Rokohl v. Texaco, Inc.

• Decision Date: 11 March 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-40276,95-40276
• Citation: 77 F.3d 126
• Parties: 5 A.D. Cases 503, 7 NDLR P 409, Pens. Plan Guide P 23918N Monroe R. ROKOHL, Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellant, v. TEXACO, INC., Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 126

77 F.3d 126

5 A.D. Cases 503, 7 NDLR P 409, Pens. Plan

Guide P 23918N

Monroe R. ROKOHL, Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellant, v. TEXACO, INC., Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellee.

No. 95-40276.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

March 11, 1996.

Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc Denied April

10, 1996.

Larry R. Daves, Larry R. Daves and Associates, San Antonio, TX, for Rokohl.

Bruce D. Viles, Wood, Burney, Cohn and Viles, Corpus Christi, TX, for Texaco, Inc.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, WIENER and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

WIENER, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-Appellant Monroe R. Rokohl filed suit against his employer, Defendant-Appellee Texaco, Inc., alleging inter alia that Texaco wrongfully dismissed him because of his disability, in violation of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA), ¹ and that Texaco had discharged him to avoid paying him maximum retirement benefits, in violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). ² The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Texaco on the TCHRA claim, reasoning that the claim was preempted by ERISA; and, after a one-day bench trial, the court granted Texaco's motion for a directed verdict on Rokohl's ERISA claim. Rokohl appeals only from the grant of summary judgment on his TCHRA claim. Concluding that ERISA does not preempt Rokohl's TCHRA claim, we reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing that claim and remand for further proceedings in the district court consistent with this opinion.

I. FACTS

The essentially undisputed facts, with all inferences presented in the light most favorable to Rokohl, ³ are as follows: From 1968 to 1990, Rokohl worked for Texaco as a roustabout, a position that primarily entails the maintenance and repair of field lines and equipment; and as a pumper, a position that primarily entails driving around oil fields from well to well gauging volumes of production and checking for mechanical problems with equipment. In 1969, Rokohl started to experience epileptic seizures, the frequency and severity of which increased over time. After Rokohl suffered a seizure while driving a company truck in 1986, a Texaco physician restricted him to performing tasks that did not involve driving, climbing, or working near open machinery. Texaco continued to employ Rokohl after his on-the-job seizure, although the parties dispute the precise capacity in which he served after the imposition of the medical restrictions.

In 1988 and 1989, Texaco granted Rokohl any number of brief medical leaves of absence pursuant to the company's Short-Term Disability (STD) Plan. When Rokohl returned to work after one of these leaves, he suffered yet another seizure and had to be driven home by a co-worker. The following day, a Texaco executive instructed Rokohl not to return to work until he had received a complete medical release and was able to perform the full range of duties of a roustabout.

In November of 1989, Rokohl underwent epilepsy surgery. The surgery initially proved unsuccessful: Rokohl's seizures continued, and he began to experience psychiatric problems. In March of 1990, physicians treating Rokohl notified Texaco that he could resume employment on the condition that he continue to avoid driving, climbing, and operating hazardous machinery. Shortly thereafter, Rokohl reported to Texaco's field office and asked to be assigned to a roustabout crew. The Texaco supervisor on duty, observing that Rokohl was trembling and unable to carry on a coherent conversation, sent him home on sick leave. Texaco officials again informed Rokohl that he should not return to work until he was able to resume, without medical restrictions, the duties of a roustabout.

In July of 1990, when Rokohl's eligibility for benefits under the STD plan expired, Texaco's division manager recommended that Rokohl be approved for benefits under the company's Long-Term Disability Plan, an ERISA-qualified "employee welfare benefit plan." ⁴ Significant for our consideration today, under Texaco policy, the grant of LTD benefits constitutes a termination of employment with that company.

In response to the division manager's recommendation, Texaco's LTD plan administrator terminated Rokohl's employment upon finding him eligible under the provisions of the LTD plan. ⁵ As a result, Rokohl was "granted" monthly LTD benefits, albeit without his having applied therefor, effective October of 1990. Texaco forthrightly concedes that this action constitutes termination of employment.

