Roland v. General Motors Corp.

• Decision Date: 03 March 2008
• Docket Number: No. 09A05-0708-CV-425.,09A05-0708-CV-425.
• Citation: 881 N.E.2d 722
• Parties: Jenean ROLAND and Carl J. Roland, a minor, b/n/f Jenean Roland, Appellants-Defendants, v. [PG GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, a foreign corporation, Appellee-Plaintiff, Kristen Shelton and Genasys, L.C., a foreign limited liability corporation, Defendants below.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

881 N.E.2d 722

Jenean ROLAND and Carl J. Roland, a minor, b/n/f Jenean Roland, Appellants-Defendants, v. [PG GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, a foreign corporation, Appellee-Plaintiff,

Kristen Shelton and Genasys, L.C., a foreign limited liability corporation, Defendants below.

No. 09A05-0708-CV-425.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

March 3, 2008.

Fred Schultz, Greene & Schultz, Bloomington, IN, Robert L. Habush, Daniel A. Rottier, Donald H. Slavik, Virginia M. Antoine, Habush Habush & Rottier S.C., Milwaukee, WI, Attorneys for Appellant.

Nicholas C. Pappas, Julia Blackwell Gelinas, Lucy R. Dollens, Locke Reynolds LLP, Indianapolis, IN, A. Erin Dwyer, Timothy A. Daniels, Figari & Davenport, L.L.P., Dallas, TX, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

HOFFMAN, Senior Judge.

Plaintiffs-Appellants Jenean Roland and Carl J. Roland, a minor, b/n/f Jenean Roland ("the Rolands") appeal the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment pertaining to claims against Defendants-Appellees General Motors Corporation, a foreign corporation ("General Motors"), Kristen Shelton ("Shelton"), and Genasys, L.C., a foreign limited liability corporation ("Genasys").¹ We affirm.

The Rolands raise four issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as:

I. Whether the trial court erred in determining that federal law preempted state law claims that a passenger car's rear center seat occupant restraint system was defectively and negligently designed because it had a lap-only seatbelt, rather than a lap/shoulder belt, that would have prevented injuries to the occupant of that seat.

II. Whether the trial court erred in determining that federal law preempted state law claims that the rear center occupant restraint system was defectively and negligently designed because it was equipped with a manual adjusting devise, rather than a retractor.

III. Whether the trial court erred in determining that federal law preempted state law misrepresentation and failure-to-warn claims.

On July 3, 2004, Jenean Roland was driving a 1998 Chevrolet Cavalier convertible when it was struck by a vehicle driven by Shelton and insured by Genasys. At the time of the collision, Jenean's ten-year-old son, C.J., was seated in the center seat of the rear passenger compartment of the Cavalier. The seat was equipped with a lap belt, which C.J. was wearing at the time of the collision. C.J. suffered serious, disabling injuries.

General Motors' manufacture and final assembly of the Cavalier driven by Jenean occurred on or about August 25, 1997.

The vehicle's center rear seating position was equipped with a Type-1 two-point (lap only) safety belt with a manual adjusting device. The vehicle complied with all Federal Motor Vehicle Standards ("FMVSS"), including FMVSS 208, which gave General Motors the choice to install a Type-1 or. Type-2 (lap/shoulder) safety belt with either an automatic or manual adjusting device.

The Rolands filed suit asserting that the Cavalier was defectively and negligently designed because the center rear seat was not equipped with a lap/shoulder belt. General Motors responded by filing a motion for partial summary judgment, in which it asserted that any claim predicated on General Motor's choice of the lap belt option in the center rear seat was pre-empted by federal law. In its supporting brief, General Motors alleged that the Rolands' claims were pre-empted by FMVSS 208 (49 C.F.R. § 571.208) which was promulgated by the Department of. Transportation ("DOT") and its subdivision, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA"), under the authority of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (the "Safety Act"), 15 U.S.C. § 1391 et seq., recodified as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 30101 et seq. The trial court granted General Motors' motion, and this appeal followed.

Summary judgment is appropriate only where the evidence shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Indiana Trial Rule 56(C). All facts and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts are construed in favor of the nonmoving party. Pannell v. Penfold, 848 N.E.2d 1130, 1132 (Ind.Ct.App.2006), trans. denied. "We must reverse the grant of a summary judgment motion if the record discloses an incorrect application of the law to those facts." Id. (quoting Lake States Ins. Co. v. Tech Tools, Inc., 743 N.E.2d 314, 317 (Ind.Ct.App.2001)). Here, the meaning of a statute and interpretative regulations are at issue, and because the parties agree that the relevant facts are not in dispute, construction of the statute and regulation is a pure question of law for which disposition by summary judgment is appropriate. See Pike Township Educational Foundation v. Rubenstein, 831 N.E.2d 1239, 1241 (Ind.Ct.App.2005).

