Roman v. Morconava Grp.

• Docket Number: Civil Action 22-cv-0907-WJM-SKC
• Decision Date: 24 July 2023
• Parties: RAMON ROMAN, on his own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. MORCONAVA GROUP, LLC, d/b/a SANTIAGO'S MEXICAN RESTAURANT, SANTIAGO'S MEXICAN RESTAURANT, and CARMEN MORALES, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Colorado

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RAMON ROMAN, on his own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. MORCONAVA GROUP, LLC, d/b/a SANTIAGO'S MEXICAN RESTAURANT, SANTIAGO'S MEXICAN RESTAURANT, and CARMEN MORALES, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 22-cv-0907-WJM-SKC

United States District Court, D. Colorado

July 24, 2023

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' EARLY MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

WILLIAM J. MARTÍNEZ SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is Defendants Morconava Group, LLC d/b/a Santiago's Mexican Restaurant, Santiago's Mexican Restaurant, and Carmen Morales (collectively “Defendants”) Early Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (“Motion”). (ECF No. 22.) Plaintiff Ramon Roman filed a response (ECF No. 23), and Defendants filed a reply (ECF No. 24). Because Defendants raised what could be considered a new argument in their reply brief, the Court permitted Plaintiff to file a sur-reply. (ECF Nos. 25 29.) For the following reasons, the Motion is granted.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is warranted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-50 (1986). A fact is “material” if, under the relevant substantive law, it is essential to proper disposition of the claim. Wright v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 259 F.3d 1226, 1231-32 (10th Cir. 2001). An issue is “genuine” if the evidence is such that it might lead a reasonable trier of fact to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Allen v. Muskogee, 119 F.3d 837, 839 (10th Cir. 1997).

In analyzing a motion for summary judgment, a court must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). In addition, the Court must resolve factual ambiguities against the moving party, thus favoring the right to a trial. See Houston v. Nat'l Gen. Ins. Co., 817 F.2d 83, 85 (10th Cir. 1987).

II. MATERIAL FACTS^[1]

Plaintiff was employed by Morconava Group, LLC from approximately July 2018 through January 21, 2022 as a cook at its restaurant located at 6365 E. Hampden Ave., Denver, Colorado 80222. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 1, 5.)

Plaintiff's second claim alleges violation of the Colorado Minimum Wage Act (“CMWA”), C.R.S. § 8-6-101, et. seq. as implemented by 7 C.C.R. 1103-1 (renamed the Colorado Overtime and Minimum Pay Standards Order (“COMPS Order”)) and predecessor Wage Orders. (Id. ¶¶ 72-76.) In his second claim, Plaintiff seeks to recover unpaid overtime wages arising from work performed between January 1, 2018 and January 21, 2022.^[2](Id. ¶ 65.)

Plaintiff's fifth claim alleges violation of the COMPS Order and predecessor Wage Orders, 7 C.C.R. 1103-1. (ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 112-15.) In his fifth claim, Plaintiff seeks recovery of unpaid minimum and overtime wages arising from mandatory rest breaks denied between April 14, 2016 and the present, on behalf of himself and a class of similarly situated individuals. (Id. ¶¶ 104-06).

III. ANALYSIS

The sole dispute raised in the Motion concerns the applicable statute of limitations governing Plaintiff's claims 2 and 5. The CMWA (which is implemented through the relevant Colorado Minimum Wage Orders and COMPS Orders) does not contain its own statute of limitations. Balle-Tun v. Zeng & Wong, Inc., 2022 WL 1521767, at *2 (D. Colo. May 13, 2022). Further, the applicable minimum wage orders and COMPS Orders do not expressly provide a statute of limitations for bringing a private right of action. See id. The CMWA is codified in Article 6 of Title 8. Id. at *3. Article 6, on which Plaintiff relies to support his second and fifth claims for relief, does not contain a specific limitations period. On all of this, it appears, the parties agree. (See ECF No. 22 at 4; ECF No. 23 at 2.)

However, they do dispute what statute of limitations the Court should apply. Two (or three) Colorado statutory provisions concerning statute of limitations are relevant to resolving the Motion.^[3] On one hand, Defendants argue that C.R.S. § 13-80-102(1)(i), which provides that Colorado's two-year statute of limitations applies to “[a]ll other actions of every kind for which no other period of limitation is provided,” applies to claims 2 and 5. (ECF No. 24 at 2.)

