Rolo v. Goers
| Decision Date | 04 November 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 91-2330,91-2330 |
| Citation | 174 Wis.2d 709,497 N.W.2d 724 |
| Parties | Donald J. ROLO, Petitioner-Respondent, v. H. David GOERS, Director, Winnebago Mental Health Institute, Gerald Whitburn, Secretary, Department of Health and Social Services and Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services, Respondents-Appellants, Peter Desantis, Chief Executive Officer of North Central Community Services Program and North Central Community Services Program, Respondents-Respondents. . Oral Argument |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
For respondents-appellants the cause was argued by F. Thomas Creeron, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom on the brief was James E. Doyle, Atty. Gen.
For the petitioner-respondent there was a brief by Kate Kruse Livermore and Legal Assistance To Institutionalized Person Program, Madison, and oral argument by Ms. Kruse.
For the respondents-respondents there was a brief (in the court of appeals) by William C. Hess, Calvin R. Dexter and Hess, Daubert, Dexter and Reinertson, S.C. and oral argument by Calvin R. Dexter.
A judgment of the circuit court for Winnebago County declared that the Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS) is responsible for funding the court ordered conditions of release for Donald J. Rolo (Rolo), an individual ordered conditionally released from the Winnebago Mental Health Institute (Institute). The DHSS appeals arguing that counties always have been and continue to be financially responsible for their residents on conditional release. We disagree. We hold that the DHSS bears the responsibility for funding the conditions of release for indigent persons conditionally released from mental health institutions pursuant to sec. 971.17(2), Stats. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court.
We further conclude that this decision applies to those persons currently under orders for conditional release who are still institutionalized, as well as to those already in release programs presently funded by their counties who will have future expenditures requiring funding.
The relevant facts are undisputed. In January, 1989, Rolo, a Langlade County resident, was found not guilty of a felony by reason of mental disease or defect and committed to the Winnebago Mental Health Institute pursuant to sec. 971.17, Stats. 1987-88 1. In July, 1989, Rolo was granted conditional release under sec. 971.17(2). 2 The conditions of Rolo's release included placement at a group home or residential facility that is able to monitor compliance with the administration of his medication. Neither the DHSS nor North Central Community Services Program (County) was willing to pay for the funding required to implement the conditions of Rolo's release, and as a result, Rolo remained at the Institute while the two entities debated the financial issue.
In May, 1991, almost two years after the court order for conditional release, Rolo filed a habeas corpus petition and request for declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, Rolo sought a declaration of liability for payment of his placement costs, an order requiring his placement in an appropriate setting, or an order for his unconditional release from Winnebago Mental Health Institute. The circuit court granted the declaratory judgment placing the financial burden on the DHSS for the cost of mental health care and placement set forth in the conditional release order. The DHSS appealed. We accepted the certification of this case from the court of appeals pursuant to sec. (Rule) 809.61, Stats., to resolve the following issue: "Is the Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services or the county of residence obligated to fund court-ordered conditions of a sec. 971.17(2), Stats.1987-88 release from the Winnebago Mental Health Institute?"
The DHSS argues that counties are statutorily obligated to provide transitional services such as group placement, residential treatment and associated mental health care to their residents under ch. 51, Stats., even if the recipient arrives at that situation through a criminal proceeding under sec. 971.17 and a later conditional release under sec. 971.17(2). The County argues that since the circumstances are criminal rather than civil mental health, ch. 51 does not apply to persons conditionally released under sec. 971.17(2). The County contends that the circuit court was correct in its decision placing financial responsibility with the DHSS, pursuant to sec. 971.17(2). In addition, Rolo filed a brief in this case arguing that sec. 971.17(2) must be construed to place responsibility on some governmental entity to provide the funds necessary to effectuate the conditional release of indigent persons. According to Rolo, if a governmental entity is not held responsible, the provisions of the statute are rendered meaningless and unconstitutional. Rolo does not take a position as to which entity is financially responsible.
We agree with the County that under sec. 971.17, Stats., the DHSS is financially responsible to fund conditions set forth under an order for conditional release of an indigent person. Because we conclude that a statutorily mandated source for funding exists, we do not address Rolo's constitutional arguments.
Resolution of this action depends upon statutory interpretation of legislative mandates respecting financial responsibility for individuals conditionally released under sec. 971.17(2), Stats. Statutory construction is a question of law which this court decides de novo without deference to the decisions of the lower courts. Eby v. Kozarek, 153 Wis.2d 75, 450 N.W.2d 249 (1990). "The cardinal rule in all statutory interpretation, as this court has often said, is to discern the intent of the legislature." Scott v. First State Ins. Co., 155 Wis.2d 608, 612, 456 N.W.2d 152 (1990). This court ascertains that intent by examining the language of the statute and the scope, history, context, subject matter and purpose of the statute. Id. See also Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Smith, 154 Wis.2d 199, 226, 453 N.W.2d 856 (1990).
Section 971.17, Stats., provides in relevant part:
(1) When a defendant is found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, the court shall order him to be committed to the department to be placed in an appropriate institution for custody, care and treatment until discharged as provided in this section.
(2) A reexamination of a defendant's mental condition may be had as provided in s. 51.20(16).... If the court is satisfied that the defendant may be safely discharged or released without danger to himself or herself or to others, it shall order the discharge of the defendant or order his or her release on such conditions as the court determines to be necessary. If it is not so satisfied, it shall recommit him or her to the custody of the department. 3
Subsection (1) of the statute provides that a person is committed to the department for the appropriate custody, care and treatment until discharged. The DHSS concedes that persons committed under sec. 971.17 are originally its responsibility, and it is liable for the cost while a person is committed to it for placement in an appropriate institution. The DHSS argues, however, that conditional release terminates a person's commitment to the DHSS, thus relieving it of any financial responsibility for further care, custody or treatment. We disagree. The DHSS's interpretation of the statute is inconsistent with the language found in subsection (2) which provides that a court "shall order the discharge of the defendant or order his or her ..." conditional release. Section 971.17(2) (Emphasis added). Under sec. 971.17(2), conditional release is made an alternative to discharge, thus indicating that an individual conditionally released is not "discharged" and therefore remains the DHSS's responsibility. Section 971.17(2) mandates conditional release if the person, who would still be under commitment to the DHSS, may be safely released on conditions. As the circuit court in this case indicated, the necessary implication of sec. 971.17 is that the DHSS must bear the financial responsibility for the conditional release.
Moreover, that the DHSS is financially responsible during the entire period of commitment makes sense in light of the following facts: (1) the State made the decision to charge the person with a criminal offense; (2) the State tried the person for the criminal offense; (3) the State, through the state court system, ordered the person committed to the DHSS; and (4) the person remains under the custody, care and treatment of the State (i.e., the DHSS) until discharged.
In addition, the purpose behind conditional release supports our conclusion that the statutory provision which provides for release, sec. 971.17, Stats., also provides for the entity which is financially responsible. See Belleville State Bank v. Steele, 117 Wis.2d 563, 570, 345 N.W.2d 405 (1984) () By its very provisions, it is evident that the conditional release statute is, at least in part, a legislative judgment that it is beneficial to society and to individuals in institutions to move people out of institutions into community group homes where they can obtain help in adjusting to life outside the institution. If the statute did not provide for conditional release, people would reach their mandatory release dates and be released into the community with no help whatsoever. We agree with Rolo that in enacting the conditional release provisions of sec. 971.17(2), the legislature must have provided for some governmental entity to fund residential placements and other services, or the entire process would be rendered meaningless for many of the criminal committees who are indigent. We conclude that the legislative mandate is provided in sec....
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