Roll v. Newhall

• Decision Date: 23 December 2016
• Docket Number: No. 15-1838,15-1838
• Citation: 888 N.W.2d 422
• Parties: Marcia E. ROLL, Appellant, v. Russell L. NEWHALL, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

888 N.W.2d 422

Marcia E. ROLL, Appellant,

v.Russell L. NEWHALL, Appellee.

No. 15-1838

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Filed December 23, 2016

Amended March 7, 2017

Thomas D. Hanson and Melissa A. Schilling of Dickinson, Mackaman, Tyler & Hagen, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.

Paul C. Peglow and Bethany J. Currie of Peglow, O'Hare & See, P.L.C., Marshalltown, for appellee.

HECHT, Justice.

A testator executed a last will and testament devising property to her two adult children—a son and a daughter. After the will was executed but before the testator's death, the son was adopted by a paternal aunt. The testator's daughter filed this action after the testator's death seeking a declaratory judgment establishing that the adoption terminated her sibling's ability to inherit under the will. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court concluded the son's adoption out of his biological family did not preclude him from taking under his biological mother's will, which identified him as a beneficiary both by name and by membership in a class. We affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Russell Newhall and Marcia Roll are the biological adult children of Marrian Newhall. Marrian executed her last will and testament in 2006. Article II of the will provided,

In the event my husband does not survive me, all the rest, residue and remainder of my property I give to my children, RUSSELL L. NEWHALL and MARCIA E. ROLL, share and share alike. All references to child or children shall include all children born to or adopted by me after the date this Will is executed.

The will also named Russell and Marcia as executors to serve without bond.

In 2007, Russell was adopted as an adult by his paternal aunt, Janice Anway, who wished to avoid Iowa's inheritance tax on her estate.

Marrian passed away in August 2014. She was not survived by a spouse. As a consequence of the adoption, Russell was Marrian's nephew under the law and her biological son at the time of her death.¹

Marcia, the executor and a beneficiary of the residue of Marrian's estate, filed this action seeking a declaration that Russell's adoption out of the family precluded him from inheriting under the provisions of Marrian's will.² Marcia's petition alleged entitlement to such relief because the will clearly expressed Marrian's intent to leave the property to her "children," and as a consequence of the adoption Russell was not Marrian's child under the applicable law at the time of her death. Russell filed an answer asserting his adoption by Anway did not change his relationship with his parents and that Marrian's intent for him to inherit and serve as coexecutor is clearly expressed in her last will and testament.

In August 2015, Marcia and Russell filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment, concluding Russell could inherit under the terms of Marrian's will despite the adoption because he was clearly named as an individual under the will's provisions and no statute barred him from recovering.

On appeal, Marcia makes two arguments. First, she contends the district court made an error of law in its determination of the testator's intent. In particular, Marcia asserts the district court misunderstood relevant caselaw and did not take into account the will's language or the facts and circumstances surrounding its execution. Second, Marcia asserts that even if the terms of the will would otherwise permit Russell to inherit despite his adoption by Anway, we should hold—based on public policy—that a beneficiary's right to inherit under a biological relative's will is extinguished when the beneficiary severs his or her legal relationship with that relative through a voluntary adult adoption.

Russell contends his status as a beneficiary under Marrian's will persists even after his adoption because he is a named beneficiary—not merely an unidentified member of a familial class consisting of the testator's children.

II. Standard of Review.

We review summary judgment rulings for correction of errors at law. Baker v. City of Iowa City , 867 N.W.2d 44, 51 (Iowa 2015). "On review, ‘we examine the record before the district court to determine whether any material fact is in dispute, and if not, whether the district court correctly applied the law.’ " J.A.H. ex rel. R.M.H. v. Wadle & Assocs., P.C. , 589 N.W.2d 256, 258 (Iowa 1999) (quoting Shriver v. City of Okoboji , 567 N.W.2d 397, 400 (Iowa 1997) ). "We ... view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and will grant that party all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record." Estate of Gray ex rel. Gray v. Baldi , 880 N.W.2d 451, 455 (Iowa 2016) (quoting Cawthorn v. Catholic Health Initiatives Iowa Corp. , 806 N.W.2d 282, 286 (Iowa 2011) ).