I.

The Rolands contend that the trial court erred in ruling that federal law pre-empted their state common law tort claim that the Cavalier's center seat occupant restraint system was defectively and negligently designed because it had a lap-only seatbelt, rather than a lap/shoulder belt. Like the trial court, we consider whether the Safety Act and FMVSS 208 pre-empt this claim.

The pre-emption doctrine is grounded in the Supremacy Clause of Article Six of the United States Constitution, which establishes federal law as the supreme law of the land. Rogers ex rel. Rogers v. Casco, 737 N.E.2d 1158, 1163 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied² (citing U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2). Administrative regulations promulgated pursuant to congressional authorization have the same pre-emptive effect as federal statutes. Id. at 1163-64 (citing York v. Union Carbide Corp., 586 N.E.2d 861, 865 (Ind.Ct.App. 1992)).

Congress enacted the Safety Act in response to the "soaring rate of death and debilitation on the Nation's highways." S.Rep. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 2709. The Safety Act directs the promulgation of motor vehicle safety standards that "shall be practicable, meet the need of motor vehicle safety, and be stated in objective terms . . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 1391 (now, 49 U.S.C. § 30111(a)). FMVSS 208 "specifies performance requirements for the protection of vehicle occupants in crashes." 49 C.F.R. § 571.208.S1 (1990). The regulation is designed to "reduce the number of deaths of vehicle occupants, and the severity of injuries, by specifying vehicle crashworthiness requirements . . . ., and by specifying equipment requirements for active and passive systems." 99 C.F.R. § 571.208.S2 (1990).

Here, the Rolands acknowledge that at the time the Cavalier was manufactured, General Motors was given the FMVSS 208-provided option of installing the lap-only or lap-shoulder belts and that General Motors chose the former option for the Cavalier. The Rolands contend, however, that the existence of choice under FMVSS 208 does not foreclose their state tort law claim. The crux of the Rolands' argument, is that FMVSS 208, like other regulations promulgated pursuant to the Safety Act, constitutes a minimum safety standard that may be augmented by state common law. The Rolands conclude that General Motors is negligent in failing to do more than the minimum required by the regulation.

General Motors, however, asserts, among other things, that FMVSS 208 (as applicable at the time of the Cavalier's manufacture and assembly) expressed not a minimum safety standard, but a comprehensive regulatory scheme. General Motors further asserts that its choice of installing a lap belt in the Cavalier was authorized by the comprehensive scheme and that the Rolands' tort claims interfere therewith, thus requiring pre-emption.

The Safety Act contains a pre-emption provision that explicitly pre-empts any State legislative or regulatory enactment that covers "the same aspect of performance" as a Federal standard but is not identical to the Federal standard. 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (1998), (now, 49 U.S.C. § 30103(b)(1)). The Act also contains a "savings clause" providing that compliance with a Federal motor vehicle safety standard "does not exempt any person froth any liability under common law." 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k) (1988), (now, 49 U.S.C. § 30103(e)).

With reference to the savings clause, the United States Supreme Court has held that the language "preserves those actions that seek to establish greater safety than the minimum safety achieved by a federal regulation intended to provide a floor." Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 870, 120 S.Ct. 1913, 1919, 146 L.Ed.2d 914 (2000). Indeed, the Court held that the savings clause "reflects a congressional determination that occasional non-uniformity is a small price to pay for a system in which juries not only create, but also enforce, safety standards, while simultaneously providing necessary compensation to victims." Id. at 1920, 120 S.Ct. 1913. However, the court further held that the language of the savings clause does not preclude pre-emption where a state's common law "would upset the careful regulatory scheme established by federal law." Id. at 1919, 120 S.Ct. 1913. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the savings clause "does not bar the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption principles." Id. A conflict occurs when a state law stands as an obstacle to the full implementation of a federal statute by preventing the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress or when a state law interferes with the methods by which the federal statute was designed to reach its goal. International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494, 107 S.Ct. 805, 93 L.Ed.2d 883 (1987).

In Geier, the Court considered whether FMVSS 208 pre-empted a State common law tort action where the plaintiff claimed that the defendant automobile manufacturer, which had chosen not to install airbags in some of its vehicles, as allowed by FMVSS 208, should have equipped the particular vehicle with airbags. 120 S.Ct. at 1916...