Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Kan. City in Kan. v. City of Mission Woods

Decision Date30 August 2018
Docket NumberCase No. 17-2186-DDC
Citation337 F.Supp.3d 1122
Parties ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHDIOCESE OF KANSAS CITY IN KANSAS and Saint Rose Philippine Duchesne Catholic Church, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF MISSION WOODS, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Kansas

Eric V. Hall, Pro Hac Vice, Ian S. Speir, Pro Hac Vice, Lewis Roca Rothgerber Christie LLP, Colorado Springs, CO, Jeanne Gorman, Jeanne Gorman Rau LLC, Overland Park, KS, for Plaintiffs.

Heather S. Esau Zerger, Zerger & Mauer LLP, Mimi E. Doherty, Tanya M. Rodecker Wendt, Deacy & Deacy, LLP, Kansas City, MO, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Daniel D. Crabtree, United States District JudgeThis lawsuit brings the court a dispute that pits two important values in the American experience against one another: "free exercise of religion and effective use by the state of its police powers." Messiah Baptist Church v. Cty. of Jefferson, Colo. , 859 F.2d 820, 823 (10th Cir. 1988) (noting the "particular protection" accorded to religious freedom by our Constitution but also noting, "The power of local governments to zone and control land is undoubtedly broad"). Over the years, Congress and the Supreme Court have rearranged the balance that courts must strike when deciding cases involving these two values.

The current disagreement involves a recurring situation, one that requires courts to find the proper balance between these two competing values. Specifically, the parties dispute whether a municipality's exercise of its zoning power infringed on a church's religious freedom. Plaintiffs—the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Kansas City in Kansas and St. Rose Philippine Duchesne Catholic Church—asked the City of Mission Woods, Kansas for permission to convert a single-family house into a meeting house to serve the needs of a growing congregation. The City of Mission Woods—defendant here—refused and cited local zoning laws as its reason. Plaintiffs then filed this suit, arguing that defendant's zoning decision violates federal and state laws protecting religious exercise.

The parties now have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. See Docs. 39 (defendant's motion), 41 (plaintiffs' motion). The United States also has weighed in, filing an amicus brief, as allowed by 28 U.S.C. § 517. Doc. 57. It opposes defendant's motion, at least in part. Having reviewed the filings, the court is prepared to decide the motions. The court denies plaintiffs' motion and grants defendant's motion in part and denies it in part. After setting forth the facts that govern these motions, the court explains its reasoning, below.

I. Facts1

The facts recited in this section are uncontroverted.

A. Defendant and its Zoning Ordinances

Defendant is a Kansas municipality located in Johnson County, Kansas. It borders Kansas City, Missouri, along the eastern border of Kansas. Its boundaries occupy 60 acres of land and 180 persons reside within the city. Eighty single-family houses, four commercial buildings, the St. Rose Church, Pembroke Hill School's athletic fields, and a parking lot owned by the University of Kansas Hospital Authority are situated on the property within the city.

The city has three different zoning districts that matter to this case. First, it has a "Single Family Residential District." Properties in this district only can be used for single-family houses and certain "public" or "semipublic" uses. Approved "public" and "semipublic" uses include athletic fields, churches and synagogues, community centers, libraries, parks, police stations, schools, and swimming pools. Before anyone can initiate a public use of land within the Residential District, both the City Plan Commission and City Council must approve the public use. As a prerequisite to approving a public or semipublic use, these bodies must find that:

1. The use does not materially damage or curtail the appropriate use of the neighboring property.
2. The use is compatible with the general character of the district.
3. The use does not jeopardize the public health, safety or welfare.
4. The use does not violate the general spirit and intent of the zoning ordinance and is compatible with the long-range plan used as a guide for the development of the City.
5. Adequate hard surfaced, all weather, dustless, off-street parking space is provided for the employees and patrons of the use.
6. Any other ordinance to the contrary notwithstanding, peripheral landscape screening and/or walls, and/or fences are provided at least six feet in height of sufficient depth to adequately screen the view of all proposed structures and parking facilities during the four seasons of the year from all abutting properties zoned for or developed with residential structures.
7. Structures and off-street parking areas, taken as a whole, do not occupy more than 60% of the building site, and at least 40% of the site is maintained as open, unobstructed green space.
8. Vehicular access to the use is provided only from a major thoroughfare or trafficway unless specifically waived by the City Council.
9. A landscape plan and construction details for walls and/or fences accompany the development plan and have been approved by the City Plan Commission and the City Architect.