III. Analysis.

By statute, the legal parent-child relationship between Marrian and Russell, an adult, was terminated by the decree of adoption establishing a new parent-child relationship between Russell and Anway. Iowa Code § 600A.3 (2014) ( "[T]ermination of parental rights between an adult child and the child's parents may be accomplished by a decree of adoption establishing a new parent-child relationship."). Although the adoption clearly terminated Russell's rights to inherit from his biological mother under the law of intestate succession, see id. § 633.223(1), Marrian died testate. Thus, the question now before the court is whether the adoption by Anway also extinguished Russell's right to inherit under Marrian's will.

A. General Principles of Will Construction. In Iowa, the cardinal rule of will construction is that "the intent of the testator is the polestar and must prevail." In re Estate of Rogers , 473 N.W.2d 36, 39 (Iowa 1991). In determining the testator's intent, we consider "(a) all of the language contained within the four corners of the will, (b) the scheme of distribution, (c) the surrounding circumstances at the time of the will's execution[,] and (d) the existing facts." Id. The court considers the instrument as a whole and tries to give each part meaning and effect. Id. Although the effect of a will's language is determined at the date of the testator's death, the intended meaning of the language used is "construed as of the date of its execution." Benz v. Paulson , 246 Iowa 1005, 1013, 70 N.W.2d 570, 574 (1955) (quoting In re Estate of Warren , 211 Iowa 940, 948–49, 234 N.W. 835, 839 (1931), abrogated in part on other grounds by In re Estate of Kern , 274 N.W.2d 325, 327–28 (Iowa 1979) ).

The court applies an objective standard when determining the testator's intent. Rogers , 473 N.W.2d at 39. We consider "what the testator did say" and "not what the testator meant to say." Id. The testator's intended meaning of words controls and is gathered from a reading of the instrument as a whole. In re Estate of Roberts , 171 N.W.2d 269, 271–72 (Iowa 1969). The court will only resort to technical definitions or cannons of construction if the testator's intended meaning is ambiguous, uncertain, or conflicting. Id. at 272 ; Rogers , 473 N.W.2d at 39 ; see also, e.g. , In re Estate of Nicolaus , 366 N.W.2d 562, 564–65 (Iowa 1985) (interpreting meaning of "issue" used in a will consistently with probate code provisions where intended meaning was uncertain). The court will not use extrinsic evidence of the testator's subjective intent "to vary, contradict [,] or add to terms of the will." Rogers , 473 N.W.2d at 39. Testators are presumed to know the legal effect of language in their wills, particularly when the wills are drafted by experienced scriveners. Id. at 40.

The court first looks to existing law to resolve questions of ambiguity. See First Nat'l Bank of Dubuque v. Mackey , 338 N.W.2d 361, 362 (Iowa 1983) ("[U]nless the term ‘legally adopted child’ must be deemed to include all adopted persons, [the testator's] intent cannot be ascertained without resort to rules of construction."). If existing law does not resolve the ambiguity, the court turns to rules of construction for guidance. Id. The court may also consider extrinsic evidence in resolving the ambiguity. Rogers , 473 N.W.2d at 39.

B. Application of General Principles . In this case, we find the relevant provision of Marrian's will is ambiguous. The gift "to my children, RUSSELL L. NEWHALL and MARCIA E. ROLL" is capable of multiple meanings because it describes the beneficiaries as members of a class and as individuals. The provision could therefore be understood to mean Marrian intended a class gift or an individual gift. If she intended a class gift, the naming of Russell and Marcia could have constituted a list of the members of the benefitted class at the time the will was executed. If Marrian intended instead to make individual gifts to Russell and Marcia, then the class reference (my children) could be understood as merely a means of specifying which "Russell L. Newhall" and which "Marcia E. Roll" were beneficiaries.

Marcia contends the will evidences Marrian's intent to make a class gift. We find no evidence in this record showing Marrian actually considered before executing her will whether her parent-child relationship with Russell would be legally extant at the time of her death. Therefore, in resolving the ambiguity we consider whether the relevant testamentary provision is deemed an individual or class gift under existing law.

Marcia also asserts the mere naming of individuals within a class does not override a class designation. She contends the gift "to my children, RUSSELL L. NEWHALL and MARCIA E. ROLL" is properly characterized as a class gift instead of an individual gift. She posits that only the class-gift characterization gives meaning to the word "children" in the relevant testamentary provision. Russell is precluded from inheriting, Marcia contends, because the gift is to a class of Marrian's "children," and Russell was Marrian's nephew—not her child—after his 2007 adoption by Anway.

Russell responds that the law in Iowa is well-settled that a...