Rollinger v. FCA US LLC
| Decision Date | 04 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:20-cv-11242 |
| Citation | 597 F.Supp.3d 1134 |
| Parties | Kathleen ROLLINGER, Plaintiff, v. FCA US LLC, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Jeffrey T. Stewart, Johnson Law, PLC, Detroit, MI, for Plaintiff.
Bishop A.L.E. Bartoni, Derek J. Linkous, Dylan Goodwin, Michael A. Ohly, William E. McDonald, III, Bush Seyferth and Paige, PLLC, Troy, MI, Shannon L.H. Phillips, Collins Einhorn Farrell PC, Southfield, MI, Thomas P. Branigan, Bowman & Brooke LLP, Bloomfield Hills, MI, for Defendant.
Plaintiff Kathleen Rollinger moved for partial summary judgment on whether Michigan law would allow Defendant FCA to set off any liability for future medical costs. ECF 30. The parties briefed the motion, and the Court held a hearing. ECF 34. For the following reasons, the Court will deny the motion.
Plaintiff's husband was injured in a car accident five years ago. ECF 30-2, PgID 180. At the time, Plaintiff's husband had car insurance through Allstate. ECF 32-2, PgID 264. The policy covered unlimited medical costs for the accident. Id. at 268. Allstate has since paid more than three million dollars for the husband's medical claims that arose from the accident. ECF 30-2, PgID 182; ECF 32-4, PgID 323. Allstate's obligation to pay the claims is ongoing, and no party disputes that Allstate must continue to pay. ECF 30-2, PgID 181–82.
Almost three years after the accident, Plaintiff, in her capacity as her husband's conservator, sued Defendant for breach of implied warranty and negligence. ECF 1, PgID 1, 7–9. Plaintiff's husband is now sixty-three years old. ECF 33, PgID 397 n.3.
Plaintiff has moved for partial summary judgment on Defendant's eleventh affirmative defense. ECF 30, PgID 152. The defense asserted that Defendant may "set-off ... any recovery against it to the extent [that] any and all benefits paid or payable to on behalf of ... Plaintiff[ ] [are] from any collateral sources." ECF 7, PgID 39. According to Plaintiff, Michigan law allows Defendant to set off only past medical costs—not future medical costs. ECF 30, PgID 153, 160.
The Court must grant a motion for summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A moving party must point to specific portions of the record that "it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the moving party has met its burden, the non-moving party may not simply rest on the pleadings but must present "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) ).
A fact is material if proof of that fact would establish or refute an essential element of the cause of action or defense. Kendall v. Hoover Co. , 751 F.2d 171, 174 (6th Cir. 1984). A dispute over material facts is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party."
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the facts and draw all reasonable inferences "in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." 60 Ivy St. Corp. v. Alexander , 822 F.2d 1432, 1435 (6th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted).
The dispute turns on the text of Michigan's statutory collateral source rule that is found at Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 600.6303, 600.6306. Before interpreting the rule, Defendant argued that Section 6306 does not apply for two reasons. First, Section 6311's plain text bars Section 6306 from applying. ECF 32, PgID 234–35. Second, Section 6306 is not substantive Michigan law and so the Court cannot apply it under Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins , 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). ECF 32, PgID 235–37. The Court will first provide background about Michigan's collateral source rule. After, the Court will explain why Section 6306 applies to the present dispute. Last, the Court will detail why Defendant argued the better reading of the statutory scheme.
Michigan's "common-law collateral-source rule provides that the recovery of damages from a tortfeasor is not reduced by the plaintiff's receipt of money in compensation for his injuries from other sources." Tebo v. Havlik , 418 Mich. 350, 366, 343 N.W.2d 181 (1984) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). But in 1986, the Michigan Legislature enacted the statutory collateral source rule "as part of a wave of comprehensive tort reforms." Greer v. Advantage Health , 499 Mich. 975, 880 N.W.2d 786, 787 (Mem.) (2016) (Zahra, J., concurring); see ECF 32-5, PgID 366–69. The "rule is designed to prevent double recovery by plaintiffs." State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fieger , 477 Mich. 1068, 1072, 730 N.W.2d 212 (2007) (Young, J. concurring); see also Christopher Doyle, Collateral Damage , 96-Mar. Mich. Bar J. 32, 34 n.13 (2017) (collecting cases).