Doc. 47-6 at 213 (Defendant City Code § 12-402(b) ).

The defendant municipality has approved a public use in the Residential District just once, when Pembroke Hill School asked to use an empty lot as a soccer practice field. Pembroke Hill is a private, secular school with its main campus in Kansas City, Missouri—literally, just across the street that divides the defendant municipality and the State of Missouri. Before 1999, Pembroke Hill had owned land within defendant's city limits that it used as a parking lot and for athletic fields. In 1999, Pembroke Hill acquired an empty field. This field adjoined the school's existing athletic fields and parking lot. All this property sits near single-family houses located in the Residential District. One can access the school's parking lot, the original athletic field, and the empty lot acquired in 1999 only from State Line Road—a busy public thoroughfare that divides Kansas and Missouri. Pembroke Hill hoped to use the empty lot to host soccer practices, but the lot was located in defendant's Residential District. Because that use amounted to a public use, the school had to secure defendant's approval before it could use the empty lot for soccer practices. Pembroke Hill formally applied for approval of this public use, and defendant conducted a series of public meetings to consider its request. During these meetings, several residents expressed concerns about the noise and light the field would generate. So, Pembroke Hill agreed to limit the lot/practice field's use to children between four and seven years old. The school also agreed to: (a) limit the hours the field could be used; (b) refrain from erecting lights or permanent goals on the field; and (c) avoid using loud speakers or whistles. Defendant then approved Pembroke Hill's request for a public use.

The second pertinent zoning district used by defendant is called the "Planned Recreation District." Defendant allows properties in this district to be used as athletic fields for amateur athletes; tennis courts; trails for running, walking, or biking; permanent restrooms; and storage facilities that support any of these uses. Any landowner who plans to devote land to one of the uses approved for the Planned Recreation District must apply for approval from the City Plan Commission and City Council. And those bodies can approve such an application only if they conclude that:

1. The use does not materially damage or curtail the appropriate use of neighboring property.
2. The use is compatible with the general character of the district.
3. The use does not jeopardize the public health, safety and welfare.
4. The use does not violate the general spirit and intent of the zoning ordinance and is compatible with the long-range plan used as a guide for the development of the City.
5. Adequate hard surfaced, all weather, dustless off-street parking [space] is provided for the patrons of the use.

Id. at 240 (Defendant City Code § 12-405(b) ).

Defendant created the Planned Recreation District in 2006 when Pembroke Hill asked to rezone its land. Defendant approved Pembroke Hill's application, making all the school's property within defendant's municipal boundaries part of the Planned Recreation District. After defendant rezoned Pembroke Hill's land, Pembroke Hill asked defendant if it could place a soccer field and tennis courts on its property, near two houses on 51st Street—a cul-de-sac. As required by defendant's ordinance governing the Planned Recreation District, the City Plan Commission and City Council considered the school's application and held meetings so that citizens could voice support for or objections to the project. At these meetings, the owners of the homes next to the proposed tennis courts voiced concerns about their privacy. In response, Pembroke Hill agreed to plant privacy trees to shield the tennis courts from the homes. And Pembroke Hill agreed never to erect lights on or cover the tennis courts in response to concerns about light and noise emanating from the courts. After making these stipulations, defendant approved Pembroke Hill's application.

In 2012, Pembroke Hill asked defendant to allow it to expand its usage of its property in the Planned Recreation District. Specifically, the school sought to expand its existing soccer field to regulation size and construct a permanent restroom and storage facility on the property. Pembroke Hill agreed to limit the hours when it could use these fields and the permissible volume of noise emanating from them. Defendant intended to enforce these limitations by enforcing its existing noise ordinance. In October 2016—shortly after defendant approved Pembroke Hill's 2012 request—defendant amended its noise ordinance.2 At least one member of the City Plan Commission does not recall...

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