II. PROCEEDINGS

Shortly after Rokohl was thus discharged, he filed written complaints with the Texas Commission of Human Rights and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the EEOC), alleging that Texaco had discriminated against him because of his disability. After exhausting all administrative remedies, Rokohl filed suit against Texaco in Texas state court, alleging inter alia that Texaco had (1) discharged him because of his disability, in violation of the TCHRA, and (2) dismissed him to avoid paying maximum retirement benefits, in violation of ERISA. The suit was removed to federal district court on diversity grounds in March of 1992. ⁶

Approximately two years later, Texaco moved for summary judgment on all of Rokohl's claims. The district court denied the motion with regard to the ERISA claim, but granted summary judgment for Texaco on each of Rokohl's remaining claims--including the TCHRA claim, which the court held was preempted by ERISA. In February of 1995, a one-day bench trial was held on the ERISA

                claim. 7  After Rokohl had presented his case, Texaco moved for a directed verdict.   The district court granted Texaco's motion and entered final judgment for Texaco.   Rokohl timely appealed, challenging only the grant of summary judgment on his TCHRA claim
                

III. ANALYSIS

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party ⁸; and we apply the same standards as those governing the lower court in its determination. ⁹ Summary judgment must be granted if a court determines "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." ¹⁰

B. ERISA PREEMPTION

Section 514(a) of ERISA states that the statute "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan" that is covered by ERISA. ¹¹ Courts have interpreted this preemption clause broadly, observing that its deliberatively expansive language was designed "to establish pension plan regulation as exclusively a federal concern." ¹²

The Supreme Court has given the phrase "relate to" a "broad common-sense meaning." ¹³ A state law relates to an ERISA plan "in the normal sense of the phrase if it has connection with or reference to such a plan." ¹⁴ A state law can relate to an ERISA plan even if that law was not specifically designed to affect such plans, and even if its effect is only indirect. ¹⁵ If a state law does not expressly concern employee benefit plans, it will still be preempted insofar as it applies to benefit plans in particular cases. ¹⁶

Nevertheless, ERISA preemption is not without limits. The Supreme Court has cautioned that "[s]ome state actions may affect employee benefit plans in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner to warrant a finding that the law 'relates to' the plan." ¹⁷ The ultimate question is whether, "if the appellant['s] claims were stripped of their link to the pension plans, they would cease to exist." ¹⁸ We have held in this regard that ERISA does not preempt state law claims when the claims "affec[t] only [an employee's] employer/employee relationship with [an employer] and not her administrator/beneficiary relationship with the company." ¹⁹

                More relevant to our analysis today is our earlier admonition that an employer may not use its ERISA plan as a "gimmick" to trigger preemption and thereby avoid litigation in state court. 20  In the classic metaphor, ERISA preemption may be used as a shield but not as a sword.
                

In the instant case, the district court concluded that Rokohl's TCHRA claim was sufficiently connected to the Texaco LTD plan to warrant a holding that the claim is preempted by ERISA. We disagree. The heart of Rokohl's claim is that he was wrongfully discharged by Texaco on the basis of his disability. As such, Rokohl's claim would have arisen whether Texaco had terminated his employment through the use of the LTD plan or in some other manner. Indeed, Rokohl's cause of action would pertain even if Texaco had not maintained an ERISA plan at all. Accordingly, the claim does not "cease to exist" when " 'stripped of [its] link' " to the plan. ²¹ Moreover, Rokohl's claim fundamentally affects his employee-employer relationship with Texaco, and only incidentally affects his beneficiary-administrator relationship with the plan. ²² As such, the connection between Rokohl's claim and Texaco's ERISA-qualified plan is too remote and tenuous to warrant preemption. ²³

Indeed, if we were to accept Texaco's argument that ERISA preempts Rokohl's TCHRA claim, we would effectively permit Texaco to hide behind its ERISA plan in avoidance of state anti-discrimination laws. To do that would be to allow an employer to disguise its firing decisions--even decisions to dismiss an employee because of his or her race, gender, age, or disability--as benefits decisions, in avoidance of state anti-discrimination statutes, simply by adopting an ERISA-qualified plan and awarding each discharged employee benefits under that plan. A human resources director would not have to be the proverbial rocket scientist to devise, for example, an ERISA early retirement severance plan that could evade state age discrimination laws. Congress could not have intended...