General and that his physical condition and the medication he received impaired his ability to understand information typed in fine print on the hospital admission form. He also stated that neither during or after his hospital stay was he informed that Riverside General or any of the defendants were public entities or public employees. Finally, Rojes stated that he did not recall reading the inscription on the billing envelopes that Riverside General was a public entity, and that he always threw away the envelopes after opening the bills.

On October 16, 1986, the court denied Rojes's motion for reconsideration and clarified that the original order denying late claim relief was applicable to Dr. Stewart.

Rojes filed a notice of appeal on November 12, 1986.

Additional facts relating to specific issues are set forth below.

DISCUSSION

I TIMELINESS OF APPEAL

Riverside General contends that this court does not have jurisdiction to consider this appeal because Rojes failed to file a timely notice of appeal. It argues that this court's determination in Blue Mountain Development Co. v. Carville (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 1005, 183 Cal.Rptr. 594, that rule 3 extends the time for appealing a judgment where a post-judgment motion for reconsideration has been filed, is incorrect and should be disapproved.

A notice of appeal from the denial of the petition for late claim relief, filed more than 60 days after notice of entry of judgment, is not timely under California Rules of Court, rule 2, subdivision (a), unless the time for appeal is extended under rule 3. ²

Rule 3 provides for an extension of time to file an appeal if a party files and serves a valid motion for new trial (subd. (a)), a valid motion to vacate (subd. (b)), or a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (subd. (d)) and the motion is denied. Notably, however, rule 3 does not specifically provide an extension of time to file an appeal if a motion for reconsideration is filed and denied. ³

In Blue Mountain Development Co. v. Carville, supra, 132 Cal.App.3d at page 1009, 183 Cal.Rptr. 594, we stated that "[a] motion for reconsideration under Code of Civil Procedure section 1008 is treated for purposes of rule 3 of the Rules of Court in the same manner as a motion for new trial or motion to vacate," citing our 1968 decision of Dockter v. City of Santa Ana, 261 Cal.App.2d 69, 74, 67 Cal.Rptr. 686, in support of this statement. We then concluded that "subject to the qualifications stated in rule 3, the timely filing of a motion to reconsider normally extends the time for filing a notice of appeal from the original ruling [if the original ruling is an appealable order] until 30 days after entry of the order denying consideration." (Id. at pp. 1009-1010, 183 Cal.Rptr. 594.)

Motions for reconsideration are analogous to motions for new trial and motions to vacate; they are based on different or newly discovered evidence and contain an explanation of why it could not have been discovered earlier, and they are requests to the trial court to vacate or modify a prior decision or reconsider issues previously before it. (Code Civ.Proc., § 1008.) Therefore, we conclude that the rule we stated in Dockter twenty years ago and more recently in Blue Mountain remains a sound one. We note that this rule has been relied upon by the bar and the courts in the state. (See, e.g., Tunis v. Barrow (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1069, 229 Cal.Rptr. 389; 6 Witkin, Cal.Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Proceedings without Trial, § 39, pp. 354-355.) We also observe that on several occasions during that time the Legislature and the Judicial Council have revised the applicable statutes and court rules; had either body determined that the rule as stated in Dockter and...