Roldan v. Bland Landscaping Co.
| Decision Date | 15 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 3:20-CV-00276-RJC-DSC |
| Parties | MANUEL ROLDAN, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. BLAND LANDSCAPING COMPANY INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina |
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
THIS MATTER is before the Court on “Defendant's Partial Motion to Dismiss or for Judgment on the Pleadings ” Doc. 18, and the parties' briefs and exhibits.
The Motion has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and is now ripe for the Court's consideration.
Having fully considered the arguments, the record, and the applicable authority, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Defendant's Motion be denied as discussed below.
Accepting the factual allegations of the Collective and Class Action Complaint, Doc. 1, as true, Plaintiff Manuel Roldan is a full-time foreman for Bland Landscaping Company Inc. Id. at 6. Roldan brings this action on behalf of himself and other current and former foremen (“Plaintiffs”) working for Bland. Id. at 1. As full-time foremen, Plaintiffs service four to six commercial properties per shift. Id. at 6. Bland deducts a “uniform services” fee each pay period regardless of whether Plaintiffs use the uniform services offered. Id. at 10.
Bland's work is seasonal, so work hours vary. Doc. 1 at 7-8. Plaintiffs typically work at least forty-two hours per week from January to May; fifty to sixty hours per week from May to September; and thirty-seven to forty-two hours per week from September to January. Id. Regardless of the number of hours worked, Bland guaranteed Plaintiffs a base salary paid each week. Id.
Plaintiffs are scheduled to receive a one-hour lunch break. Id. at 7. But they “routinely work through their lunch breaks” and only take a “full, uninterrupted lunch break approximately twice a week.” Id. at 7, 15. Regardless of whether they are able to take an uninterrupted lunch break, Bland deducts one hour from their total hours worked each shift. Id. at 7.
Bland paid Plaintiffs a salary under the fluctuating workweek method.[1] Id. at 2; Doc. 18-2. Under this policy, Bland paid Plaintiffs a fixed weekly salary and overtime compensation equal to one-half their regular weekly rate of pay. Doc. 1 at 8.[2]
On May 13, 2020, Plaintiff filed this action on behalf of himself and all similarly situated employees in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina. The Complaint alleges violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act (“NCWHA”). Specifically, he brings claims for (1) unpaid overtime wages under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207; (2) reimbursement under the NCWHA for improper deductions for uniforms and uniform cleaning services under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.8; and (3) unpaid wages under the NCWHA, including overtime resulting from Bland's miscalculation of wages and work performed during lunch breaks, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.6.
On August 6, 2020, the Court entered a Pretrial Order and Case Management Plan. Doc. 12. Following entry of that Order, the parties engaged in extensive written discovery, completed the depositions of Plaintiff, the only opt-in Plaintiff to date, and the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of Bland. Docs. 15, 17, 20-2, 20-4.
On February 3, 2021, [3] Defendant filed a Partial Motion to Dismiss or for Judgment on the Pleadings. Doc. 18. Bland moves to dismiss Plaintiff's NCWHA claims for overtime compensation under the “payday” statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.6.
In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “the court should accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and should view the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). The plaintiff's “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[O]nce a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.” Id. at 563. A complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss will survive if it contains enough facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
In Iqbal, the Supreme Court articulated a two-step process for determining whether a complaint meets this plausibility standard. First, the court identifies allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (allegation that government officials adopted challenged policy “because of” its adverse effects on protected group was conclusory and not assumed to be true). Although the pleading requirements stated in “Rule 8 [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] mark [] a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era ... it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Id. at 678-79.
Second, to the extent there are well-pleaded factual allegations, the court should assume their truth and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Id. at 679. “Determining whether a complaint contains sufficient facts to state a plausible claim for relief “will ... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. “Where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief, '” and therefore should be dismissed. Id. (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)).
The sufficiency of the factual allegations aside, “Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law.” Sons of Confederate Veterans v. City of Lexington, 722 F.3d 224, 228 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)). Indeed, where “it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations, a claim must be dismissed.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. at 328; see also Stratton v. Mecklenburg Cnty. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 521 Fed.Appx. 278, 293 (4th Cir. 2013)). The court must not “accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Anand v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 754 F.3d 195, 198 (4th Cir. 2014).
Bland also moves for a judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). Rule 12(c) provides that “after the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” United States v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., 248 F.Supp.3d 720, 725 (W.D. N.C. 2017) (quotations and alteration omitted). A motion for judgment on the pleadings is governed by the same standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Id. at 725 (citing Occupy Columbia v. Haley, 738 F.3d 107, 115 (4th Cir. 2013)).
On a motion to dismiss, courts may “consider documents that are explicitly incorporated into the complaint by reference, and those attached to the complaint as exhibits, ” as well as an exhibit to the motion to dismiss if the exhibit was “integral to the complaint and there is no dispute about the document's authenticity.” Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 166 (4th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). If the plaintiff's allegations in the complaint conflict with the plain language of the exhibit ultimately attached to a motion to dismiss, “the exhibit prevails.” Id. (quoting Fayetteville Inv'rs v. Commercial Builders, Inc., 936 F.2d 1462, 1465 (4th Cir. 1991)).
North Carolina's “payday” statute requires employers to “pay every employee all wages and tips accruing to the employee on the regular payday.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.6. See McLaurin v. Prestage Foods, Inc., 271 F.R.D. 465, 471 (E.D. N.C. 2010); DeHoll v. Eckerd Corp., No. 1:18-cv-280, 2018 WL 5624150, at *5 (M.D. N.C. Oct. 30, 2018). Defendant contends that Roldan's overtime compensation claim, brought under the “payday” statute, is preempted by the FLSA. Defendant does not seek dismissal of Plaintiff's FLSA claim or his claim that Bland improperly deducted amounts from his pay for uniform-related services under the NCWHA.
Contrary to Defendant's contention, there is no governing authority from the Fourth Circuit on the fundamental question presented here.
In support of its preemption argument, Defendant relies on Anderson v. Sara Lee Corp., 508 F.3d 181, 191 (4th Cir. 2007). In Anderson, the court explained the “longstanding principles of preemption” that guide the assessment of whether the FLSA invalidates a plaintiff's asserted state law claims. 508 F.3d at 191. “The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution renders federal law ‘the supreme Law of the Land ... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.'” Id. (quoting U.S Const. art. VI, cl. 2). Accordingly, federal statutes and regulations can “nullify conflicting state or local actions. Id. (q...
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