Under the statutory rule, when personal injury verdicts involve damages for "medical care," "loss of earning capacity, or other economic loss," the Court must "reduce that portion of the judgment which represents damages paid or payable by a collateral source." Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.6303(1). A " ‘collateral source’ means benefits received or receivable from an insurance policy." § 600.6303(4). And "benefits from a collateral source" are not "considered payable or receivable unless" the Court finds an "existing contractual or statutory obligation" for the "collateral source to pay the benefits." § 600.6303(5).
When a court renders a verdict for a plaintiff, it must issue judgment for "[a]ll past economic damages, less collateral source payments as provided for in section 6303." § 6306(1)(a). The judgment must include "[a]ll future economic damages, less medical and other health care costs and less collateral source payments determined to be collectible under section 6303(5), reduced to gross present cash value." § 6306(1)(c). And it must also include "[a]ll future medical and other health care costs, reduced to gross present cash value." § 600.6306(1)(d). But "Sections 6306(1)(c), (d) ... do not apply to a plaintiff who is 60 years of age or older at the time of judgment." § 600.6311.
The parties agree that Section 6311 applies here because Plaintiff's husband is more than sixty years old. ECF 32, PgID 234; ECF 33, PgID 397; see Shinholster v. Annapolis Hosp. , 471 Mich. 540, 570–71, 685 N.W.2d 275 (2004) (). The parties, however, disagree about how to read Section 6311. ECF 32, PgID 234; ECF 33, PgID 397. Simply put, Section 6311 is not as far reaching as Defendant stressed.
Defendant reasoned that Section 6311's plain text bars Sections 6306(1)(c), (d). ("Sections 6306(1)(c), (d) ... do not apply to a plaintiff who is 60 years of age or older at the time of judgment."). But Michigan Courts have read Section 6311 to merely prevent a court from "reduc[ing] any future damages award to plaintiff to their present value." Shinholster , 471 Mich. at 572, 685 N.W.2d 275. As the Michigan Court of Appeals put it, "[w]e find that [Sections] 6306 and 6311, read together, evince a legislative intent that future damages and costs awarded to plaintiffs who are sixty-years ... of age or older at the time of the judgment should not be reduced to gross present cash value." Mackie v. Grand Trunk W. R.R. Co. , 215 Mich. App. 20, 29, 544 N.W.2d 709 (1996) (per curiam) (emphasis added); see also Haas v. Briggs , Nos. 224753, 2002 WL 31013706, at *5 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 2002) (per curiam) () (internal citation omitted). Section 6311 thus "does not, by exempting persons sixty years of age or older from parts of [Section] 6306, operate to deny a plaintiff's rights to future costs and damages." Mackie , 215 Mich. App. at 29, 544 N.W.2d 709.
Defendant never explained why the Michigan Supreme Court would not adopt the same holding as the Court of Appeals. See generally ECF 32, PgID 234–35. Because the Court must follow Mackie ’s holding, Section 6311 does not bar Section 6306 from applying here. See United of Omaha Life Ins. Co. v. Rex Roto Corp. , 126 F.3d 785, 789 (6th Cir. 1997) () (citation omitted).
Under Erie , a federal court sitting in diversity must apply the forum state's substantive law and federal procedural law. 304 U.S. at 78, 58 S.Ct. 817. Defendant claimed that Section 6306 cannot apply to the dispute because it is a procedural law and conflicts with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58. ECF 32, PgID 235–37.
The Court will apply federal procedural law—not state law—when the following occurs. First, the state law must not conflict with a valid, on point federal procedural rule. Hanna v. Plumer , 380 U.S. 460, 470–74, 85 S.Ct. 1136, 14 L.Ed.2d 8 (1965). If a state law conflicts with a procedural rule, the federal rule governs so long as it regulates procedure. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 559 U.S. 393, 407–10, 130 S.Ct. 1431, 176 L.Ed.2d 311 (2010) (plurality). But if the state law does not conflict with the federal rule, then the Court must apply the outcome determinative test. Gasperini v....
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