Rollins v. Wunda Weve Carpet Co., No. 19095
Court | United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina |
Writing for the Court | LEWIS; MOSS |
Citation | 177 S.E.2d 5,255 S.C. 1 |
Docket Number | No. 19095 |
Decision Date | 20 August 1970 |
Parties | Fred ROLLINS, Jr., Respondent, v. WUNDA WEVE CARPET CO. and Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., Appellants. |
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v.
WUNDA WEVE CARPET CO. and Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., Appellants.
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[255 S.C. 2] Love, Thornton, Arnold & Thomason, Greenville, for appellants.
Richard J. Foster, Greenville, for respondent.
[255 S.C. 3] LEWIS, Justice.
This is a Workmen's Compensation case. The appeal is form an order of the lower court affirming an award of the Industrial Commission to respondent for permanent partial disability to his right arm. The Hearing Commissioner awarded respondent thirty percent specific loss of use of his right arm, which was, upon review, increased to forty percent by the Full Commission. The appellants, employer and insurance carrier, contend that (1) there was no competent evidence to support the award and (2) the Full Commission increased the award for disability without a proper consideration of the record.
Respondent sustained a fracture of his right elbow on July 28, 1968 in a motorcycle accident which was not related to his work. Subsequently, on November 22, 1968, respondent sustained an injury to his right shoulder and arm while at work. This injury allegedly resulted from a jerk and strain of his arm and shoulder. It occurred as he stepped from a platform to a lower level and was unable to release a drop cord to which he was holding. The accident was shortly thereafter reported to the employer, and respondent was sent to a physician for medical attention. Respondent testified that, because of pain and weakness in the shoulder and arm, he stopped work on December 3, 1968. He was out of work until January 12, 1969 at which time he secured a job, at less pay, which did not necessitate the full use of his right arm. The Commission made a factual finding that the jerk and strain to the shoulder and arm aggravated the pre-existing injury to the right elbow, resulting in a permanent partial disability to the right arm; and made an award on that basis.
Appellants take the position that there was no testimony of any probative value to establish a causal connection between the accident to respondent's arm and shoulder on November 22, 1968 and the condition which caused the [255 S.C. 4] present disability. This contention is based upon the premise that, in view of the pre-existing injury, the foregoing issue was so technically complicated as to require for its determination medical testimony alone.
The medical testimony need not be reviewed. It is sufficient for the present determination to state that it negatived any causal connection between the accident on November 22nd and the present disability in respondent's arm. Significantly, however, there is medical testimony to sustain the conclusion that respondent suffered to permanet disability from the fracture to the elbow on July 28th.
The findings of causation by the Commission were based upon the testimony of claimant and the observable facts and circumstances in evidence. Our inquiry then is whether these facts and circumstances are sufficient to sustain such finding or whether the issue was so complicated as to require medical testimony for its determination.
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This case presents again the troublesome question as to the probative effect to be given conflicts between medical and lay testimony on the question of causal connection between an accident and the physical condition producing disability. We have recognized that there are conditions which the lay mind is not competent to pass upon and in such scientific fields reliance must be had upon expert evidence alone.
There are however situations where the injury occurs soon after the accident, are observable to the ordinary person, and the circumstances are such that the lay mind may draw a reasonable inference of causation. In such cases, a finding of causal connection may be sustained even though in conflict with the medical testimony. Ballenger v. Southern Worsted Corp., 209 S.C. 463, 40 S.E.2d 681.
Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to support a finding as to...
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...evidence. See, Fowler-Barham Ford v. Indiana Lumbermens Mutual, 45 N.C.App. 625, 263 S.E.2d 825 (1980); Rollins v. Wunda Weve Carpet Co., 255 S.C. 1, 177 S.E.2d 5 (1970). Seaside adduced evidence of several circumstances supporting an inference that the clubhouse fire was started by a batte......
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Harris Cattle Co. v. Parker, No. 73--257
...and circumstances of the case. Mize v. Sangamo Electric Co., 251 S.C. 250, 161 S.E.2d 846.' See also Rollins v. Wunda Weve Carpet Co., 255 S.C. 1, 177 S.E.2d We conclude that the Commission in the case at bar had a right to consider all the evidence before it in determining the causal relat......
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Carter v. Anderson Memorial Hosp., No. 0360
...conflict with medical testimony. Miller v. Atlantic Bottling Corp., 259 S.C. 278, 191 S.E.2d 518 (1972); Rollins v. Wunda Weve Carpet Co., 255 S.C. 1, 177 S.E.2d 5 (1970). Cf. Gambrell v. Burleson, 252 S.C. 98, 165 S.E.2d 622 (1969) (where plaintiff is in good health prior to an injury and ......
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Garner v. Houck, No. 23921
...47.03 (1992). Statutory rules of construction may be applied Page 850 to the construction of court rules. Rollins v. Wunda Weve Carpet Co. 255 S.C. 1, 177 S.E.2d 5 The text of Rule 3(b) is not limited to absent defendants and contains no ambiguity. Conversely, construction of the heading as......
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Seaside Resorts, Inc. v. Club Car, Inc., No. 1794
...evidence. See, Fowler-Barham Ford v. Indiana Lumbermens Mutual, 45 N.C.App. 625, 263 S.E.2d 825 (1980); Rollins v. Wunda Weve Carpet Co., 255 S.C. 1, 177 S.E.2d 5 (1970). Seaside adduced evidence of several circumstances supporting an inference that the clubhouse fire was started by a batte......
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Harris Cattle Co. v. Parker, No. 73--257
...and circumstances of the case. Mize v. Sangamo Electric Co., 251 S.C. 250, 161 S.E.2d 846.' See also Rollins v. Wunda Weve Carpet Co., 255 S.C. 1, 177 S.E.2d We conclude that the Commission in the case at bar had a right to consider all the evidence before it in determining the causal relat......
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Carter v. Anderson Memorial Hosp., No. 0360
...conflict with medical testimony. Miller v. Atlantic Bottling Corp., 259 S.C. 278, 191 S.E.2d 518 (1972); Rollins v. Wunda Weve Carpet Co., 255 S.C. 1, 177 S.E.2d 5 (1970). Cf. Gambrell v. Burleson, 252 S.C. 98, 165 S.E.2d 622 (1969) (where plaintiff is in good health prior to an injury and ......
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Garner v. Houck, No. 23921
...47.03 (1992). Statutory rules of construction may be applied Page 850 to the construction of court rules. Rollins v. Wunda Weve Carpet Co. 255 S.C. 1, 177 S.E.2d 5 The text of Rule 3(b) is not limited to absent defendants and contains no ambiguity. Conversely, construction of the heading as......