On the other hand, Plaintiff argues that C.R.S. § 13-80-103.5(1)(a) applies. (ECF Nos. 23, 29.) That section provides that

(1) [t]he following actions shall be commenced within six years after the cause of action accrues and not thereafter:

(a) All actions to recover a liquidated debt or an unliquidated, determinable amount of money due to the person bringing the action, all actions for the enforcement of rights set forth in any instrument securing the payment of or evidencing any debt, and all actions of replevin to recover the possession of personal property encumbered under any instrument securing any debt; except that actions to recover pursuant to section 38-35-124.5(3), C.R.S., shall be commenced within one year ....

C.R.S. § 13-80-103.5(1)(a).

“[I]t is the nature of the right sued upon and not the nature of the relief demanded which governs the applicability of a statute of limitations.” McDowell v. United States, 870 P.2d 656, 661 (Colo.App. 1994). When determining which of two possibly applicable statutes of limitations applies, the Colorado Supreme Court instructs that courts consider the following rules of statutory construction: (1) a later enacted statute should be applied over an earlier enacted statute; (2) the more specific of two applicable statutes should be applied; and (3) the longer of two applicable statutes should be applied.” Reg'l Transp. Dist. v. Voss, 890 P.2d 663, 668 (Colo. 1995) (citing Dawson v. Reider, 872 P.2d 212, 214 (Colo. 1994)). However, the third rule is the “rule of last resort,” BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Patterson, 185 P.3d 811, 814 (Colo. 2008).

The Court examines the two Colorado general statutes of limitation, which both arise under title 13, article 80. Section 13-80-102 became effective on July 1, 2014, and § 13-80-103.5 became effective August 7, 2013. Thus, the former is the later-enacted statute. However, this does not end the inquiry.

Section 13-80-103.5(1)(a), which applies to “[a]ll actions to recover a liquidated debt or an unliquidated, determinable amount of money” is arguably more specific than § 13-80-102(1)(i), which is something of a catch-all limitation period for actions for which no other limitations period is provided.

In Sobolewski v. Boselli & Sons, LLC, 342 F.Supp.3d 1178 (D. Colo. 2018), United States District Judge Raymond P. Moore examined these precise statutory provisions. As in this case, the claims in Sobolewski arose by statute-Colorado Revised Statutes provisions implemented by the COMPS Order. Id. at 1188. Therefore, Judge Moore concluded that the claims in Sobolewski were “neither based in contract nor tort, making inapplicable the general limitations on actions found in Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-101 (3 years for contract actions) and Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102 (2 years for tort actions).” Id. at 1188-89. Further, Judge Moore explained that

[n]either of the parties nor the Court's research has identified a general limitations period more applicable to Plaintiff's claims than Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-103.5(1)(a), which applies to a “liquidated debt” or an “unliquidated, determinable amount.” Portercare Adventist Health Sys. v. Lego, 286 P.3d 525, 528 (Colo. 2012); Interbank Investments, L.L.C. v. Vail Valley Consol. Water Dist., 12 P.3d 1224, 1230 (Colo.App. 2000) (applying Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-103.5(1)(a)'s six-year statute of limitations where dispute was over amount of compensation owed). Because Section 13-80-103.5(1)(a) is most applicable to Plaintiff's claims under the Wage Order, and it is the longer of the potentially applicable periods of limitations, the Court relies on the “rule of last resort” and finds the longer statute of limitations should be applied to Plaintiff's claims brought pursuant to the Wage Order. Patterson, 185 P.3d 811, 81415 (Colo. 2008).

He did not, however, address § 13-80-102(1)(i) before moving on to apply § 13-80- 103.5(1)(a) under the “rule of last resort.”

Defendants argue that Judge Moore misread § 13-80-102 by finding that it applied only to contract and tort actions. (ECF No. 24 at 2.) Instead, Defendants contend that § 13-80-102 applies to “far more than just contract or tort actions,” citing subsections (b)-(k), which cover myriad actions, from all actions for strict liability, to all actions against any veterinarian, to all actions (except certain ones) for wrongful death. (Id.) Thus, Defendants assert that even if it could be said that

the COMPS Order did not specifically incorporate the two and three year statutes of limitation from C.R.S. § 8-4-122, the COMPS Order's failure to provide a limitations period is specifically addressed by C.R.S. § 13-80-102(1)(i), requiring that any claim based thereon is brought within two years. Thus, regardless of how this court reads the COMPS Order and C.R.S. § 8-6-101, et seq., the applicable statute of limitations is either two or three years.

(Id. at 3.)

The Court agrees. Although Plaintiff argues that the Court should apply § 13-80- 103.5(1)(a), the Court agrees with Judge Moore's initial observation that the claims in Sobolewski-like the claims in this case-did not arise in contract or tort; rather, they were statutory claims. The cases upon which Plaintiff relies do not apply a six-year statute of limitations to wage and...