Rollerson v. United States, 17675.

• Decision Date: 01 October 1964
• Docket Number: No. 17675.,17675.
• Citation: 119 US App. DC 400,343 F.2d 269
• Parties: Roosevelt ROLLERSON, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

119 US App. DC 400, 343 F.2d 269 (1964)

Roosevelt ROLLERSON, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

No. 17675.

United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued April 13, 1964.

Decided October 1, 1964.

Mr. William H. Allen (appointed by this court), Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. James vanR. Springer, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellant.

Mr. Max Frescoln, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Messrs. David C. Acheson, U. S. Atty., and Frank Q. Nebeker, Asst. U. S. Atty., were on the brief, for appellee.

Before BAZELON, Chief Judge, and WILBUR K. MILLER and WASHINGTON, Circuit Judges.

BAZELON, Chief Judge.

Rollerson appeals from two convictions: one for robbery and one for contempt of court during the robbery trial.

He claims that his insanity defense was not sufficiently rebutted by the psychiatrists' "conclusory" testimony that he suffered no mental disease.¹ He says the psychiatrists "usurped the function of the jury" by testifying to the "ultimate fact" of insanity rather than explaining the "basis of their conclusions."

Although we do not reverse this conviction, we think it necessary to point out that the value of a psychiatrist's testimony depends largely upon his opportunities for observation and the facts he observes. The testimony of an expert, like that of any other witness, may be excluded if it reports mere opinion, unsupported by "underlying facts."² In its discretion, a trial court may require an expert witness to amplify his conclusions with an explanation of the basis for them.³ This discretion should be exercised where evidence of either sanity or insanity appears inadequate. True, it is difficult to draw the line between underlying facts and conclusions.⁴ On the issue of responsibility, moreover, the psychiatric conclusion that a man is or is not mentally diseased has evidentiary worth. A jury which must decide the issue of responsibility is aided by knowing whether qualified psychiatrists think there is some recognized psychiatric disorder to which the defendant's symptoms are referable. Yet the jury must make a determination of responsibility, not a clinical evaluation of disease. McDonald v. United States, 114 U. S.App.D.C. 120, 312 F.2d 847 (1962). Thus, the conclusion of the psychiatrists that a man is "not mentally diseased" may not be enough in any particular case to meet the Government's burden of proving sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. The Government can best meet its burden by bringing forth from psychiatric witnesses both the conclusion of "no mental illness" and a full explanation of the dynamics of the defendant's personality.⁵

In the instant case, the jury's verdict was not against the weight of the evidence and, subject to the condition noted in Part II, we affirm the robbery conviction. However, the frequent failure to adequately explain and support expert psychiatric opinion threatens the administration of the insanity defense in the District of Columbia. We think it important to explicate this problem further, by reference to the trial record here and in Kimble v. United States, No. 17836, a pending appeal presenting similar issues.

Rollerson and Kimble are not unusual cases. Both defendants had ninety-day mental examinations in St. Elizabeths Hospital at public expense. Both had court-appointed counsel who raised the insanity defense with what evidence was available in light of reports from St. Elizabeths that the defendant was sane at the time of the crime and the crime was not a product of mental disease. Indigents like Rollerson and Kimble are largely dependent on the resources of the public system. But in both their cases, the public system has produced records in which the expert testimony is entirely conclusory, the questions perfunctory, the lay testimony unfocussed.

Rollerson's counsel raised the insanity defense by offering a letter he wrote to the jail authorities claiming they were trying to poison him and that "voices" were protecting him, a jail record showing that a sharpened object was found in his cell, and the testimony of a jail official that he had been placed in the maximum security part of the jail, "where we put the men who are a little off." In rebuttal, the Government offered two psychiatrists who testified that he "was not suffering from a mental illness or disorder" at the time of the crime and that "he could distinguish right from wrong" and "was able to exercise control over his actions and behavior." The Government also put on a third psychiatrist who felt that "he has * * * a severe character disorder." "It is not a psychosis or neurosis, but it is considered as a mental disorder in that the individual — it is listed, shall we say — listed in the gray book of the nomenclature, and that also since 1957 was considered by St. Elizabeths as a mental disorder."

