Rollins v. Wunda Weve Carpet Co.

• Decision Date: 20 August 1970
• Docket Number: No. 19095,19095
• Citation: 177 S.E.2d 5,255 S.C. 1
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: Fred ROLLINS, Jr., Respondent, v. WUNDA WEVE CARPET CO. and Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., Appellants.

Page 5

177 S.E.2d 5

255 S.C. 1

Fred ROLLINS, Jr., Respondent, v. WUNDA WEVE CARPET CO. and Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., Appellants.

No. 19095.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Aug. 20, 1970.

Love, Thornton, Arnold & Thomason, Greenville, for appellants.

Richard J. Foster, Greenville, for respondent.

LEWIS, Justice.

This is a Workmen's Compensation case. The appeal is form an order of the lower court affirming an award of the Industrial Commission to respondent for permanent partial disability to his right arm. The Hearing Commissioner awarded respondent thirty percent specific loss of use of his right arm, which was, upon review, increased to forty percent by the Full Commission. The appellants, employer and insurance carrier, contend that (1) there was no competent evidence to support the award and (2) the Full Commission increased the award for disability without a proper consideration of the record.

Respondent sustained a fracture of his right elbow on July 28, 1968 in a motorcycle accident which was not related to his work. Subsequently, on November 22, 1968, respondent sustained an injury to his right shoulder and arm while at work. This injury allegedly resulted from a jerk and strain of his arm and shoulder. It occurred as he stepped from a platform to a lower level and was unable to release a drop cord to which he was holding. The accident was shortly thereafter reported to the employer, and respondent was sent to a physician for medical attention. Respondent testified that, because of pain and weakness in the shoulder and arm, he stopped work on December 3, 1968. He was out of work until January 12, 1969 at which time he secured a job, at less pay, which did not necessitate the full use of his right arm. The Commission made a factual finding that the jerk and strain to the shoulder and arm aggravated the pre-existing injury to the right elbow, resulting in a permanent partial disability to the right arm; and made an award on that basis.

Appellants take the position that there was no testimony of any probative value to establish a causal connection between the accident to respondent's arm and shoulder on November 22, 1968 and the condition which caused the present disability. This contention is based upon the premise that, in view of the pre-existing injury, the foregoing issue was so technically complicated as to require for its determination medical testimony alone.

The medical testimony need not be reviewed. It is sufficient for the present determination to state that it negatived any causal connection between the accident on November 22nd and the present disability in respondent's arm. Significantly, however, there is medical testimony to sustain the conclusion that respondent suffered to permanet disability from the fracture to the elbow on July 28th.

The findings of causation by the Commission were based upon the testimony of claimant and the observable facts and circumstances in evidence. Our inquiry then is whether these facts and circumstances are sufficient to sustain such finding or whether the issue was so complicated as to require medical testimony for its determination.

This case presents again the troublesome question as to the probative effect to be given conflicts between medical and lay testimony on the question of causal connection between an accident and the physical condition producing disability. We have recognized that there are conditions which the lay mind is not competent to pass upon and in such scientific fields reliance must be had upon expert evidence alone.

There are however situations where the injury occurs soon after the accident, are observable to the ordinary person, and the circumstances are such that the lay mind may draw a reasonable inference of causation. In such cases, a finding of causal connection may be sustained even though in conflict with the medical testimony. Ballenger v. Southern Worsted Corp., 209 S.C. 463, 40 S.E.2d 681.

Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to support a finding as to causation in a Workmen's Compensation case and whether the presence or absence of medical testimony is conclusive depends upon the particular facts and circumstances of the case. Grice v. Dickerson, Inc., 241 S.C. 225, 127 S.E.2d 722.

The present inquiry concerns disability to the right arm and its causal connection to the accident sustained to the arm and shoulder on November 22nd. There had been a prior injury to the right elbow on July 28th. The testimony of respondent and the doctors sustains the conclusion that respondent recovered from this prior injury and, although there was a slight limitation of movement in the elbow, was able to lift, push, and pull with his right arm without pain or difficulty.

The jerk to the shoulder and arm on November 22nd caused the shoulder to begin hurting immediately, with pain occurring in the elbow a day or so thereafter. A knot or protrusion, which did not exist before, appeared on top of the right shoulder within a day or two and has increased in size. It was described by the Hearing Commissioner, from his observation, as about the size of a quarter and protruded about one-third of an inch or more, with a reddish appearance. Respondent testified as to the limitation in movement and use of his arm, which did not exist prior to the last accident. The Hearing Commissioner described the limitation in movement of the right arm as follows:

'The employee demonstrates about twenty-five per cent loss of flexion in his elbow joint. He also demonstrates that he cannot raise the arm above waist level. And in his forward elevation, he's only about one-fourth of normal. And backwards is only about one-fourth to one-third normal. He can bring his right arm across his chest and touch his left elbow, but he demonstrates...