Kimble's counsel offered the defendant's father and sister who testified that over a period of three years, he had exhibited peculiar behavior, "rocking and reeling," "laughing to hisself," unaware of anyone around him. Dr. Dabney, a psychiatrists from St. Elizabeths, testified that a majority of the staff conference denoted him "a paranoid personality," that this was a mental disease, and that in his opinion the crime was a product of the disease. In rebuttal the Government put on Dr. Platkin, the head of the pavilion for the criminally insane at St. Elizabeths, who testified that "a paranoid personality" was not in his opinion usually a mental disease.⁶

No one hearing this testimony or reading these records could understand why either Rollerson or Kimble acted as he did. We know nothing of their childhood, their emotional structure, the major events of their lives, their day-to-day behavior, their personalities, their own explanations for their behavior. As it stands, the testimony does little to help the jury answer the question whether either defendant has "any abnormal condition of the mind which substantially affected his mental or emotional processes or substantially impaired his behavior controls." McDonald v. United States, supra, 114 U.S.App.D.C. at 124, 312 F.2d at 851.

Nor do we know what the psychiatrists who testified knew about the defendants. The only effort in either case to explain conclusions was Dr. Dabney's outline in Kimble of a paranoid personality: "overly sensitive in relationships with other people"; "his conclusions about things are way out of proportion to actually what is happening around him"; he "actually does not want to exist in the social world * * *." But cross-examination enmeshed the psychiatrist in this typical dialogue:

"A Dr. Dabney I said that Kimble has extreme sensitivity in his relationships with other people.

"Q What do you mean by that?

* * * * * *

"A In other words, in his daily living, a word, an innocent remark from someone else in the form of a joke, or kidding, may be interpreted by this individual as a gross insult.

"A pat on the back, a gentle shove in the person's bowel may be impressed upon this man as an assault of his person.

* * * * * *

"Q Can you tell us * * * whether he could distinguish between right and wrong?

"A I think that he can distinguish between right and wrong. He has a value set of what is right and what is wrong, but, due to his mental disorder, they are distorted.

"I mentioned, before you asked this question, that if someone kids him, he may interpret it as an insult. He is aware that to insult someone is wrong.

"He is aware that to push someone around is wrong, or to badger someone is wrong.

"But in his interpretations of things which influence his reactions to a particular situation, he tends to magnify it way out of the actual reality of the situation.

* * * * * *

"Q You stated, sir, that he is capable of distinguishing between right and wrong; is that correct?

"A Yes.

"Q Would you say, then, in being able to distinguish between right and wrong he can embrace the right and resist the wrong?

"A I am saying that by his mental disorder, by his distortions of thinking, that even though he knows right from wrong he inevitably does what is considered the wrong thing.

"Q * * * Can he embrace one and reject the other?

"A In his value system that depends on what he feels is right and wrong.

"Q You stated a moment ago that he knows it is wrong, I believe you stated, to push somebody; is that correct?

"A Or to inflict harm. Everyone has a sense of right and wrong.

"Q I am not talking about everybody; I am talking about him. You said that —

"A Well, in his value system, to shove someone is wrong. To harm someone is wrong. He is aware of this."

One difficulty is that the psychiatrist was at least as interested in how Kimble viewed acts others did to him as in how he viewed acts he did to others. The prosecutor's questions went only to the latter issue, so that the answers are clouded in ambiguity. The deeper difficulty is that the psychiatrist was trying to say that Kimble's ability to assess right and wrong responses was impaired by his hypersensitive reaction to what was done to him. Thus, in the midst of testifiying that Kimble could "embrace the right and reject the wrong," the psychiatrist was perhaps saying the opposite.

The doctors in both cases arrived at their conclusions on the basis of "the usual personal interviews and the physical examination, * * * a psychological examination which is a battery of tests designed to find out something about his degree of intelligence, * * * learning something about his aptitudes, feelings and personality characteristics."⁷ A doctor testified that he saw Rollerson about twice a week on "ward rounds." In each case, all the doctors who testified had been present at an hour's staff conference at which the defendant was interviewed.

We are not told how many personal interviews of the defendant were conducted. We are not told the extent or content of the staff observations. We are told nothing about the...